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In Greek mythology, Antaeus was a giant encoun-
tered by Hercules. A mighty wrestler, Antaeus forced
passing strangers to wrestle with him and lolled them
when he won. The Earth was his source of superhu-
man power, and as long as he could touch the ground
he was invincible. If an opponent threw him down, he
sprang back with renewed vigor from his contact with
the Earth. Hercules was able to defeat Antaeus by
holding him in the air and strangling him.
Participants in the 1978 NASA-ASEE Engineering
Systems Design Summer Program studied the feasibili-
ty of establishing an orbiting quarantine facility where
samples returned from Mars could be analyzed. The
particular advantage in this approach is that any
pathogens the samples might contain would be less
likely to pose a hazard to Earth. Like Antaeus, for
whom the project is named, such an organism might
thrive on contact with the terrestrial biosphere. By
keeping the pathogen contained and distant, the
proposed orbiting quarantine facility would safeguard
the Earth from possible contamination.
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Preface
On several occasions, both before and after the two
unmanned Viking spacecraft successfully landed on
Mars and earned out their extensive suite of experi-
ments, NASA conducted studies aimed at defining
mission requirements for the unmanned return to
Earth of Martian soil samples. All aspects of such a
Mars sample return (MSR) mission were considered,
including mission profile, vehicle design, flight trajec-
tories, scientific analysis of the returned samples, and
planetary quarantine or planetary protection (PP)
factors. During the course of these studies it became
clear that PP factors could have a significant impact
on mission design, cost, and complexity, depending
upon how serious a concern they were judged to
represent and what means were proposed to handle
them during the course of the MSR mission.
Planetary protection factors of interest in this
context related mainly to the issue of back contamina-
tion—that is, the possibility of contamination of the
Earth's biosphere by potentially hazardous microbes
which could be present in the Martian soil samples.
Even after the Viking missions did not detect life in
the samples analyzed, there were many scientists who
felt that any samples returned from Mars should be
held in strict isolation until analyses could be per-
formed to show that the soil was free of hazardous
species.
As part of these MSR mission design studies, related
studies were earned out to find solutions to the
potential back-contamination problem. Options stud-
ied ranged from the extreme proposal of stenhzing the
sample in transit, before it reached the vicinity of the
Earth, to simply housing the sample in a special Earth
laboratory similar to the Lunar Receiving Laboratory.
Consideration was also given to isolating the sample in
a maximum containment facility like those used for
highly infectious diseases or recombmant DNA re-
search. Yet another report proposed that the best
solution was to isolate and analyze the sample in an
Earth-orbiting laboratory before certifying it safe for
release to terrestrial laboratones.
Of all the options listed above, least was known
about the latter one. Although analysis m space had
been suggested several times before, very little hard
information was available concerning the feasibility of
this approach. No studies had been done regarding
containment requirements for such a laboratory, the
development of a quarantine protocol, or even sample
handling and expenment conduct in the absence of
gravity. It was precisely these questions that were
addressed during this engineering design study.
The purpose of the design study was to examine for
the first time the feasibility of designing, constructing,
and operating a unique space-based laboratory—one
dedicated, at least initially, to the isolation and
analysis of potentially hazardous samples returned
from Mars. This report does not argue that analysis of
Mars samples should be done in space. Rather, it
defines the characteristics of an orbiting laboratory
should this be an option for active consideration for
future MSR studies. Hence, considerable effort was
devoted to development of an appropnate series of
tests to be performed on the sample (the quarantine
protocol) and to design of the facility in which these
tests would be conducted. Because of the complexity
of the system to be designed and the limited time
available to complete this study, some details and
contingencies may have received only superficial
treatment. Furthermore, the study was limited to the
design of a system presenting minimal risk, rather than
an absolutely fail-safe system able to deal with every
conceivable eventuality. We believe, nevertheless,
that this report does provide a useful analysis of the
major features and characteristics of an orbiting
quarantine facility.
The 10-week summer study was conducted at
NASA's Ames Research Center and sponsored by the
Amencan Society for Engineering Education (ASEE),
Stanford University, and NASA. The program format
followed that developed dunng previous ASEE sum-
mer studies. Some 20 scientists were selected for the
program, which is intended to be an intensive learning
experience for the participants as they work on a
system design of use to NASA. During the first 2
weeks, a series of lectures provided the basic back-
ground needed to begin the project. The next 6 weeks
were spent doing design research, individually or in
teams, on vanous subsystems of the orbiting laborato-
ry. In the final 2 weeks, the vanous subsystem designs
were integrated and the first draft of the final report
was prepared. No further design work was done
following the 10-week program, but various groups
and individuals participated in assembling and editing
this final report.
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Chapter 1
Summary
A NASA design study examined requirements for
handling extraterrestrial samples in an orbiting quar-
antine facility. The major concepts and findings of the
study are outlined in this chapter.
The Antaeus Report describes in detail one ap-
proach that could be taken for receiving, containing,
and analyzing samples returned from the surface of
Mars in a mission analogous to the lunar return
missions of the late 1960s and early 1970s. It con-
structs a general mission scenario and presents an
overall systems design, including an approach to cost
assessment. Particular attention is paid to the design of
system hardware components and to the elaboration of
an experimental protocol.
BACKGROUND
With the Viking mission to Mars, a great deal of
knowledge has been gained about the surface features
and composition of the planet. However, one of the
major questions that prompted the mission—Is there
life on Mars?—has not been conclusively answered.
Automated experiments conducted by instruments
aboard the landers did not detect organic carbon or
ongoing metabolic processes in the Martian soil, nor
did photographs of the area around the two landing
sites show any signs of life. But because of the
limitations of automated analysis, and because the
landers sampled visually only a small fraction of one
percent of the planet's surface, there can be no real
certainty that Mars, like the Moon, is devoid of
organic life.
This uncertainty means that, in the event that
samples of Martian sod are returned to Earth for
study, special precautions ought to be taken to
safeguard them. Moreover, many scientists believe
that the samples should be considered to be potential-
ly hazardous to terrestrial organisms until it has been
conclusively shown that they are not. The logical
extension of this view is that adequate precautions
should be taken to protect the Earth's biosphere until
the samples have been proved safe. The question may
then be asked, "What land of precaution constitutes
adequate precaution?"
There are three basic alternatives for handling such
a sample. The first is to sterilize the sample while it is
en route from Mars (by heat treatment, for example).
The second is to hold it under quarantine in a
maximum containment facility on Earth, possibly in a
remote location, while it is undergoing analysis. The
third is to perform hazard analysis on the sample
before it is introduced to the terrestrial biosphere. The
first two options have known advantages and disad-
vantages. Little was known about the third option.
In 1978, as part of the planning for a possible future
Mars sample return (MSR) mission, NASA convened a
summer study. The purpose of this study was to
examine the feasibility of designing, constructing, and
operating an Earth-orbiting manned laboratory facility
suitable for receiving and analyzing Martian soil
samples. The Antaeus Report presents the findings of
that study group.
THE OQF MISSION
Mission Objective
The purpose of the Orbiting Quarantine Facility
(OQF) would be to detect the presence of biologically
active agents—either life forms or uncontrolled (repli-
cating) toxins—in the sample and to assess their
potential impact on terrestrial systems. Only when the
sample could be certified safe or controllable would it
be transmitted to laboratories on Earth for physical
analysis.
The particular technical advantage of an orbiting
facility over an Earth-based one is the flexibility it
offers in the event that potentially pathogenic agents
are present in the sample. With space as a buffer
between such organisms and the terrestrial biosphere,
the risk of terrestrial contamination is far lower.
Complete characterization of the hazard such organ-
isms might represent could thus be carried out without
fear of a containment failure and possible contamina-
tion of the biosphere. Depending upon the results of
testing, the options available for subsequent disposi-
tion of the sample would include (1) unqualified
release, (2) sterilization prior to release to Earth
laboratories, (3) indefinite retention in orbit for pro-
longed study, and (4) in one extreme case, boosting the
sample-containing facility into a distant orbit. A
terrestrial quarantine facility could not offer such
margins of security.
Mission Scenario
The scenario for such a mission includes several
novel features, all of them resting upon technology
which is now available or will be available by the time
a MSR mission could take place. The OQF mission has
been designed so as to be compatible in all its
elements with the most likely MSR mission profile as
currently projected by planners at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL).
The mission plan calls for the Space Shuttle to
deliver the OQF, one or more components at a time,
into near Earth orbit, where it will be assembled and
manned. While awaiting the arrival of the Mars
sample return vehicle (MSRV), the crew will conduct
system tests and protocol review. The incoming
MSRV, bearing the sample in a sealed canister in its
crown, will be inserted into the same orbit in the
vicinity of the OQF. An orbiting transfer vehicle
comprised of an inertia! upper stage engine (IUS) and
remote-teleoperated-manipulator system (TELLE)
will then link up with the MSRV, extract the sample
canister, and deliver it to the OQF. Resupply of the
laboratory, replacement of crew members if necessary,
and eventual transport of the sample and crew to
Earth will all be earned out via the Space Shuttle.
SYSTEMS DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION
Design Options
A number of general approaches to hardware
system design were investigated. For example, the
option of developing a completely new system for the
OQF mission was analyzed in depth, and was rejected
for reasons of cost and available time. The final
determination was that the most practical and cost
effective approach would be to utilize modified
Spacelab components, principally the Spacelab pres-
sure vessel and its subsystems, to construct the OQF.
Modules
The proposed facility will consist of five Spacelab-
derived modular units, each dedicated to a specific
function or group of functions. The overall OQF will
be free-flying and will have a pinwheel configuration,
with four of the cylindrical modules connected spoke-
fashion to a central hub. Such a design produces low
aerodynamic drag and is easy to assemble; it also
allows efficient intermodule movement.
Central to the OQF mission is the Laboratory
Module, in which the quarantine testing protocol will
be earned out. This unit is equipped with a centrally
located containment cabinet system for sample han-
dling and processing. To obtain greater containment
reliability than is offered by rubber gloves, specially
designed metal bellows manipulative arms will be
employed for access to the cabinets. Provision is made
to maintain portions of the cabinetry under simulated
Martian environmental conditions, and a variety of
other controlled environments required by the proto-
col can be produced. Clean air is continuously passed
down the face of the cabinets, which are kept under
negative pressure to eliminate leakage into the
laboratory.
The high-hazard containment facility at the Center
for Disease Control (CDC) served as a model for
design of many of the physical features and procedures
employed in the Laboratory Module. Based on CDC
practices, the module itself acts as a barrier to
contamination. All equipment and materials leaving
the laboratory must be sterilized and packaged in leak-
proof containers. Personnel entering or leaving the
module must pass through a decontamination area,
where they disrobe and take an air shower. The
laboratory has independent life support, waste storage,
and air filtration systems, and its atmospheric pressure
is slightly lower than that of the other modules—all
features that ensure effective containment. It is fully
equipped for the performance of the quarantine
protocol. A variety of microscopes, including scanning
electron microscope, are provided. Cameras, spectro-
photometers, centrifuge and vacuum devices, auto-
claves, refrigerators, and all other necessary laboratory
equipment and instruments are present as well.
The Habitation Module is the crew's living quar-
ters. In addition to small, private cabin spaces, it
contains exercise and personal hygiene facilities and
provides equipment for medical support. An environ-
mental control and life support (ECLS) system housed
in this module provides waste management, atmo-
sphere regeneration, and water purification for the
entire OQF (except for the Laboratory Module, which
has an independent ECLS system so that contami-
nants can be contained within the laboratory). The
Habitation Module is also the location of a command
console that provides centralized systems control for
the overall OQF. The functions of the command
console include systems monitoring, control of both
internal and external (ground) communications, guid-
ance control, power distribution, and data handling.
The OQF's source of power is the Power Module.
By means of wing-like solar cell panels this unit is
capable of generating up to 35 kw of electric power,
which is stored in batteries for use throughout the
facility. Distribution of this energy is controlled
remotely by the command console. A second function
of the Power Module is thermal control. Heat pro-
duced throughout the system is dissipated to space by
radiators mounted on the exterior of the module,
thereby maintaining both air and equipment at desired
temperature levels. In addition to these functions, the
Power Module provides attitudinal and orbital control
for stabilizing the OQF.
A general purpose Logistics Module provides stor-
age for supplies and for waste materials generated in
the Habitation Module (the Laboratory Module has
independent waste storage). Sufficient storage space is
provided in the Logistics Module for supplies neces-
sary to support a 30-day mission.
A fifth unit, the Docking Module, serves as a
common interface linking the other four. It permits
unhindered crew access between modules, as well as
access to space through an airlock and EVA hatch.
Docking facilities for the shuttle orbiter are provided,
and the module can accommodate up to two addition-
al modules if necessary.
Personnel
The determination that the proposed OQF should
be a manned facility, rather than a completely
automated one, was based primarily on the consider-
ation that man's manipulative and judgmental skills
would be essential for experiments requiring situabon-
al decisions. Particularly in the event that life forms
are detected in the sample, the testing protocol would
require a free-form responsiveness that completely
automated systems could not provide.
The crew would probably consist of five members,
a commander (an astronaut/engineer) and four scien-
tists (a medical doctor, a geobiologist, a biochemist,
and a general biologist). Their tasks would be of two
general types: facility operation and maintenance, and
laboratory woik. The allocation of functions and the
scheduling of activities have been carefully worked
out for each crew member.
Contingency Planning
In its final design, the OQF will have redundant
systems as well as emergency procedures available in
the event of equipment or system malfunctions. If the
ECLS system in the Habitation Module were to fail,
for example, the Laboratory Module's life support
system could be interconnected with it to support the
entire facility—or the reverse. There is also a backup
ECLS in the Logistics Module that can be activated if
necessary. Similar planning has been devoted to such
eventualities as module depressurization, fire, illness of
a crew member, and containment failure.
EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
All the hardware components of the OQF system,
both modules and onboard equipment, as well as the
structuring and scheduling of the crew, are focused on
the primary mission: the performance of life-detection
and characterization tests on the quarantined sample.
The design of the experimental protocol is therefore
critical to the success of the mission.
The OQF protocol has the advantage of a prece-
dent: the lunar sample quarantine. The quarantine of
Apollo mission return samples at the Lunar Receiving
Laboratory (LRL) provided an important model for
the formulation of the experimental tests and proce-
dures to be applied to Martian soil samples. It also
provided insights into ways to avoid some of the many
problems that may emerge during a quarantine
mission.
A number of factors impact the experimental
design. For example, the protocol must take into
account the limited amount of sample available for
testing (probably about 100 g). In addition, it must
ensure that the untested portion of the sample remains
unaltered. It must include a sufficient range of tests to
allow biologically active agents to be detected with a
high degree of confidence. Equipment and experi-
ments alike must be appropriate for use in the zero-g
environment. The potential for human error must be
minimal. And there must be enough flexibility de-
signed into the protocol to permit a thorough charac-
terization of life forms that might not closely resemble
terrestrial forms.
The proposed quarantine testing procedure meets
those criteria. It consists of five separate phases or
analytical approaches, with data from each contribut-
ing to a comprehensive assessment of the sample
material. Individual tests are specified in detail to
permit assessment of engineering feasibility, equip-
ment requirements, etc. Decisions about the subse-
quent course of sample disposition will rest on the
outcome of this overall analysis.
Preliminary Handling
The protocol begins with receipt of the sample
canister from the IUS-TELLE. A collapsible structure
in the OQF guides the transfer vehicle into position so
that a trigger mechanism and clamp can acquire the
canister and draw it into the OQF's airlock. The
sample canister is punctured with a needle and a
sample of the gas within the canister is taken. A
mechanism similar to a can opener then removes the
bottom of the canister so that further gas sampling and
removal of a subsample can take place. The subsam-
ple, consisting of approximately 100 g (or 10 percent)
of the returned sample, is first analyzed for radioactiv-
ity and then transferred by a manipulator to a sample
processing unit.
This unit is specially designed to permit the
subsample to be manipulated in the absence of
gravity, by means of centrifugal force. In the process-
ing unit, the sample is sized and larger particles are
viewed under a stereomicroscope to determine wheth-
er organisms or fossils are present. The larger-sized
material is then evenly ground and the entire subsam-
ple is recombined and mixed. This mixture is dis-
pensed to the five testing phases. Of the 100 g
subsample, 46 g will be used in the various tests; 54 g
will be held in reserve for possible further series of
tests. The remaining 900 g of sample material is stored,
unopened, under Martian environmental conditions
for later delivery to Earth (if approved).
The Testing Protocol
The five testing phases, and the specific experi-
ments they include, are:
• Chemical analysis
— pH, Eh, and conductance tests
— aqueous extraction/element analysis
— organic mass spectrometry
— ammo acid analysis
• Microscopy
— stereomicroscopic examination
— scanning electron microscopy
— light microscope examination
— ultraviolet microscopy
• Metabolic testing
— gas exchange: dry
— CO2 fixation: dry and moist
— enriched O 2 metabolism
— autoradiography of labeled samples
• Microbiological culturing
— growth on solid media
— impedance changes in liquid media
• Challenge culture.
The challenge culture phase involves the introduc-
tion of Martian soil into cell cultures representing a
cross section of terrestrial species. Although a number
of organisms have already been tested in zero g to
date, additional research is necessary to determine the
most appropriate species to include in the challenge
system. Such organisms must not only be representa-
tive of the Earth's major phyla, but must also have a
minimal reaction to zero g.
If results of the preceding series of tests show no
evidence of nonterrestrial life forms or replicating
toxins, the sample will be approved for delivery to
Earth, where more extensive physical, chemical, and
biological studies will be undertaken. However, in the
event that biological agents have been detected, a
second order of tests would be initiated. The precise
character of second-order testing cannot be estab-
lished in advance. The type of tests would be
determined on the basis of characteristics such organ-
isms or toxins might present.
Protocol Planning
The protocol is a complex network of interdepen-
dent tests, with many activities being dependent upon
the outcome of previous tests. To illustrate the
sequence of events in the protocol, a tracking tech-
nique known as Graphical Evaluation and Review
Technique (GERT) is used. GERT charts present test
activities and information flows in their proper
sequence, and use GERT symbology to indicate the
logic that determines each protocol step. By this
means, it is possible to calculate the probabilities
associated with different experimental outcomes, and
thus to calculate the detection sensitivity of various
tests. Detailed GERT charts are presented for each
testing phase, along with tables of associated outcome
probability analyses.
SYSTEM COST ASSESSMENT
The cost of designing and building the OQF,
launching it, and carrying out the quarantine mission
is difficult to estimate with any certainty, particularly
since the impact of certain variables (such as overall
mission length) cannot be predicted. Moreover, a
detailed and accurate cost analysis was not a prime
objective of the design study. However, a method for
estimating costs is presented, based largely on previous
cost-estimate calculations for similar system concepts.
The approach involves a breakdown of the mission
itself into separate phases: design, development, test-
ing, and evaluation (DDT&E); production; and opera-
tions. A work breakdown structure is used to subdi-
vide each phase into particular activities and hardware
procurements. These expenditures are then spread out
over the time period in which they will be required.
Since overall mission length is uncertain, costs are
expressed on the basis of two possible mission scenar-
ios: a maximum mission length of 6V2 years, and a
minimum mission length of 2 years.
ADDITIONAL USES OF THE OQF
Beyond its value in a Mars sample return mission,
this facility has great potential value for use in
subsequent long-term studies in space. With its
modular construction it is structurally adaptable to a
variety of needs. As equipped, the Laboratory Module
already contains most of the instruments required to
support life sciences study programs. The other OQF
modules, by contrast, are independent of the mission
type and mission objectives that they support. They
can be docked with modules dedicated to any
purpose.
Currently planned Spacelab missions will have a 7-
day duration. The OQF could offer much longer times
in orbit for investigation of such questions as the effect
of zero g on processes in developmental biology, and
biomedical studies of weightlessness. The superior
containment afforded by an OQF could make it
attractive as a site for the pursuit of currently
prohibited recombinant DNA research or other re-
search on hazardous systems. Research on the manage-
ment and processing of materials in space is yet
another area that could benefit from the availability of
a long-term base in space.
CONCLUSION
The facility and the experimental protocol de-
scribed here offer a strong margin of protection
against the possibility that a Mars sample would
contain hazardous agents. They also offer a powerful
hedge against the unknown, and against the fears that
could easily develop if organisms showing signs of
pathogemcity were detected in a sample undergoing
study in a laboratory on Earth. With such a sample
held in orbit, its disposition could be determined on
the basis of analysis rather than emotion, and the
scientific value of the returned sample could thus be
maximized.
The Antaeus Report represents a thoroughgoing
study of a facility and a protocol capable of accom-
plishing such a mission. In the event that a Mars
sample return mission takes place, the report will
provide decision makers with a basis for judging the
merits of this option.
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Chapter 2
Mission Perspectives
The advancement of scientific knowledge through
space exploration continues to be one of the funda-
mental goals of an active national space program. In
pursuit of this goal over the past 18 years, NASA has
conducted a highly successful program of planetary
investigation. As in any research, however, the value
and quantity of information that can be gained is
limited by the kind of investigative techniques em-
ployed. Thus, while telescopic and even fly-by exami-
nation of planetary objects (e.g., Mercury, Venus,
Mars, Jupiter, the asteroids, and—most recently—
Saturn) has provided some data on their general
characteristics, numerous questions concerning sur-
face composition and environment remain
unanswered.
Perhaps of all the planets, Mars has stimulated the
most interest in its nature and composition. Curiosity
about this planet has touched the public as well as the
scientific community. Because of its relative proximity
to Earth, telescopic and other examinations of Mars
have been particularly rewarding. But, again, these
techniques have had limitations. The questions left
unresolved by remote investigations prompted a sec-
ond phase of planetary reconnaissance: the landing of
an automated instrument package on the planet to
transmit information back to Earth. The Viking
mission to the surface of Mars has now been success-
fully concluded, and has provided a wealth of pictures
and data on surface features in the vicinity of the
landers.
In any area of scientific investigation, however, the
acquisition of additional knowledge always stimulates
new questions. The Viking mission was no exception.
By providing so much information, it has opened
whole new areas of research that were previously not
apparent. In addition, while the Viking experiments
did not indicate the presence of life, that question
cannot yet be considered settled. It is still possible that
organisms are present on the planet but were not
detected by the automated test equipment (ref. 1).
Thus, to advance our understanding of the physical
science (and, possibly, the biological science) of our
solar system, the next phase of Martian research must
involve a thorough, detailed investigation of surface
material from Mars.
A manned voyage that would last several years is
well beyond the scope of practicability in the immedi-
ate term; furthermore, unless the astronauts were able
to perform extensive scientific experiments on the
planet's surface, their primary function on such a
mission would be to collect samples for return to
Earth. However, man is not essential for sample
collection. Expenence with the Viking and the Soviet
Luna 16 spacecraft has shown that automated docu-
mentation, sampling, collection, and return of surface
material to Earth (Luna 16) can be carried out.
Because of the detailed chemical and mineralogical
experiments that must be performed on Martian
materials, returning samples to Earth laboratories is
the preferred means of thoroughly analyzing Martian
soil. Sample return is considered to be the best option
for conducting an intensive search for Martian life
forms (living or fossilized) or determining, in their
absence, why Martian life failed to evolve. The results
of analyses conducted in a laboratory by trained
investigators will be far more conclusive than results
obtained by automated means in a mission such as
Viking.
Recognizing the potential for a Mars sample return
(MSR) mission, NASA planners have developed the
preliminary design concepts for MSR vehicles and
equipment. As this planning evolves, parallel plans for
receiving and handling the samples on Earth must be
developed. Because there is still a possibility of Me on
Mars (ref. 1), there is also a possibility that these
organisms could find a suitable niche on Earth and
somehow upset the terrestrial ecosystem. While the
existence on Mars of organisms that are pathogenic for
humans is the most often cited fear, the existence of
organisms that are pathogenic to, or would displace,
certain terrestrial rmcrobial or botanical forms could
be of equal consequence to man. Thus, prior to the
release of Martian samples, it will have to be deter-
mined either that they are free of life forms or that any
forms of life that are present are not harmful to
terrestrial life.
This study suggests handling the Martian samples
by requiring that they be subjected to a complex
protocol designed to detect life, which, if present, will
then be assessed for its effects on terrestrial life forms.
Sample testing must be performed within facilities
that ensure that such Martian organisms cannot be
accidentally introduced to Earth's biosphere during
the assessment process. This study represents a thor-
ough analysis and descnption of an Orbiting Quaran-
tine Facility (OQF) designed to permit the detection
and characterization of Martian life forms while
affording the Earth and its inhabitants the maximum
level of protection.
INTRODUCTION OF ALIEN SPECIES
An alien species usually will not survive when
introduced into a new ecosystem because it is unable
to compete with native species which are better
adapted to the environment Occasionally, however,
introduced species flourish because the physical envi-
ronment is ideal and indigenous species are not able to
defend against the foreign life forms. When this
occurs, the result may be an irreversible perturbation
of the ecosystem, with severe environmental and,
often, economic consequences. Indeed, modern socie-
ties have in many instances been profoundly affected
by the accidental yet successful introduction of alien
species into new areas
The introduction of alien species is not in itself
undesirable. For example, the cultivation of countless
European and Asian fruits and vegetables in the
United States has resulted in economic and social gain
sufficient to easily offset the ecological and cultural
turmoil caused by their introduction. In other cases,
the introduction may have little noticeable effect, such
as the northern range expansion of the armadillo
However, it is apparent that there is always a finite
risk involved in introducing a new organism into an
existing ecosystem.
Often, the alien organisms that cause species
destruction are microbiological forms that, while
nonfatal in their native habitat, in a new habitat
become unrelenting killers of hosts not adapted to
them. For example, the chance introduction of a
fungus (Endothia parasitica) into New York at the turn
of the century resulted in the total obliteration of the
American Chestnut tree (ref. 2). Extinction of this
tree, which had been one of the dominant members of
American forests, had a profound effect on the
ecosystem and resulted in immeasurable economic and
aesthetic loss. A similar, though slower, destruction
can be seen today: Elm trees are being lolled by a
fungus introduced into this country early in the
century. Human societies as well have fallen victim to
organisms against which they were defenseless; an
example is the rapid spread of diseases transmitted to
American Indians and Polynesians by European set-
tlers in previous centuries (ref. 3).
An alien organism need not infect man directly to
exact a large toll in human life and social upheaval.
When the potato blight fungus (Phytaphthora infes-
tans) was introduced into Europe, it spread through-
out the Continent and the British Isles within a year.
In Ireland, where the potato comprised a significant
fraction of the total food supply for the populace,
within 5 years over 1 million people starved to death
and at least as many were forced to emigrate (ref. 4).
Obviously, before any species is intentionally intro-
duced into a new environment, it is essential to
determine whether the organism is pathogenic to any
indigenous species. It is equally important, however,
to determine whether the organism will be able to
force out existing species, thereby upsetting the
ecosystem. For example, the planting of Punkwood
trees and Australian pines was intentionally encour-
aged in Florida by the U S. Department of Agricul-
ture. Although the trees were not pathogens, their
effect was nevertheless detrimental to the environ-
ment. They quickly flourished, replacing countless
acres of otherwise economically valuable trees. Costly
attempts at controlling their spread have proved to be
of httle value. Examples of successful competition can
also be drawn from the animal kingdom Fire ants and
"killer" bees are not considered pathogens, but their
aggressive behavior and rapid spread have created
economic and social problems, the full impact of
which is yet to be determined. The introduction of
rabbits into Australia is a classic example of a
nonpathogen creating immense problems because of
high reproduction rates unchecked by natural
predators.
As illustrated in these examples, organisms that are
not pathogenic or directly harmful to any species can
have a nonetheless dramatic effect on the natural
ecosystem, with severe economic implications. They
precipitate these changes by simply flourishing in their
new environment. Therefore, both pathogemcity and
competitive viability would have to be considered
before Martian life forms were introduced into the
terrestrial biosphere.
THE VIKING RESULTS
Results from a series of experiments that were
conducted on the surface of Mars have indicated that
there is no evidence of life in the samples tested.
Close-up visual observation of the planet's surface
showed only a barren world, devoid of any larger life
forms. Images of the two lander areas recorded at 20-
day intervals showed no evidence of any objects
moving in a manner suggestive of life (ref. 5). A series
of three tests designed to detect the metabolic
reaction of microorganisms yielded results that are
more easily accounted for in terms of nonbiological
reactions (ref. 6). The absence of life indicated by
imaging and metabolic tests is further supported by
the fact that the Viking instrumentation was unable to
identify organic carbon within the sensitivity limits of
the equipment (ref. 7).
The Viking results are taken by many people as
proof that no life exists on Mars, thereby obviating
concern over back contamination of the Earth with
Martian organisms. Although this conclusion may well
be correct, a critical review of the Viking experiments
suggests that there is not yet enough evidence to
justify it. For example, one of Viking's metabolic tests
produced results that could have been caused by a
living organism (ref. 8). Furthermore, the incubation
temperatures of all the experiments deviated from
Martian ambient conditions (ref. 6), an organism with
a defined senes of environmental stimuli necessary for
germination or a specific optimum temperature essen-
tial for growth might consequently have remained
dormant and thus escaped detection. It is also conceiv-
able that the number of organisms present was low
enough to preclude detection by Viking techniques.
For example, using laboratory equipment to simulate
the Viking experiment, DeVmcenzi and Deal (ref. 9)
demonstrated that a bacterium would have to attain a
population density of at least 100 000 live bacteria per
gram of sod before its presence could be detected in
the labeled release experiment. Also, calculations
based on the sensitivity of the instrument used for
detecting organic carbon indicate that the carbon
present in 100 000 bacteria per gram of soil could have
escaped detection. When samples of soils from harsh
terrestrial environments such as Antarctica have been
examined, at times fewer than 100 living bactena per
gram of soil have been detected. However, in addition
to bacterial carbon, such terrestrial soils contain about
1000 times more organic carbon locked in nonliving
particles (ref. 7). It is conceivable that large quantities
of nonliving organic carbon do not accumulate on
Mars because of the soil chemistry, because of
ultraviolet degradation, or because such carbon is
rapidly recycled into living organisms. An alternative
hypothesis is suggested by Friedman and Ocampo's
discovery of algae sequestered within the interior of
Antarctic rocks (ref. 10). No Martian rock samples
were tested, so organisms harbored within them could
have gone undetected.
Even assuming that the Viking results conclusively
showed that life did not exist in the vicinity of the
landers, they fad to dismiss the possibility of life
hidden in or confined to a protected region of the
planet. Collectively, both landers visually sampled
about 56 km2 of the surface, or 4 X 10-' percent of the
entire planet's surface (ref. 5). The soil sampled in the
metabolic tests totaled only a few grams of material.
Principles of statistical sampling and our knowledge of
terrestrial ecosystems enable us to extrapolate this
information to a much broader region, especially since
Viking II landed about 150 km nortlTof and 11 000 km
west of Viking I. On the other hand, the regions
sampled were, by terrestrial standards, extremely
harsh, daytime high soil temperatures were -10° to
-13° C and nighttime lows were -82° to -88° C (ref.
11). Mathematical models of the temperature of Mars'
surface indicate that there are regions in the southern
hemisphere where the temperature could be expected
to be above freezing for up to 11 hours per day (ref.
12). It is possible that life may be confined to this
warmer region distant from portions of the globe
sampled by Viking. In addition, it has been speculated
that if water is the limiting factor to growth, life may
be restricted to a layer near the permafrost.
The very low soil moisture in the Viking sample
(perhaps 1 percent) (ref. 13) appears to negate the
possibility of life because current models for the
evolution of Me require larger quantities of free water.
However, indications are that water once flowed on
the planet's surface (ref. 13), so it is conceivable that
life forms developing in the seas could have gradually
evolved mechanisms to permit their survival during
the transition of Mars from what it once was—a world
with a denser atmosphere and abundant water—to its
present state. It is reasonable to hypothesize evolution-
ary progression of this type because terrestrial life
apparently began in freshwater oceans under a
reducing atmosphere and gradually evolved to survive
in all terrestrial environments, including the world's
deserts. To further illustrate the habitabihty of Mars,
data from experiments in which terrestrial organisms
were exposed to simulated Martian conditions indicate
that these terrestrial residents could survive on Mars
and, if moisture were present, could even grow (ref.
14).
Thus, although the Viking results indicate that life
was not present at the lander sites in concentrations
high enough to be detected by Viking instrumentation,
samples were not taken in locales where life may be
more likely to exist, such as more "tropical" regions,
areas near the permafrost, and protected low areas.
Because Earth organisms can survive under simulated
Martian conditions and because living organisms have
demonstrated the ability to adapt to unique and severe
environments, it is therefore not possible to rule out
native life on Mars. Consequently, an MSR mission
must continue to address the possibility of life in the
sample until tests have conclusively demonstrated the
contrary.
CHARACTERISTICS OF POTENTIAL
MARTIAN LIFE FORMS
Based on our knowledge of Mars and our under-
standing of biological mechanisms, certain characteris-
tics of potential Martian life forms can be hypotheti-
cally defined. It is then possible to determine the
potential impact that an accidental release of such
organisms would have upon the Earth's biosphere.
Because many currently accepted schemes for the
evolution of life are based on an elaboration of basic
compounds found in nonterrestrial bodies such as
meteorites, it would be reasonable to assume that
Martian life forms are carbon-based and constructed
of the same basic compounds as are Earth forms.
However, Martian organisms would have to evolve
highly efficient mechanisms for obtaining or conserv-
ing water: for example, thick walls, the production of
metabolic water, a unique means of obtaining mois-
ture from the atmosphere or frost, and the ability to
remain dormant except when water is present in
ample supply. In addition, given what we know of the
Martian environment, Martian life forms must be
anaerobic, and they must be able to survive (and
probably grow) at subfreezing temperatures.
Considering these characteristics, a general under-
standing of evolution would suggest that Martian life
forms, if they exist, are poorly adapted for growth on
Earth. But while this might be true with regard to
terrestrial environments inhabited by man, consider-
ation must be given to other terrestrial regions where a
Martian organism could possibly survive. For example,
the low moisture levels of deserts (and dehydrated
foods), the extreme cold of Arctic regions (and frozen
food lockers), and the low oxygen levels of subsoil
areas (and the interior of animal intestines) are
terrestrial environments that to some degree resemble
Martian conditions. Furthermore, it is possible that
certain Martian environmental conditions are not
essential to native Martian life, but, on the contrary,
inhibit its growth. Given the variety of Earth environ-
ments and possible Martian life characteristics, it is
impossible to identify those terrestrial habitats (if any)
that would be suitable for growth of such organisms.
Also, lacking this basic knowledge, it is difficult to
estimate with any certainty the impact of potential
Martian life forms on the Earth's ecosystem.
As was discussed earlier, terrestrial experience has
shown that the introduction of an alien organism into a
new habitat may result in disastrous consequences to
specific native species. However, the pathogenic
organisms responsible for these highly "targeted"
blights evolved in their original habitat for countless
generations with species very similar to their new
hosts. In its original habitat, the organism may have
been commensal (deriving some benefit from the host
at little or no expense to the host) or even mutualisbc
(with both members deriving benefit from the rela-
tionship). Thus, host specificity (i.e., infection of a
single host species) is the result of long periods of co-
evolution of the pathogen and host species. The more
restrictive the specificity or the more complex the
interaction of parasite and host, the longer the time
over which the co-evolution of the two species
probably occurred. For this reason, it can be assumed
that if Martian organisms exist they would be either
nonpathogenic or pathogenic with general (non-host-
specific) reactions, attacking a wide variety of terres-
trial species and even isolated cells.
Uncertainties associated with the characteristics of
possible Martian Me forms make it difficult to predict
in what habitat on Earth the organisms would flourish
and what effect their growth could have on terrestrial
species. Because the possibility of catastrophic conse-
quences cannot be dismissed on the basis of existing
information, the return of a Martian sample to Earth
poses questions of global significance.
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SOLUTIONS TO THE BACK-CONTAMINATION
PROBLEM
Sterilized Sample Return
One way to return a sample that is free of
organisms that could contaminate the Earth's bio-
sphere is to sterilize the sample during its return from
Mars. The sterilization treatment employed must be
severe enough to ensure that no life forms, as we know
them, could survive. Recently, terrestrial soil-mhabit-
ing microbes have been discovered that show a mere
10-fold reduction in viable organisms after 139 hours
at 125° C—a heating treatment 70 times longer than is
required to kill most sod organisms (ref. 15). This
illustrates the difficulty of defining a suitable moderate
heat treatment that could be certified effective even
on terrestrial spores adapted to survive long penods of
dessication, while at the same time retaining the
scientific value of the sample. It would also be difficult
to identify chemical sterilants that would be effective
in killing organisms sequestered within a soil as highly
reactive as the Martian samples appeared to be during
the Viking expenments.
An important consideration in sterilizing a return
sample is the effect that the treatment would have on
the value of the soil for subsequent geological and
physicochemical research. Use of chemical sterilants
probably would result in contamination of the sample
in a way that would prohibit measurement of certain
soil properties Moist heat may prompt violent reac-
tions within the soil, resulting in significant changes.
While dry heat would be expected to have less effect,
it too would influence the geological information
recovered from the sample For example, Duke and
Reynolds (ref. 16) state that certain volatile elements
in the lunar samples could escape at temperatures less
than 200° C. Jones (ref. 17) noted that while dry
heat sterilization has little effect on some minerals,
others are altered (due to a change in oxidation state)
at temperatures as low as 150° C for 72 hours.
However, he does conclude that although tempera-
tures above 300° C would result in "irrevocable loss of
data, few serious chemical and physical changes occur
at temperatures below 270° C." Thus, sample steril-
ization might result in some loss of physicochemical
information, although it appears that careful control
can limit the impact of sterilization in this regard.
While sterilization of the sample may not seriously
affect the geological information to be gained from the
sample, it would greatly reduce the amount of
meaningful biochemical information that might be
gamed. Heat treatment, even at 100° C, results in the
loss of nitrogen from proteins. Hochstein, Kvenvolden,
and Philpott (ref. 18) observed a 40 percent loss of
ammo acid nitrogen after heating to 200° C. If
organisms had been present in very low numbers in
the soil, such losses would mean that very large
quantities of soil would have to be chemically extract-
ed to yield measurable amounts of organic compounds.
Heat also destroys cellular structure, electron micro-
scopic examination of soil heated to 160° C for 3 hours
indicated that bacterial cell structure in the soil was
virtually obliterated even though the soil had not been
completely sterilized. It is questionable whether signif-
icant data of interest to biologists could be gained
from studying heat-sterilized samples. Even if a
sterilization treatment were developed that killed
organisms while retaining their cellular structure, it
would drastically reduce the chance of accomplishing
a major return sample objective: to compare the basic
biological characteristics of Martian life (if present)
with the characteristics of life as we know it.
A primary point of interest is the question of
whether or not Martian life forms evolved using the
same metabolic strategies as did terrestrial forms.
Evidence of fundamentally different genetic, metabol-
ic, and molecular characteristics would prove that the
terrestrial evolutionary strategies are not universal.
One theory is that there are many possible metabolic
approaches to life, and that the first-appearing organ-
isms in a biosphere determine which approach is
followed by out-competing other developing forms.
Returning a sterilized sample would eliminate the
potential opportunity for biologists to investigate such
major scientific issues in the context of a life form that
evolved independently from We on Earth.
Terrestrial Quarantine of Unsterilized Samples
If sterilization of the sample is not acceptable, an
alternate solution to the problem of possible contami-
nation of the Earth is to quarantine an unstentized
sample until a full assessment can be made of its
potential for disturbing the Earth's ecosystem.
Historically, "quarantine" was a period during
which ships suspected of carrying persons with conta-
gious diseases were detained at their port of arrival.
The interval—usually 40 days—was adequate to cover
the incubation penod of most highly infectious dis-
eases If no symptoms appeared at the end of the
quarantine, the voyagers were permitted to disembark.
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Recently, the term "quarantine" has acquired a new
connotation: holding a suspect organism or a person
with a diagnosed disease in stnct isolation until they
are no longer capable of transmitting the disease. With
the advent of the lunar quarantine, the term has taken
on elements of both definitions.
A critical question that must be addressed in regard
to any quarantine system is whether the containment
measures are adequate to hold known or suspected
pathogens while experimentation is in progress. Basi-
cally, existing maximum containment facilities such as
those at the Center for Disease Control have two
components:
1. An isolation chamber (Class III cabinet) in which
the sample is contained and tested. The cabinet
is certified leak-tight and is accessible only
through the use of attached thick rubber gloves.
All material exiting the cabinet is filtered, auto-
claved, or incinerated before release.
2. A secondary barrier designed to prevent the
spread of organisms in the event of their acciden-
tal release from the cabinets. The term "secon-
dary barrier" means a completely sealed build-
ing. Air flow within the building is designed to
filter organisms released from the cabinets. All
inanimate objects are decontaminated before
they are taken from the facility. Workers enter
the lab by controlled access and are required to
shower and discard potentially contaminated
protective garments before leaving.
A Third Alternative
The technology and procedures for containment
have been successfully used for many years m the
development of germ warfare agents and the study of
highly infectious diseases. In an attempt to ascertain
the adequacy of similar facilities to contain potential
Martian organisms, Michaelsen (ref. 19) interviewed
scientists who worked with various containment facili-
ties throughout the country. The scientists agreed with
near unanimity that existing Class III cabinets are
adequate to handle the most hazardous terrestrial
agents, the potential dangers of which are largely
known.
Judging from the large uncertainties associated with
potential Martian life forms, however, it is not clear
that any containment faculty based solely on the
physical barriers described in the previous paragraphs
will gain wide acceptance by the scientific and
political communities or by the general public. Locat-
ing the facihty and all laboratory workers in an
isolated location on Earth would provide only a small
additional measure of protection.
As previously discussed, eco-catastrophies can oc-
cur when organisms that are nomnfectious to man are
released into a new environment. Thus, as has been
suggested by numerous authors, efforts should be
made to analyze extraterrestrial samples before their
return to Earth (see, for example, refs. 2, 19, 20). By
eliminating the chance of an accidental crash of an
Earth-returning craft, by ensuring that any organisms
that escape from the secondary barrier do not enter
the biosphere, and by guaranteeing that the workers
remain in total isolation, a facihty located in space has
marked advantages over terrestrial systems.
EXTRATERRESTRIAL QUARANTINE
Systems Evaluation
The purpose of an extraterrestrial quarantine facili-
ty is to contain planetary return samples in space
while tests (the quarantine protocol) are conducted on
them. The quarantine protocol is designed to provide
responsible authorities with information that will assist
them in determining the ultimate disposition of the
sample. Ensuing chapters of this report illustrate a
proposed design concept for an extraterrestrial quar-
antine facility and define a protocol compatible with
the proposed facility and suited for a space environ-
ment. The remainder of this chapter explores the
rationale for adopting an extraterrestrial approach to
return-sample quarantine. As such, the discussion that
follows will help the reader to evaluate the design
discussed in subsequent chapters.
The value of conducting quarantine testing prior to
admitting planetary return samples to the Earth's
biosphere is best viewed in the context of an overall
risk analysis. Figure 2-1 illustrates a possible ap-
proach. In this figure, event scenarios for quarantine
system success or failure are shown for both terrestrial
and extraterrestrial quarantine systems. Existing ter-
restrial systems provide us with a wealth of experience
and serve as convenient "yardsticks" in evaluating the
effectiveness of extraterrestrial quarantine measures.
The intent here is not to determine a stnct numerical
value for the worth of an extraterrestrial quarantine
system, but rather to develop the major points that
must be addressed in the design of such a system.
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Figure 2-1.—Event schedule for quarantine testing: A comparison of the different outcomes possible,
depending on whether the facility is located in space or on the Earth.
As indicated in figure 2—1, terrestrial and extrater-
restrial quarantine systems are characterized by differ-
ent outcomes depending on the stage at which
containment failure occurs. To be considered ade-
quate, a quarantine system (terrestrial or extraterres-
trial) must be capable of containing all extraterrestrial
organisms present in a sample, detecting them during
protocol testing, and controlling them after detection
until their ultimate (controlled) disposition is realized.
The success with which containment is maintained by
a quarantine system is a measure of the total system's
reliability.
However, system reliability is not the sole factor in
determining the expected value of a quarantine
system. Evaluation of the system's worth is also
dependent upon the consequences of system failure,
the cost of the system, and the probability that
harmful organisms are present in the return sample.
Several inferences can be drawn from the relation-
ship of these four factors. If the existence of harmful
organisms in a return sample is considered to be more
than a remote possibility, and if a large value is placed
on the estimated consequences of accidental release of
these organisms, then quarantine system cost becomes
less important. Under these same circumstances,
quarantine reliability becomes the dominant factor in
determining the value of a quarantine system, i.e., the
optimum system is the most reliable one, and cost will
not be a prime consideration. On the other hand, if the
existence of pathogens in the return sample is deemed
remote and (or) their potential impact on the environ-
ment is judged to be small, the importance of cost
considerations increases while the importance of
system reliability decreases.
These considerations provide insight into the char-
acteristics of an acceptable quarantine system. Previ-
ous discussion in this chapter highlighted the uncer-
tainties associated with the existence of Martian life
forms and their potential for disrupting the Earth's
ecosystem. If conservative assumptions are adopted to
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account for these uncertainties, the quarantine system
demonstrating superior reliability would be the logical
choice despite significant cost savings afforded by
competing systems. In fact, it would be difficult to
defend a low-cost solution if it sacrificed any signifi-
cant degree of reliability
The following discussion addresses factors pertain-
ing to reliability of an extraterrestrial quarantine
system, that is, its ability to contain, detect, and
control potential Martian pathogens. Where possible,
comparisons will be drawn between terrestrial and
extraterrestrial quarantine options.
Reliability: Containment Considerations
As depicted in figure 2-1, the first quarantine
failure mode that must be considered is violation of
containment integrity. In evaluating the reliability of
containment systems, three major areas must be
considered: the external environment of the system,
the physical containment barriers afforded by the
system, and the management of containment
measures.
An extraterrestrial facility will operate in a relative-
ly controlled environment. The extremely remote
possibility of impact by a large meteonte represents
the only failure source not directly attnbutable to
system malfunction. This is in contrast to terrestrial
systems, which are subject to largely unpredictable
(albeit rare) catastrophic occurrences, both "nature-
related" (i.e., floods, storms, earthquakes) and "man-
related" (e.g., airplane crashes, chemical explosions).
The potential impact of these considerations on the
design of terrestrial quarantine facilities is not clear.
However, the precedent exists in the nuclear industry
for requirements to address remotely possible natural
and man-initiated disasters in the design of contain-
ment facilities. The realization of this design constraint
on terrestrial quarantine facilities will depend on the
perceived risks associated with containing a return
sample. Design of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory
(LRL) facilities, for example, did not address these
remote possibilities. However, it is more reasonable to
expect to find viable organisms in a Martian return
sample than in a lunar sample, and that expectation
may dictate a more conservative approach to quaran-
tine system design.
In addition to providing a relatively benign environ-
ment for maintenance of containment integrity, space
provides an additional physical bio-barner. In the
unlikely event of a breach of containment integrity,
even a low Earth orbit provides significant protection
against back contamination If particles accidentally
released from a facility in orbit are assumed to have
the same velocity as the facility, the particles remain
m orbit for a long time. Calculations (M. Diffley,
personal communications) based on momentum trans-
fers between released particles and molecules in the
ratified atmosphere of near space indicate that a
particle 1 micrometer (1 fim) m diameter will take 3
years to reach the upper stratosphere from a 200 km
orbit. Similar calculations indicate that because of its
greater mass, which resists deceleration due to colli-
sions with air molecules, a 25-/un particle will take 30
years to descend the same distance. Experiments
designed to test the survival of microorganisms in
space environments indicate that survival capability is
primarily a function of shielding from ultraviolet (UV)
radiation and length of exposure. Extrapolation of
these results to exposure times of 3 years (and greater)
indicates an extremely low survival probability for
even relatively UV-resistant microorganisms such as
Penicillium rogue/acft. For example, Hotchin, Lorenz,
and Hemenway (ref. 21) report a large decrease in
Eschenchia coh and a significant reduction in Penicil-
lium populations during experiments conducted on
board Gemini IX-A and XII satellites at an altitude of
300 km Even the microorganisms shielded by 0.4 mm
of aluminum throughout the experiments (17 hours for
Gemini IX-A, 6 hours for Gemini XII) experienced
significant reductions
Based on these and similar experiments (refs. 22
through 25), it appears highly unlikely that organisms
afforded minimum UV protection (i.e., free floating or
attached to 1-jum particles) would survive a 3-year
descent to the stratosphere. It seems equally unlikely
that organisms afforded greater UV protection (i.e.,
attached to particles greater than 25 /un) would
survive a 30-year descent. To be more confident of this
last point, additional research will be necessary in the
area of the long-term survivabihty of microorganisms
in space. However, breach of containment integrity in
a terrestrial system would result in the immediate
release of contaminants to the Earth's biosphere. In
light of weaknesses evident in terrestrial containment
systems, the fail-safe aspect of space quarantine may
provide the only acceptable measure of containment
reliability for a Mars return mission
Besides the physical advantages for maintaining
containment integrity in space, extraterrestrial quaran-
tine measures provide two significant advantages
related to quarantine system management.
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First, both the equipment and the crew of the
extraterrestrial facility would be dedicated to the
execution of the quarantine protocol. This singleness
of purpose would alleviate potential problems associ-
ated with the conflict of interests between quarantine
measures and basic science research or other NASA
interests. Conflicts of this nature could be serious
impediments to the implementation of effective quar-
antine measures.
Second, execution of protocol tests in space will
facilitate crew quarantine measures. In terrestrial
quarantine systems, workers who unknowingly contact
organisms leave the lab and return to their communi-
ties. On the other hand, extraterrestrial protocol
testing will necessarily impose a continual quarantine
of the crew, thereby affording an additional measure
of protection. Undetected breaches of primary con-
tainment result in exposure of only the crew of the
extraterrestrial facility. This level of exposure control
is significantly greater than that afforded by terrestrial
systems, which do not quarantine laboratory workers
unless a breach of containment is recognized quickly.
That is not to say that crew safety would not receive
prime consideration in the design of an extraterrestrial
facility. In fact, the design developed in this study
provides crew protection that is at least equal to the
protection afforded workers in existing terrestrial
maximum containment facilities such as those at the
Center for Disease Control.
Reliability: Detection (Protocol) Considerations
Several protocols were prepared for the lunar
mission, each based on the assumption that a wide
variety of species should be tested to ensure that
obscure species would not be influenced or harmed.
One such protocol, prepared by Baylor University (ref.
26), required representatives of most major phyla to be
tested. The LRL protocol that was eventually adopted
(ref. 27) called for the testing of approximately 45
species. Obviously, exhaustive testing of the world
biota is not feasible in an orbiting laboratory. This
raises the question of whether it is possible to develop
a protocol adequate to accomplish the quarantine
objectives. As will be discussed in succeeding chap-
ters, although the scope of the proposed extraterrestri-
al protocol is greatly reduced from the LRL experi-
ence in terms of the number of species challenged, it
has been augmented with life-detection tests that
greatly increase the reliability of the protocol to detect
replicating organisms.
The emphasis of the Mars return sample quarantine
testing is, first, to determine whether Me is present in
the sample, and then to attempt to assess its impact on
terrestrial systems. The first objective is to be accom-
plished by exposing the soil to various environmental
conditions that, it is hoped, will provide Martian
organisms with factors necessary for growth: a range
of temperatures, photopenods, nutrients, moisture
levels, gas mixtures, and atmospheric pressures.
Growth is assessed by a series of techniques including
visual observation, conductance measurements, meta-
bolic tests, and chemical analyses. Direct microscopic
examination of the sample is included to determine
whether dormant organisms exist in the sod. Finally, to
detect nonspecific pathogens, isolated terrestrial cells
that are devoid of some of the disease-protective
mechanisms found in intact organisms will be chal-
lenged with the sod. If this basic series of tests is
executed and no evidence of extraterrestrial life is
obtained, the sample wdl be certified safe for trans-
port to Earth. If, on the other hand, extraterrestrial life
is discovered, a second order of testing is essential to
completely characterize the life form, to determine its
growth requirements, to assess sterilization tech-
niques, to evaluate containment methods, and to
determine pathogemcity or abdity to flourish in the
terrestrial environment. Only after a complete and
thorough analysis of the Martian life forms has been
conducted could any consideration be given to releas-
ing the sample from quarantine in space.
While this particular protocol could be performed
more conveniently on Earth, its reliabdity in detecting
alien organisms would not improve significantly. This
is due to the fortunate circumstance that the life-
detection systems and challenge species that will be
used in the protocol are relatively easily modified for
space operations. Thus, conducting the protocol in
space does not result in any significant reduction in
the system's detection reliability.
Reliability: Control Considerations
In determining the quarantine system's reliabdity,
the third major factor that must be considered is the
abdity of the system to control replicating organisms,
should any be discovered in the return sample. There
are four basic control measures that can be taken
subsequent to protocol testing: release of the sample
to various science research laboratories, retention of
the sample and any sample-indigenous life forms,
sterilization of the sample and all contaminated
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equipment, or ejection of the sample and contaminat-
ed equipment and facilities from the vicinity of the
Earth's biosphere. One measure of quarantine control
adequacy is the flexibility provided to responsible
authorities in selecting the appropriate course of
action.
If the life forms detected are clearly unable to
cause harm to terrestrial systems, the appropriate
option would be the first one—to release the organ-
isms to scientists for additional study. For example, if
the Earth's atmospheric pressure or moisture content
were fatal to the organism, its accidental release into
the biosphere would have no effect because suitable
terrestrial habitats do not exist. The emphasis of
sample containment would then switch from protect-
ing the Earth to protecting the sample and Martian
life forms. The second control possibility would be to
retain the sample in absolute containment while
scientific examination of the organisms continues. This
option would be followed if there was insufficient
proof that the extraterrestrial organisms were harm-
less. The third and fourth control measures, steriliza-
tion and ejection from the biosphere, would be
appropriate if characteristics of the Martian organisms
observed during the protocol demanded a level of
containment reliability beyond that provided by exist-
ing systems.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding discussion illustrates a major benefit
to be derived from adopting extraterrestrial testing
that a search for replicating organisms in a Martian
return sample and the identification of their physical
and chemical characteristics can be conducted before
that sample is admitted to the Earth's biosphere. The
increased reliability of an extraterrestrial system re-
duces the chances of accidental release of the organ-
ism into the Earth's biosphere during protocol testing.
Test results could be used to assess potential dangers
posed by the sample in order to determine if terrestrial
containment measures are reliable enough to cope
with these dangers. With an orbiting facility, there is
additional flexibility in determining the disposition of
the Martian sample. For example, three hypothetical
results of extraterrestrial tests could be:
1. No replicating organisms were discovered.
2. Replicating organisms that are not a threat to the
Earth were discovered.
3. Replicating organisms demonstrating potentially
harmful effects were observed.
On the basis of these results, policy-makers might
decide
1. That the risk is minimal and (or) that terrestrial
containment facilities are adequate and that,
therefore, the sample should be transported to
Earth.
2. That terrestrial systems cannot assure positive
protection of the Earth's ecosystem, but testing
of the sample should continue in space.
3. That continued research represents an unaccept-
able nsk, and therefore, the sample should be
sterilized or otherwise rendered harmless to the
Earth's biosphere.
The enhanced flexibility of a system employing
extraterrestrial testing increases the likelihood that a
decision to release the sample will reflect an appropri-
ate balance between the benefits of studying the
organisms and the requirement to protect the Earth's
ecosystem.
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Chapter 3
Systems Overview and Design Methodology
The primary focus of the- mission hardware de-
scribed in this report is to support a quarantine
procedure for a proposed unmanned Mars sample
return mission. There are several current options for
acquiring a sample from the surface of Mars, ranging
from a "grab-and-run," or undocumented, sample
return to a fully documented, selected-site, multisam-
ple mission. Although the Orbiting Quarantine Facility
conceived in this study was designed for one of the
more likely mission plans (a documented collection of
many subsamples), the facility is suitable for quaran-
tine testing of the sample regardless of how it is
acquired on Mars.
SAMPLE RETURN MISSION
CONSIDERATIONS
The need for the OQF to be fully integrated with
the overall MSR mission means that the timetables for
sample return and quarantine testing must be effec-
tively intermeshed (see figure 3-1). The hypothetical
mission time frame depicted in figure 3-1 (activities in
left-most column) provides a guideline for the timing
of activities in the OQF operation (second column).
These activities are integrated into a single temporal
sequence in the chart itself.
The presumed limited quantity of the sample
imposes constraints on the design of the OQF. The
complex soil sampling procedures desirable for a well-
documented mission mean that a greater mass of the
MSR spacecraft will be devoted to equipment, thereby
reducing the return payload capacity of the mission.
As currently envisioned by planners at the Jet Propul-
sion Laboratory (JPL), the return payload design calls
for a variety of documented subsamples, each sealed in
individual gas-tight containers (also called "quarantine
vessels") immediately after acquisition on the surface
of Mars. These subsample containers will be sealed in
a larger canister for return to the laboratory. Examples
of this hardware are shown in figures 3-2 and 3—3. The
environment within the canister will be monitored
during the return journey to ascertain the degree to
which the original Martian conditions are retained.
Current projections call for a return sample quantity
of 1 kg. In view of this constraint on sample size, full
consideration was given to developing test procedures
and hardware for the OQF that would utilize the
minimum amount of sample. As designed, the protocol
will require between 5 and 10 percent of the 1 kg
sample (about 50 to 100 g) while protecting the
remaining 90 to 95 percent from contamination by
terrestrial organisms or chemicals.
Because the exterior of the return vehicle and the
canister will have been on the surface of Mars, both
must be considered to be contaminated with particu-
late soil matter that can potentially contaminate the
OQF's orbit envelope. Thus, a means of sterilizing the
canister's extenor surface will be required. Levin and
Hall (ref. 1) have suggested extracting the canister
from the return vehicle en route from Mars and
burning off an exothermal covering at high
temperature.
Another consideration involved transfer of the
returned canister to the orbiting facility. For design
purposes, it was assumed that the Mars sample return
vehicle (MSRV) would deliver the sample just to the
orbital vicinity of the containment laboratory. This
constraint dictated the need for a craft capable of
orbital transfers beyond the limited capabilities of the
OQF itself, to retrieve the sample.
A design (ref. 2) has been proposed for a remote-
teleoperated-manipulator (TELLE) utilizing an iner-
tia! upper stage (IUS) delta engine. This propulsion
unit is designed to be remotely operated and, once
delivered to orbit by the Space Shuttle, will be
capable of orbital changes as well as orbital plane
changes. For its use in the quarantine mission, the
IUS-TELLE must be capable of being programmed
and remotely controlled; it must have propulsion and
navigation capabilities to reach the orbit of the MSRV;
it must be able to "grab" the sample canister; and it
must then successfully return to the OQF to deliver
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Figure 3-1.—A rtme line which integrates the quarantine and sample acquisition schedules.
the canister into the sample acquisition port of the lab.
(See figure 3-4.)
PROTOCOL CONSIDERATIONS
It became apparent early in the design process that
the thrust of the design effort should be toward
developing a protocol that can be performed within
tight constraints on available power supply, equip-
ment weight and volume, and crew size, while
providing adequate, reliable information to those
responsible for deciding the sample's ultimate disposi-
tion. The facility must provide safeguards against back
contamination (contamination by the sample, through
the release of alien organisms into the facility at large
or into the Earth's biosphere) as well as forward
contamination (of the sample, by contact with organ-
isms or chemicals from Earth).
The design of the system must therefore be
responsive to the protocol and its outcome in four
distinct ways. First, the results of an initial battery of
tests (a planned minimum protocol) may dictate that
the facility be rapidly modified or expanded to permit
additional testing before the sample is returned to
Earth. Second, the facility must be capable of long-
term continuous operation, thus ensuring adequate
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Figure 3-2.—One concept of a Mars sample return vehicle capable of taking up to 10 subsamples from the surface
and subsurface of Mars. The craft possesses the flexibility to permit taking core samples even where the terrain
is unfavorable. Two booms work together to drill and collect samples from a variety of slopes and then deposit
the samples in the craft's crown. (Adapted from JPL studies)
flexibility in evaluating and reacting to initial test
results. Third, because the characteristics of potential
Martian organisms are unknown, it must be assumed
that the hazard they present is equal to that of
terrestrial Class IV pathogens (i.e., the organism is
capable of being spread rapidly among humans, no
vaccine exists to check the spread of the pathogen, no
cure has been developed, and the organism produces
high mortality in infected persons). Thus, the facility
must be capable of providing the very high level of
containment and protection of the crew that is
afforded terrestrial workers in Class IV faculties.
Finally, the facility design and protocol procedures
must provide protection against forward contamina-
tion of the sample.
HARDWARE CONSIDERATIONS
General
The design considerations discussed in the follow-
ing sections stem from existing state-of-the-art hard-
ware technology, with a reasonable allowance for
advances over the next 5 to 8 years. To achieve the
degree of system flexibility required to ensure MSR
mission compatibility and execution of a responsive
quarantine protocol, a manned facility was deemed
necessary. Records of over 100 unscheduled in-flight
maintenance tasks performed by Skylab crew mem-
bers indicate that man is capable of providing a
significant measure of flexibility in a space environ-
ment and that effective in-flight man-in-the-loop
maintenance systems are realizable. On the other
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Figure 3-3.—MSR core sampler as viewed from the front (a) and top (b) The unit is designed to permit the
automatic drilling of 10 subsurface cores that are then stored in individual quarantine vessels within the
canister. Each sample vessel is sealed with a plug, and the entire canister is removed and stowed at the top of
the return vehicle. (Adapted from JPL studies)
hand, the Viking lander experience illustrates the
relatively limited degree of flexibility provided by
state-of-the-art unmanned systems. Although the Vik-
ing landers demonstrated a remarkable degree of
reliability, they could adjust to initial test results only
within narrowly defined design capabilities For the
quarantine mission, it was decided that an unmanned
design concept which adequately anticipates every
desired mode of system response was not achievable
without an unreahstically large increase in the com-
plexity and cost of equipment. Therefore, it is desir-
able to have humans do the detailed manipulatory
work and to interpret, evaluate, and modify experi-
ments during protocol procedures.
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Figure 3-4.—A Mars sample return mission. After its voyage from Mars, the MSRV is inserted into a high Earth
orbit where it couples with an IUS-TELLE. This rocket system returns the sample to the OQF, where the
sample undergoes quarantine testing.
The presence of humans aboard the OQF places a
number of constraints on the design of the OQF
system. For example, because prolonged laboratory
studies in the confines of an orbiting facility under
weightless conditions impose a high degree of stress on
human researchers, it was deemed highly desirable to
maintain a "shirtsleeves" environment in the OQF.
This requires an Earth-normal atmospheric pressure, a
breathable gas mixture, and a comfortable tempera-
ture range, along with systems to regenerate and
maintain them. The ability to move freely (without the
encumbrance of a positive pressure suit), to breathe
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normally and communicate by direct voice, and
generally to function in as normal a fashion as possible
will greatly facilitate the crew's performance.
Another constraint in the hardware design was the
mfeasibility, within the time frame of this mission, of
developing a laboratory capable of induced gravity
Human physiological problems associated with rotat-
ing environments dictate the use of large, slowly
rotating systems to develop artificial gravity. Even
systems rotating as slowly as 3 rpm necessitate
prolonged penods for physiological adaption following
entry into the system (ref. 3). To avoid these adapta-
tion penods while simulating a gravitational force only
one fifth as strong as Earth's, the habitation and
laboratory facilities must be over 20 m from the center
of rotation. The hardware development and space
construction costs associated with an artificial gravity
facility of this magnitude would greatly exceed the
costs of designing laboratory equipment for zero-g
conditions. Based on cost effectiveness and optimum
utilization of available resources, a zero-g laboratory
was deemed appropnate for the mission. Although
laboratory testing in zero g presents many unique
problems, these considerations were taken into ac-
count in the design of specific laboratory hardware.
The experience gained in the Skylab flights shows that
it is possible to conduct a wide variety of experiments
in zero g.
Several orbit locations for the OQF were consid-
ered, including lunar orbit, hbrabon points L4 and Ls,
geosynchronous orbit, and near Earth orbit. It became
readily apparent that locating the facility at a great
distance from Earth significantly increases the com-
plexity of mission operations and hardware. For
example, locating the system in a lunar orbit is
infeasible because of energy requirements (see Appen-
dix A). Although the higher (more distant) orbital
options would increase the mission life of the facility
and afford a greater degree of safety in terms of back
contamination, selection of the near Earth orbit for
the OQF was, in fact, a direct function of the upper
orbit limits of the Space Shuttle. Thus, options other
than low Earth orbit were rejected primarily because
of limitations in the hardware available for resupply
and for reasons of overall cost effectiveness.
The Delivery System to Earth Orbit
NASA's future Earth orbital mission flights are
based on the Space Transportation System (STS), in
which the shuttle is the transport vehicle. The shuttle,
which will be in full operation many years pnor to an
MSR project launch date, is designed to deliver to low
Earth orbit an "orbiter" (the glider-like orbiting
component) carrying experiment packages weighing
up to 29 483 kg (65 000 Ib). Its round tnp flights follow
the sequence shown in figure 3-5. This "commuter"
capability is ideal for transporting crew members and
materials to and from an orbiting station. Thus, the
orbiter became the first component subsystem m the
evolution of the MSR mission hardware design, and
the design of OQF components was based upon its
capabilities.
Four major payload constraints of the Space Shuttle
impacted the design of the overall system's hardware.
They were (ref. 4): (1) a 14500 kg (32000 Ib) payload
maximum during launch (current limitation), (2) the
center of gravity envelope of the payload and orbiter,
(3) the effective geometric envelope of the orbiter
cargo bay, and (4) the reentry bending moment flexure
characteristics of the orbiter. (See Appendix B for a
discussion of the impact of these constraints on
mission and hardware designs.)
Other payload constraints of the shuttle system (ref.
5), such as power and usage potential, payload
attachment locations and load characteristics, vibra-
tion and acoustics spectra, and thermal environment,
did not significantly impact the design of the project.
Options for Developing an OQF
After investigating the compatibility of many possi-
ble hardware systems both with the orbiter and with
mission goals, the study group selected three concep-
tual approaches for detailed analysis
1. Designing a totally new system,
2. Modifying and refitting Skylab (which was still in
orbit at the time of this study),
3. Modifying spacelab designs such as those pro-
posed by McDonnell Douglas, North American
Rockwell, Grumman, and ESA-ERNO (Europe-
an Space Agency and ERNO Raumfahrttechmk).
In the selection of the shuttle as the delivery system
for the OQF, it was assumed that orbiter modification
was not an option (ref. 6). This fact significantly
enhanced the importance of OQF/orbiter
compatibility m the design of system hardware.
Orbiter payload constraints nullified several prelimi-
nary considerations and thus accelerated the process
of selecting among the three alternatives. The selec-
tion process is outlined below.
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Figure 3-5.—A typical mission profile of the Space Shuttle (ref. 5).
Option #1—Design a Totally New System
An in-depth analysis was made of the problems
involved in designing a totally new hardware system
for the quarantine mission. However, this line of
investigation was not pursued beyond the stage of
analysis because, under the time-frame assumptions
that prevailed during the study, there would be
insufficient time to develop an entire new system. In
addition, it is more cost efficient to use existing
hardware and technology where possible and to
update subsystems as new developments in space
hardware technology become available. As a conse-
quence, this option was rejected early in the design
development phase of the project.
Option #2—Skylab Refitted
There was a strong desire to use Skylab (figure 3-6)
as part of the total orbiting system because it was
assumed that reutilization of this equipment would
provide significant cost savings. Although Skylab has
since reentered the atmosphere and been destroyed, it
was in orbit at the time of this design study, and plans
for preventing its demise were in progress. Skylab was
seriously considered for use in the total OQF but was
rejected for several reasons.
Because Skylab was relatively small and would
have provided far too little power to permit it to
function as a self-contained quarantine facility, it
would have been necessary to mate Skylab with
additional power modules. However, Skylab's docking
port was incompatible with the orbiter and other
proposed modules and would not have been large
enough to accommodate crew members wearing
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Figure 3-6.—Skylab.
extravehicular activity (EVA) gear; the extensive
refitting that would consequently have been needed to
restructure Skylab as a biocontainment laboratory—
replacing entire subsystems in space—would have
required EVA operations of untested magnitude.
Skylab was also deemed impractical for use as crew
quarters because it used a two-gas system maintained
at 0.34 atm; the rest of the system would have had to
operate at 1 atm to ensure adequate heat transfer from
the extensive laboratory equipment. Therefore, crew
members entering Skylab would have required a 2-
hour decompression and nitrogen-adaptation period.
Of equal importance is the fact that the structural
strength of Skylab would have been unknown, because
by the time the quarantine mission began Skylab
already would have been in orbit for twice as long as
its designed lifespan. Finally, as delays (because of
problems in developing a booster engine) in the shuttle
launch schedule became apparent, it was felt that
there was little chance that Skylab would be available
for the quarantine mission. For all these reasons,
Skylab was rejected as a viable option.
Option #3—Spacelab Modified
Spacelab is a joint NASA-ERNO experimental
laboratory designed to be carried into space in the
orbiter cargo bay, where it will remain for the
duration of the mission. Utilization of a modified
Spacelab design was considered by this design group
to be the best option to investigate in depth. Because
design studies by McDonnell Douglas (ref. 7), North
American Rockwell (ref. 8), Grumman (ref. 9), and
others have already been conducted, these studies
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Figure 3-7.—Three concepts of freely orbiting space stations (refs. 7, 8, and 9).
were reviewed and analyzed as possible conceptual
models of station systems (figure 3—7).
These reports documented various approaches to
space station design, with varied design constraints,
mission durations, mission goals, etc. In yet another
study, the European Space Agency evaluated these
studies (ref. 10), comparing the various station design
concepts and their feasibility. The ESA report suggest-
ed employing the STS as the prime delivery system for
a free-flying orbiting laboratory constructed by assem-
bling several modified Spacelab pressure vessels (see
figure 3-8).
All of these studies were taken into consideration
when the major design parameters for an effective,
feasible OQF were determined by the design study
group. Those features of the OQF are:
• It will be a manned system.
• It will be free-flying, rather than permanently
docked to the orbiter. (It was felt that if the OQF
were docked to the orbiter, the orbiter would be
more likely to become contaminated by crew
contact or orbital contamination from the MSRV.
In addition, it is unrealistic to consider using one of
the limited number of orbiters in the shuttle fleet
solely to maintain the OQF throughout the lengthy
period of quarantine testing.)
It will be constructed of Spacelab-type compo-
nents, principally the Spacelab pressure vessel
module and its concomitant subsystems.
It will be kept in low Earth orbit.
A "shirtsleeves" environment will be maintained
within the facility
The orbiter will be used as presently designed.
The orbiter will use its remote manipulator system
to hard berth each component module into posi-
tion.
The OQF, with monthly logistics support from the
orbiter, will be capable of supporting continuous
operations for an indefinite period.
SYSTEMS DESIGN AND CONFIGURATION
Module Overview
The OQF consists of five modules, each construct-
ed from Spacelab components and modified to meet
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Figure 3-8.—The use of Spacelab-derived pressure
vessels to construct three sizes of modules.
the specific requirements of that module's mission
(figure 3-9).
The Power Module provides 25 to 35 kw of power
from solar collectors, controls the orbital attitude of
the entire system, dissipates heat generated within the
OQF, and provides communications with Earth.
The Habitation Module will provide the crew with
quarters, food service, exercise and personal hygiene
facilities, medical support, and a command console. It
will also provide an environmental control and life
support (ECLS) system to support the OQF's atmo-
sphere regeneration (except in the laboratory).
The Laboratory Module is designed to contain the
equipment, instrumentation, and supplies necessary to
carry out the chemical and biological testing protocol
on the Martian sample. These experiments will be
conducted in sealed cabinets that both protect the
sample from terrestrial contamination and prevent
exposure of the personnel to potential Martian con-
taminants. Additionally, this module is isolated from
the remainder of the OQF because it has independent
life-support and waste storage systems. The docking
port at the end of the Laboratory Module is available
for the berthing of additional laboratory sections if an
expanded protocol or an abort propulsion kit is
required.
A general purpose Logistics Module provides stor-
age for supplies and for waste generated in the
Habitation Module. At approximately 30-day intervals,
the logistics unit will be removed and replaced with a
module containing new supplies.
These four modules will be linked in their final
configuration (see figure 3-10) using a pressurized
Docking Module. This unit will be able to connect five
to six modules of various designs, permitting the crew
members unhindered access between each area. It
would contain an EVA hatch and airlock as well as
docking facilities for the orbiter.
A sixth module, the Laboratory Abort Propulsion
Kit, will not be orbited with the OQF unless the need
arises to place the system (or the Laboratory Module)
in a higher Earth orbit. The kit will consist of one or
more lUSs, depending on the altitude desired for the
abort action. (See Appendix A.)
System Configuration Options
The specific layout of the OQF was adopted after
consideration of personnel safety, functional facilita-
tion, the minimum facility needed to meet mission
objectives, maximum cost effectiveness, and capability
for alternative uses and (or) expansion of the baseline
configuration.
Two basic configurations considered in the design
of the OQF were an in-line design, which did not
require a pressurized docking module, and a "pin-
wheel" design, in which all the modules were attached
to a common pressurized docking module. The pin-
wheel design (figure 3-10) was selected because:
• It provides a berthing port for the Logistics
Module and for the berthing of additional modules.
• Its final assembly is easier.
• It has less aerodynamic drag (and consequently
requires less fuel for attitude control and orbit
maintenance).
• It provides emergency escape routes via the
unberthed end cone of each module.
• It permits any module to be nonfunctional or
depressurized without interrupting movements
throughout the rest of the system.
• Its compact design facilitates the movement of
personnel, equipment, and supplies through the
modules.
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Figure 3-9.—Adaptation of Spacelab modules to produce the five major component sections of a free-
flying, manned Orbiting Quarantine Facility (adapted from ref. 10).
Because crew members will move between the
Habitation and Laboratory Modules most frequently,
these two modules were placed on a direct line with
each other. This will help crew members to maintain a
frame of reference and will eliminate disonentatoon.
SPACE TRANSPORT AND ASSEMBLY OF
MODULES
The number of shuttle flights required to transport
the OQF modules into a low Earth orbit depends upon
the cargo mass and the altitude selected for the OQF.
The orbiter is currently limited to 14500 kg (ref. 11),
although approximately twice that capacity may be
realizable by the late 1980s. However, in this study,
the current cargo mass limits were used as a design
constraint, thus necessitating at least four shuttle
missions to assemble the entire OQF. Details concern-
ing the payload limitations and center of gravity
requirements can be found in Appendix B. The
Docking and Logistics Modules will constitute the
cargo on the first flight; once in orbit, the pressurized
Docking Module will be berthed to the Logistics
Module using the orbiter's remote manipulator system
(RMS). (See Appendix C.) The second flight will orbit
the Power Module, which will then be attached to the
Docking Module. On the third flight, the Habitation
Module will be coupled with the Docking Module,
permitting the station to be manned for systems
checkout. The Laboratory Module will then be trans-
ported to the facility and berthed with the Docking
Module to complete the OQF.
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OQF Orbit and Orbit Maintenance
Selection of an orbit for the OQF is predicated on
the altitude-payload capabilities of the orbiter and the
aerodynamic drag of the OQF; in addition, the OQF
orbit must be compatible with the orbit of the MSRV.
Because the MSRV return orbit has not yet been
established, the most desirable inclination of the OQF
cannot be specified at this time. However, unless an
orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) is used to
provide a higher orbit, the maximum altitude possible
is 463 km (287 mi), based on the current launch mass
limits and an orbit inclination of 28.5 degrees (ref. 11).
Increased launch weights may require the orbit to be
lowered by approximately 12 percent, while different
inclinations further reduce the altitude. The orbit will
be maintained using the altitude control system
located in the Power Module.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the numerous constraints described in this
chapter (shuttle/orbiter limitations, use of humans in
the system, cost considerations, etc.), there is surpris-
ingly little flexibility remaining in the design possibili-
ties of the quarantine system. However, with proper
integration of the quarantine into the sample-return
schedule, a system based on current technology can be
constructed which provides an environment that is
safe from both forward and back contamination,
affording the Earth the greatest possible degree of
protection, and yet permits the execution of a credible
and thorough testing program for the Martian samples.
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TABLE 3-1.—ESTIMATED MASS OF THE OQF
COMPONENTS
Module Mass
Laboratory
Habitation
Power
Docking
Logistics
Large Motor IUS (1st stage)
Large Motor IUS (2nd stage)
Small Motor IUS
13600 kg"
13600 kg
13600 kg
2300 kg
4500 kg
11400 kg
11400 kg
3100 kg
•13600 kg = SOOOOIb.
to transfer the OQF into an elliptical transfer orbit
(Vi) and the other to place the OQF in a circular
geosynchronous orbit (Vi). Using the equations of
space mechanics, and assuming an initial altitude of
296 km and a final altitude of 550 km, the magnitude
of these velocity corrections is Vi = 7.2X10-2 km/sec
(160 mi/hr) and V2 = 7.1 X10-2 km/sec (158 mi/hr).
The magnitude of the velocity impulse supplied by the
small motor IUS is 21 X10-2km/sec (467 mi/hr). Thus,
a small motor IUS is sufficient to allow the OQF to be
placed in a higher Earth orbit.
Appendix A—Energy Requirements for
Various Orbits
TRANSFER TO LUNAR ORBIT
One of the options investigated was the possibility
of placing the OQF in a circular lunar orbit. To
accomplish this, the OQF would be injected from
Earth orbit into an elliptical transfer orbit (Mohman's
orbit) around the Moon using a velocity correction of
3.1 km/sec (ref. 12), and then inserted into the desired
circular lunar orbit using a correction of 1.0 km/sec.
These velocity impulses represent the minimum ener-
gy transfer conditions. Any other Earth escape trajec-
tories (i.e., parabolic or hyperbolic) require a much
higher escape velocity and significant velocity reduc-
tions for insertion into a circular lunar orbit.
Considering the total mass of the OQF and a two-
staged, large motor IUS to be 70400 kg (table 3-1),
the maximum velocity impulse that can be achieved
after expending both stages of the large motor IUS is
1.15 km/sec (ref. 13). This is much less than the
velocity of 3.1 km/sec required to transfer the OQF
from an Earth orbit into an elliptical transfer orbit. In
addition, independent insertion of each of the OQF
components into lunar orbit cannot be accomplished
with a two-staged IUS: The heaviest module could be
accelerated to only 2.8 km/sec. Thus, the lunar orbit
option is not possible.
TRANSFER TO HIGHER EARTH ORBIT
(GEOSYNCHRONOUS)
To transfer the OQF to a higher, geosynchronous
Earth orbit will require two velocity corrections, one
EMERGENCY BOOSTING OF THE
LABORATORY MODULE
The design study group believed that the OQF
should have the capability of removing the Laboratory
Module from the immediate vicinity of the Earth in
the event of a serious emergency. One option, expul-
sion of the module from the Earth's solar system,
would mean inserting it into a hyperbolic escape orbit
with a velocity impulse equal to 3.5 km/sec. Because
the two stages of the large motor IUS can together
achieve only 2.8 km/sec, it is not possible to eject the
Laboratory Module from our solar system.
However, the velocity correction of 2.4 km/sec
required to transfer the Laboratory Module from an
Earth orbit of 296 km to one of 8000 km is well within
the capability of the two-staged large motor IUS. This
appears to be a reasonable option in the event of a
serious problem stemming from a containment failure
during quarantine testing.
Appendix B—Orbiter Payload Weight
Constraint
The orbiter is designed to land carrying a maximum
of only 14500 kg (32000 Ib) (ref. 11). Currently, this
mass limitation also serves as the maximum that can be
launched, since a malfunction could necessitate an
emergency landing with full load. Therefore, although
the craft is designed to launch 29 500 kg (65 000 Ibs),
permission to orbit a maximum payload may not be
given until after years of successful flights (if ever). In
addition, in this mission the maximum payload is
further reduced by 900 kg (2000 Ib) because of the
necessity to include a second remote manipulating
system (Appendix C) and the orbiter docking port. In
this study, the lower, currently acceptable weight was
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Figure 3-11.—Orbiter longitudinal center of gravity constraints as a function of cargo mass (ref. 11).
assumed to be mandatory (i.e., a maximum module
mass of 13 600 kg, or 30000 Ib), although calculations
of the influence of the greater cargo mass were also
made (i.e., a maximum module weight of 28 600 kg, or
630001b).
During landing, the orbiter cargo must also be
positioned so that its center of gravity is located
around a point approximately 12.8 m behind the
forward bulkhead (ref. 11). As the cargo mass in-
creases, placement of the payload near this position
becomes more critical (see figure 3-11). The cargo
must also be symmetrical about the orbiter's center
line and occupy an area no greater than 16.2 m by
4.0 m. Finally, the cargo must be arranged to permit a
certain degree of bending flexure about the craft's
longitudinal axis (ref. 6).
Considering both current and projected cargo
launch weights, the center-of-gravity constraints are
given in table 3-2.
TABLE 3-2.—CONSTRAINTS ON THE CARGO'S
CENTER OF GRAVITY
Kg of Cargo Launched
Type of Constraint Current
14500
Projected
29500
Longitudinal distance from
forward bay bulkhead (fig-
ure 3-12) 9.8-13.8 m 11.0-13.1 m
Vertical: distance below pay-
load bay centerhne 0.7-1.22 m 0.15-0.51 m
Lateral, distance from pay-
load bay centerbne ±8.9 cm ±6.4 cm
If equipment and materials are properly located
within the module, they can be mounted within the
cargo bay in accordance with these requirements.
Furthermore, the longitudinal position of the module
within the bay can be adjusted by attachment to
fittings located at 10 cm increments. Ballast can also
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be added to the cargo bay to adjust the center of
gravity.
With the current launch limits and the assumed
module masses (see table 3-1), a minimum of four
separate launch missions would be required to orbit
the five components, since the Logistics and Docking
units could be flown together (figure 3-12, top).
However, if the masses of the fully equipped Habita-
tion, Laboratory, or Power Modules (estimated to be
13600 kg each) actually exceed the current orbiter
payload limit (also 13 600 kg) by a moderate amount,
then enough equipment would be removed to reduce
the weight of that module to an acceptable level. The
excess equipment would then be launched separately
for installation in space (perhaps along with the lighter
Logistics and Docking units). If the mass estimates are
incorrect by, say, a factor of two, then the modules
would be subdivided, launched separately as major
subcomponents, and coupled in space.
On the other hand, if the higher cargo limit (28 600
kg) is eventually allowed, then up to three smaller
modules can be launched simultaneously (figure 3-12,
bottom). However, because the length of the Habita-
tion Module necessitates its solo flight, the remaining
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Figure 3-12.—The location of the actual longitudinal center of gravity (COG) in the
orbiter bay, and its relation to the COG constraint. Top: Assuming a maximum
launch cargo of 14 500 kg (32 000 Ib), only 13600kg (30 000 Ib) would be available
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four modules would require a minimum of two flights
for a total of, at the minimum, three launches. The net
saving with the higher cargo limit is thus only one
launch. The major advantage afforded by increasing
the payload maximum is that the modules can be
equipped fully without fear of exceeding the mass
limits.
Appendix C—Remote Manipulators
Berthing of the modules will be accomplished with
the use of two remote manipulator systems (ref. 5), as
shown in figure 3-13. Although orbiters include one
manipulator arm mounted on the port side of the
vehicle, a second manipulator arm must be installed
on the starboard side, adding a weight of 450 kg. The
manipulators are capable of deploying a payload 4.5 m
in diameter, 18.3 m in length, and 29 500 kg in weight
to a position clear of the orbiter. During berthing
operations one manipulator will be used to hold the
already-emplaced portion of the OQF while the
second manipulator (controlled remotely from the
orbiter) moves the module being berthed into position.
If an EVA effort is required during the berthing
maneuver, space construction personnel can egress
through the orbiter's docking port to assist.
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Figure 3-13.—A detailed drawing of a remote manipulator system. The insert depicts an orbiter with two
manipulators (ref. 5).
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Chapter 4
Quarantine and Protocol
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
The purpose of the Orbiting Quarantine Facility is
to provide maximum protection of the terrestrial
biosphere by ensuring that the returned Martian
samples are safe to bring to Earth. Thus, the protocol
described in this chapter is designed to detect the
presence of biologically active agents in the Martian
soil; basic scientific investigations unrelated to hazard
detection are not included. The protocol determines
one of two things about the sample: (a) that it is free
from nonterrestrial life forms and can be sent to a
terrestrial containment facility where extensive chemi-
cal, biochemical, geological, and physical investiga-
tions can be conducted; or (b) that it exhibits
"biological effects" of the type that dictate second-
order testing.' The quarantine protocol is designed to
be conducted on a small portion of the returned
sample, leaving the bulk of the sample undisturbed for
study on Earth.
The experiments suggested for the quarantine
protocol were selected because they maximize the
chance of detecting life if it exists; because they do not
involve the kind of activities that commonly cause
barrier systems to fail (i.e., the use of sharp instru-
ments, open flames, and live animals is unnecessary for
the completion of this protocol); because they use,
when possible, equipment that already has been (or is
expected to be) flight qualified; and because they can
be performed by a small crew operating in zero g.
The protocol operates at two levels. First, it seeks
to detect the presence of any replicating organisms or
toxic substances through a four-pronged approach
consisting of: direct observation of the sample, analysis
for the chemicals comprising living organisms, meta-
bolic experiments patterned after the Viking tests, and
microbiological cultunng attempts using different
'Second-order testing is initiated if nontenrestnal life forms or
uncontrolled toxins are detected in the sample Because the nature
of second-order testing depends upon the results derived from the
OQF protocol, a sequence of tests cannot be specifically defined in
this protocol However, the protocol set forth in this chapter will
generate the information necessary to develop second-order testing
procedures, if they are required.
environments. Second, a "challenge system" is em-
ployed to determine whether agents or organisms
present in the Martian soil are hazardous to terrestrial
life forms. This is accomplished by adding samples of
soil, or agents/organisms detected in previous tests, to
challenge cultures of terrestrial species. In the event
that a nonterrestrial life form or replicating toxic agent
has been detected at any stage of the protocol, second-
order testing is initiated to characterize it more fully.
The experimental methods to be employed in the
proposed protocol are presented in this chapter. They
are specified in enough detail to permit a thorough
assessment of the particular equipment, space, and
personnel requirements for operating that system in
the zero-g OQF. Such planning is essential to ensure
that, in addition to being able to successfully detect
life if present, the experiments are compatible with
the total constraints of the space facility.
THE LUNAR RETURN EXPERIENCE
The quarantine of extraterrestrial soil is not unique
to the return of Martian material. The Lunar Receiv-
ing Laboratory (LRL) at Houston provided quarantine
facilities for 2 years during the Apollo program. This
expenence has provided an important model for
formulating the OQF protocol described in this report.
Located at Johnson Space Center (JSC), the LRL
was designed to permit quarantine testing and con-
tainment of the returning lunar samples, astronauts,
and equipment. The entire LRL program was con-
ceived, built, put into operation, and concluded in a
relatively short period of time—between February
1966 and April 1971, when the Apollo 14 samples
were released from quarantine. The lunar sample
quarantine did not run its course without mishap,
however. Lessons were learned that can be profitably
applied to any facility for the quarantine of extrater-
restrial material.
In a quarantine mission, three aspects of the
mission that are particularly important to mission
success are: mission planning, experimental protocol,
and equipment integrity. Weaknesses or poor perfor-
mance in any of these areas can lead to failure of the
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mission through a breach of quarantine. In the Apollo
quarantine program, weaknesses in all three of these
areas were in evidence (refs. 1 through 3), and a
review of the program in this light is of value in
planning for a Mars sample quarantine.
Mission Planning
During the planning of a planetary mission it is
essential that the quarantine phase be allotted suffi-
cient time to develop and execute a credible testing
program. In the case of the lunar quarantine, the
official decision that a scientific advisory committee
should be established and that funding for a facility
should be sought came just 6 months before LRL
construction was to begin. In that time it was
necessary to recruit a qualified directorate, establish
experimental protocols, and design facilities suitable
for mission execution and containment. The initial
schedule also allowed only 13 months for facility
construction, testing, certification, personnel training,
mission simulations, and preparation for sample
receipt (ref. 1).
Although most of the researchers who were em-
ployed in the program were very familiar with the
procedures to be followed during quarantine, many of
the principal investigators did not arrive at the LRL
until sample receipt (ref. 1). The thorough training of
all participants in an MSR mission, both direct mission
members and supporting persons, would have to be
mandatory. Such personnel must participate in the
various mission simulations and have a primary dedica-
tion to the execution of the protocol.
A potential danger in the lunar quarantine was that
the location of the LRL near a major city presented
the possibility of a rapid spread of infection, as
workers who might have unknowingly breached quar-
antine went home in the evening. A quarantine facility
for future extraterrestrial return samples must be
physically isolated from population centers, and the
workers should be held in quarantine throughout the
mission.
Experimental Protocol
In the lunar protocol, the emphasis of the testing
was on demonstrating that terrestrial plants and
animals were not harmed by exposure to the sample
material. With Martian samples, especially in view of
the greater likelihood of life forms being present, the
emphasis should more properly be on first detecting
life forms—dormant as well as active—before initiat-
ing extensive challenges of terrestrial systems with the
sample.
One criticism of the LRL protocol has been that
quarantine testing consumed an excessive amount
(528 g, or 1.5 percent) of the lunar sample (ref. 3).
With a much smaller Martian sample, the OQF
protocol will clearly not be able to consume as much
material, but the percentage will nonetheless be
higher than in the lunar case. Probably 100 g, or 10
percent, of the returned Martian sample would be
available for use in the protocol—less than one fifth
the amount used in the lunar protocol. The limited
amount of material for testing is another strong
argument for emphasizing an initial sequence of tests
that concentrate on life detection (ref. 4) before
challenging species for possible harmful effects. The
test protocol should involve the minimum number of
challenge organisms that can be used without entailing
a loss of credibility in the test results (refs. 1, 3).
Simulated trial runs of the protocol using pathogen-
contaminated sod are highly advisable. Simulations
would allow the protocol to be debugged and would
train all laboratory personnel under realistic condi-
tions, so that sample-wasting errors could be avoided.
Such trial runs were recommended for the LRL
protocol but were not performed, partly because of
limited time.
Bagby (ref. 1) noted that a source of problems in
the LRL was that the samples were used by both
geologists and biologists, whose needs and interests
sometimes conflicted. If quarantine testing is estab-
lished as a first priority, with the interests of physical
scientists protected by careful planning and proper
protocol, it is possible to accomplish all of the very
diverse scientific objectives of a planetary sample
return. Basic science investigations of the sample must
await its certification and release. On the other hand,
the quarantine protocol must ensure that the nonquar-
anbne portion of the sample is not altered or de-
stroyed, so that future investigations remain
unimpeded.
Equipment Security
Several physical problems were noted with the
equipment used in the lunar quarantine testing proto-
col. The rubber gloves used for access to the contain-
ment cabinets, for example, were a source of sample
contamination. Under negative pressure such gloves
pass sizeable amounts of water and oxygen (ref. 3). In
future quarantines of extraterrestrial material, sealed
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but flexible metal manipulator arms should be used for
initial sample handling, since they present a lower risk
of contamination (ref. 5). Another problem noted by
Duke and Reynolds during the lunar quarantine (ref.
3) was that the pumping systems used to establish a
vacuum during various stages of the testing protocol
allowed organic contaminants to be introduced into
the cabinets. In an orbiting facility, space itself could
be used to produce a vacuum, minimizing the risk of
contamination from machinery, lubricants, and tubing.
The proper sterilization of the cabinets prior to
introducing the sample is an important matter. The
cabinets in which the pristine sample is first opened
should be thoroughly cleaned and sterilized through
the use of dry heat, rather than organic sterilants,
because trace residues of formaldehyde or ethylene
oxide could contaminate the sample (ref. 3). However,
the handling of the quarantine sample, once it has
been separated from the pristine portion, should be
done in multiply-decontaminated areas to reduce the
chance of forward contamination. Microbes surviving
cabinet decontamination could lead to puzzling results
and delays in sample release. Use of surface sterilants
in these areas is recommended before samples are
received to remove all residue and organisms remain-
ing from trial runs of the protocol with pathogen-
contaminated soil. Dry heat should follow.
Quarantine Priority
Mars has a complex atmosphere. There is evidence
that at some point in the planet's history water flowed
across its surface. Although the automated soil testing
performed by the Viking lander in a single location did
not find any incontrovertible signs that life was
present, the existence of Me forms on the planet
cannot yet be ruled out. Thus a sample quarantine is
necessary, both to perform definitive life-detection
tests and to protect the Earth's biosphere from
possible harm. If this basic principle is accepted, then
the quarantine must be considered a crucial phase of a
Mars sample return mission and careful steps should
be taken to ensure that the program is not compro-
mised (ref. 4). Early in the mission planning phase, an
independent commission should be established, similar
to the lunar program's Interagency Committee on
Back Contamination (ICBC) but with sole authority to
coordinate, evaluate, and approve quarantine
activities (ref. 4).
By its nature, a quarantine excites impatience
among scientists eager to sample the fruits of what will
have been a long, difficult, and successful sample
return mission. The quarantine must not be vulnerable
to the pressure to take short-cuts and make premature
judgments. To ensure that its integrity is maintained, it
must be equal in priority to sample acquisition and to
subsequent scientific investigations (refs. 1,2).
THE VIKING EXPERIENCE
The Viking mission provided much information that
had a significant effect on the design of this protocol—
primarily the negative results in various tests designed
to search for life. The most dramatic indication that
Mars is without life comes from images that portray
the planet's surface as barren and devoid of large life
forms. Detailed studies of these images by Levmthal,
Jones, Fox, and Sagan (ref. 6) concluded that no
evidence, direct or indirect, has been obtained for
macroscopic biology on Mars. This statement may be
qualified by the fact that total visual coverage for both
landers was an area of 56 km2, representing 4X 10-'
percent of the planet's surface. In addition, the
resolving power of the camera ranged from 1.0 mm at
a distance of 1.5 m, to 2 m at the horizon, 3 km away.
Because there are areas on our planet that could
yield images as sterile-appearing as the Viking pic-
tures, a more significant series of tests involved
searching for microscopic life forms in the soil. Even
the harshest and most barren terrestrial locations have
microscopic life forms sequestered within soil, rocks,
or ice. Rather than attempting direct observation for
microscopic cells, these tests attempted to observe
chemical changes in the atmosphere and in the soil,
changes that could indicate the presence of organisms
capable of metabolism (refs. 7 through 10). The three
different metabolic experiments were based on the
assumption that Martian life would be similar to
terrestrial life, and that such life, if present, would be
metabolically active under the environmental condi-
tions provided within the spacecraft. The experiments
were: carbon assimilation (ref. 7), designed to detect
photosynthesis; gas exchange (ref. 8), designed to
detect metabolism, and labeled release (ref. 9), also
designed to detect metabolism. Although the results of
these experiments were not altogether in agreement,
the findings could be explained on the basis of
inorganic chemical reactions (ref. 10). Because meta-
bolic experiments are perhaps the most sensitive
methods available for detecting life (ref. 11), it is
imperative that experiments similar to those flown on
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TABLE 4-1.—COMPOSITION OF THE LOWER
MARTIAN ATMOSPHERE
Gas Percent Abundance
CO2
N2
Ar
02
CO
H2O (vapor)
Ne
Kr
Xe
03
95.32
2 7
16
0.13
0.07
0.03 (variable)
0.00025
0.00003
0.000008
0000003
TABLE 4-2 —THE COMPOSITION OF MARTIAN
SOIL
Element Percent Abundance
o
Si
Fe
Mg
Ca
Al
S
Cl
Ti
K
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21
13
5
4
3
3
07
0.5
0.25
Note Percentages do not total 100 percent Values shown reflect
relatively inexact Viking measurements.
the Viking mission be conducted on return samples,
but under more sensitive and controlled conditions.
The negative interpretation of the metabolic experi-
ments appears to be in agreement with the inability of
the Viking instruments to detect any organic carbon in
the Martian soils (ref. 12). However, this latter result
does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of organic
life in the samples tested (see the discussion on page
9). If on Mars there is little free organic carbon
present in the soil, then a relatively large number of
bacteria might not be detectable with the mass
spectrometer. If most of the organic carbon were
located within bacteria the size of Escherichia coh, for
example, the soil sample could have contained as
many as 100000 cells and still have yielded negative
results in this experiment. What this Viking experi-
ment does indicate is that the search for Me during the
quarantine will be more difficult because Me forms are
not likely to be present in large quantities.
In addition to the direct and indirect search for Me
conducted by Viking, there were several other investi-
gations performed on the Martian atmosphere (refs.
13, 14) and soil (refs. 15 through 17) that yielded
information that should be taken into account when
planning the experimental design of the protocol. The
lower Martian atmosphere has been shown to be
composed primarily of carbon dioxide, with little
nitrogen and trace concentrations of other gases (table
4-1); its pressure ranges between 0.006 and 0.0077
atm (ref 14).
Knowledge of these values could be useful in the
quarantine analysis. If the preliminary gas sample from
the sample canister demonstrates a variation from
these data, it could indicate either metabolic processes
occurring after containment or leakage of the contain-
er to space. In addition, the knowledge of the
atmospheric composition and pressure will be used to
simulate the Martian atmosphere during several
phases of quarantine protocol.
The Martian soil has been shown to contain water;
it appears to be weathered, and it is continually blown
about by the wind. Table 4—2 shows the major
elements detected and their abundance, in percentage
of sample weight (refs. 15 through 17); samples taken
from both landing sites were found to be approximate-
ly the same.
Increased knowledge of the soil composition and its
chemistry will assist the quarantine investigations by
permitting accurately simulated soils to be prepared to
test the various biologic systems in the protocol for
compatibility with the material.
RATIONALE FOR PROTOCOL DESIGN
The possibility that living organisms exist on Mars
that could directly affect man, animals, plants, or
microorganisms, or could in some way subtly upset the
Earth's biological or geochemical cycles, can be
guarded against by a logical, well-designed protocol
(ref. 4). The experience of the LRL and the informa-
tion gained from the Viking missions provide a
significant basis for designing a quarantine protocol.
The development of the testing procedure for the
protocol was guided primarily by four considerations.
First, protecting the biosphere from back contami-
nation becomes extremely difficult once a sample has
entered the biosphere. So-called remote Earth facili-
ties are remote only in terms of human population.
There is no such thing as an ecologically remote
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facility on the Earth. Thus, a nonterrestrial facility can
provide significantly greater protection than a terres-
trial one.
Second, quarantine testing should consume the
minimum quantity of soil necessary to provide accu-
rate hazard assessment, while the remainder of the
sample is protected from forward contamination or
accidental alteration. Thus, experiments with maxi-
mum sensitivity for life and hazard detection should
be chosen.
Third, life forms, if they exist on Mars, are most
likely to be present in low concentrations. Therefore,
any assessment of hazard must be based on attempting
to detect such forms. Increasing the population of any
forms detected, prior to exposing them to challenge
cultures, would provide a more sensitive test than
simply exposing a large number of terrestrial species to
Martian sod.
Fourth, in a quarantine protocol, human error is the
most common cause of failure. Therefore, experiments
should be selected that require the minimum number
of persons to handle the sample.
THE PROTOCOL
Planning Mechanisms: GERT
Processing of the Martian sample involves a com-
plex series of tests (the protocol) that are interdepen-
dent and have a variety of possible courses of action
and outcomes, depending on the results obtained at
each stage. To illustrate this testing sequence, the
Graphical Evaluation and Review Technique (GERT)
symbology developed by A. A. B. Pritsker (ref. 18) is
used. The advantage of this visual representation
method over the traditional flowcharts is that the
information can also be used to estimate the probabili-
ty of certain outcomes occurring (ref. 19).
GERT symbology graphically presents test activi-
ties and information flows in the sequence in which
they are to be executed or generated (in the case of
information flows). Activities and information flows
are represented in the figures as direct lines that are
numbered according to the nature of the activity. An
activity is initiated by an event (or events) and ends
with the occurrence of another event. In the graphs,
the events are represented by a structure (an event
node) which may be of two shapes (figure 4-1). A
circular event node indicates that at the completion of
a given number of the activities leading to the node
DETERMINISTIC NODE
NUMBER OF ACTIVITY
COMPLETIONS FOR
1ST NODE REALIZATION
NUMBER OF ACTIVITY
COMPLETIONS FOR
2ND AND SUBSEQUENT
NODE REALIZATIONS
PROBABILISTIC NODE
NODE IDENTIFICATION
NUMBER (Keyed to the
step within the protocol)
Figure 4-1.—Event node symbolism. Circular nodes
indicate that if the required preceding event (or
events) occurs, then the event (or events} leading
away from the output side will also occur. The
pointed output indicates that the subsequent path
to be followed depends upon the outcome of the
events that led to the node—at least two alternative
paths are possible. A node that has been activated
by events is said to be realized.
(i.e., the node is realized), the next activity will be
initiated: such a node is called deterministic. The
nodes that resemble horizontal teardrops indicate that
the next activity to be initiated depends on the results
of the preceding activity. Such a probabilistic node has
at least two different activities leading away from it,
which one is followed depends on the experimental
results that activated the node.
In its richest form, GERT permits either analytical
reduction or computer simulation of the procedures
represented by the GERT network. One may then
estimate expected times for completion, expected use
of consumables (i.e., sample, time, power, equipment,
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etc.), and the probabilities associated with different
outcomes. It is the latter use of GERT that assumed a
major role in this study because it was possible thereby
to calculate the sensitivity of the various protocol tests
at detecting different levels of microbes contained
within a soil sample. The GERT symbology is used
throughout the remainder of this chapter to illustrate
the sequence of protocol steps and to show how
various experimental outcomes determine subsequent
testing and (or) decisions. An overview of the com-
plete protocol is shown in figure 4—2. Subsequent
GERT charts present a detailed view of events within
each discrete phase of the protocol. Each of these
following charts thus elaborates upon a particular
segment of the overview shown in figure 4-2. A
detailed explanation of how the GERT symbology is
applied to a specific protocol, using the chemistry
program as an example, is presented in Appendix A.
Appendix A also includes estimates of the probability
that each of the protocol steps could successfully
detect a microorganism.
Outline of the Protocol
The quarantine protocol requires 46 g of sod to
complete the first-order testing. Statistical calculations
based on the proposed protocol indicate that the 46-g
quantity provides reliable results: Regardless of the
sample size returned, a representative sample of 46 g
is sufficient for first-order quarantine testing.
As was mentioned earlier, the OQF and the
quarantine testing protocol have been designed for
flexibility regarding the "packaging" of the returned
sample. The discussion of sample manipulation and
preparation that follows assumes the most likely
possibility: that a sample canister is received that
contains 10 separately collected and sealed subsam-
ples. In this scenario, a quarantine sample for use in
the protocol could consist of either (1) one of the 10
subsamples, with the others held in storage under
pristine Martian conditions, or (2) a representative
sample formed by mixing portions of all 10 subsam-
ples. Because there are advantages and disadvantages
in both approaches, the equipment and procedures
described here have been designed to allow for either
choice. Whether the 100-g sample used in the protocol
is composed of one intact subsample or 10 g from each
of the 10 subsamples will not affect the execution of
the protocol, except for those preliminary handling
steps that are involved in preparing the sample. For
example, if a composite quarantine sample is to be
used, then gas samples would need to be collected
from all 10 subsample vessels, rather than from just
one. Preparation of the composite quarantine sample
would follow gas sampling.
Figure 4-3 illustrates a proposed division of soil
from a 1 kg sample return, with 100 g dedicated to
quarantine testing. Of that amount, 54 g would be
reserved for second-order testing if required. Nine
hundred grams of the 1 kg sample would be stored
under pristine conditions for basic scientific study
after the completion of quarantine testing. This
distribution of material is deemed essential because
the orbiting facility has been developed to certify that
the Martian sample is safe to send to Earth, and not to
perform basic scientific research. As much sample as
possible must be available for research in laboratories
on Earth once the sample has been certified as safe;
the quantity used for quarantine testing must be kept
to a minimum.
When the Martian sample is received in the OQF,
this procedure (figure 4-4) would be followed:
• A gas analysis of the contents of the sample
canister and individual subsample contamer(s) will
be performed.
• The quarantine sample will be removed and
analyzed for radioactive materials. If radioactive
levels do not constitute a health hazard, the sample
will be prepared (as outlined in figure 4—4), and
larger particles will be visually inspected using a
stereomicroscope.
• The chemical analyses will be performed.
• The metabolic and microscopic protocols will be
initiated using the results of the chemical analyses.
(See figure 4-5.)
• The microbiological culture and challenge culture
studies will be undertaken.
• The results of the five test phases (chemical,
metabolic, microscopic, microbiological, and chal-
lenge cultures) will be collected in the data pool
for the project and thoroughly analyzed. The
results of this analysis can lead to either of two
outcomes (figure 4-6): (a) nonterrestrial life forms
or uncontrollable toxins (a toxic agent that repli-
cates or is in some manner uncontrolled) are
detected, dictating second-order testing; or (b) no
such forms are observed, in which case the sample
is released to a containment facility on Earth.
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DISPOSE OF
SAMPLE AND
Figure 4-2.—An overview of the entire testing protocol.
PRISTINE
STORAGE
(900 g)
SAMPLE
PREPARATION
AND
PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION
TOTAL
SAMPLE
RETURNED
(1000 g)
QUARANTINE TESTING
RESERVE
FOR SECOND-
ORDER
TESTS
Figure 4-3.—The distribution of the Martian sample to the various experimental protocols.
Preliminary Handling
Prior to sample receipt, the microbial flora of the
quarantine facility and the organisms indigenous to the
crew will be sampled and identified. The information
gained (i.e., species detected) from this procedure will
be incorporated into a basic data pool so that, if an
organism is detected during the quarantine tests, it can
be compared to those species found on board prior to
sample receipt to determine if the organism is a
terrestrial contaminant.
The preliminary handling of the quarantine sample
begins with gas sampling. (See also Chapter 5,
Appendix B.) This procedure will provide information
regarding the sample history during transit from Mars.
The quarantine sample will then be examined for
various forms of radioactivity; because cell cultures
may be damaged at abnormal radiation levels, this
information will be available to assist interpretation of
the cell challenge culture experiments. If by some
remote chance the sample is extremely radioactive,
provisions have been made for ensuring crew safety.
A cursory stereomicroscope inspection of the quar-
antine sample, discussed in detail in the microscopy
section, is designed to identify unusual portions of the
sample that require special handling. Objects such as
macroscopic life forms, large fossils, and anomalous
structures will either be stored (in the case of fossils) or
cultured on media and tissues and investigated with
high-resolution microscopy.
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ACQUISITION OF
SAMPLE CANISTERI
SAMPLE GAS IN CANISTER
OPEN SAMPLE CANISTER
PRISTINE STORAGE
SAMPLE GAS IN
QUARANTINE
SAMPLE CONTAINER
REMOVE AND OPEN
QUARANTINE CONTAINER
T
TOTAL QUARANTINE SOIL SAMPLE (100 g)
SEPARATED INTO
jt
PARTICLES <100/im PARTICLES >100/im
i
STEREOMICROSCOPIC SCAN
(10X AND 40X)
LIVING ORGANISMS OR FOSSILS
OBSERVED
4
NO LIVING ORGANISMS OR
FOSSILS OBSERVED
JL
ISOLATE LIVING
ORGANISMS
I
ISOLATE FOSSIL-?I  >5>IL5
FURTHER MICROSCOPIC
AND BIOLOGICAL STUDIES
!
i
GRIND
PARTICLES)
HOLD FOR RELEASE TO
EARTH
HOMOGENEOUS
MIXTURE
i
DISPENSE
Figure 4—4.—Preparation of the Martian sample for initial cursory microscopic examination and subse-
quent quarantine testing.
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CONDUCTANCE
MEASURE WATER-
SOLUBLE MATERIAL
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QUARANTINE
SAMPLE
ELEMENTAL
ANALYSIS
ORGANIC CARBON
ANALYSIS
CONTINGENT
ANALYSIS (AMINO ACIDS)
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REQUIRED
FOR
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TESTING
GENERAL
SAMPLE
CHARACTERISTICS
Figure 4-5.—The utilization of information obtained from the chemical analysis protocol.
The remaining sample will be sized, with particles
larger than 100 /un reduced to 100 fan size. While
grinding soil would appear to be detrimental to
organisms in the material, similar procedures per-
formed on Arctic soil (ref. 20) did not significantly
reduce the viability of the sod's microorganisms if the
temperature was kept below —15° C. The two portions
of the quarantine sample will then be recombined and
intimately mixed to produce a homogeneous mixture
from which samples will be taken for protocol testing.
Pooling of the sample will be performed because,
statistically, a more precise result is obtained by
mixing subsamples and analyzing the mixture than by
analyzing the subsamples separately and pooling the
results (ref. 21). The homogeneous mixture will be
distributed to the five investigation programs, each of
which is designed to test for life forms in a different
manner: microbiological culturing, microscopic analy-
sis, chemical analysis, metabolic tests, and challenge
cultunng. Figure 4—7 illustrates the preliminary han-
dling steps.
Gas Sampling Experiments
Objective: To qualitatively and quantitatively analyze
the gases contained in the Mars sample return canister
(MSRC) and subsample container(s).
Method: A clean stainless steel sampling container will
be connected through a microbiological filter to the
MSRC, evacuated, and filled with the sample canis-
ter's gas. This gas will be admitted directly into a high-
resolution mass spectrometer for qualitative and quan-
titative analysis and the filter will be retained for
subsequent culturing. The bottom of the sample
canister will be removed to gain access to the
quarantine sample vessels. The gas sampling proce-
dure will then be repeated for the quarantine sample
vessel or vessels, as appropriate.
47
PRE-MISSION
SAMPLING
OF MICROFLORA
CHEMICAL
ANALYSIS
PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS OF
SAMPLE
Figure 4-6.—The flow of information from the protocol tests into the mission outcomes.
Rationale: By providing results that can be compared
to the atmospheric composition determined by the
Viking missions (see table 4-1), this experiment will
indicate whether changes have occurred in the atmo-
sphere within the canister or subsample containers
during transit. Such changes would be explained in
one of four ways: (a) the Martian atmosphere was not
in chemical equilibrium with the soil during transit, (b)
viable organisms in the container altered the gases, (c)
the canister leaked to space during transit, or (d) a
combination of possibilities a, b, and c. Any changes in
the atmospheric composition could impact subsequent
testing in ways that are dependent on the nature of the
change.
Even if complete confirmation of the Vilang results
is obtained, the presence of viable organisms cannot
be excluded because organisms could be dormant or
present in concentrations so low that atmospheric
interactions are negligible.
Design Requirements: Vacuum to ICHtorr, a special-
ized gas-transfer sample container, and filter and
fittings compatible with the gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometer (GC/MS) must be provided. No special
procedures are required for zero-g conditions.
Radioactive Decay
Objective To determine the level of alpha, beta, and
gamma emission in the Mars return sample.
Method. Signals from scintillation detectors (sensitive
to alpha, beta, and gamma radiation) will be amplified
and counted (ref. 22). After determining background
radiation, replicate 250 mg samples of Martian soil will
be counted for 20 mm in the alpha-, beta-, and
gamma-sensitive wells. Samples found not to be highly
radioactive will be returned to the quarantine sample.
Rationale The cell challenge experiments are affected
by radiation, so that prior knowledge of the sample's
radioactivity could prevent possible misinterpretation
of cell challenge experiments. In addition, even
though the Vilang results indicate low radiation levels,
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Figure 4-7,—The preliminary handling of the Martian return sample.
ensuring crew safety requires that counting proce-
dures be performed.
Design Requirements: The equipment for this experi-
ment is currently available, although verification of
these instruments for space flight would be essential.
Chemical Analysis Protocol
A set of chemical experiments has been developed
to support the biological testing sequence as well as to
identify organic compounds that could be associated
with hfe processes. Material necessary for all the
chemistry experiments will be taken from the homoge-
neous quarantine sample. It is anticipated that, with
replicate experiments, approximately 10 g of the
quarantine sample will be used.
A set of five experiments, designed to identify some
general soil chemical characteristics, was selected to
identify possible adverse reactions of cell culture and
media to Mars soil exposure. The pH, Eh, and
conductance measurements are to be made by first
wetting the sod for pH and Eh analysis, followed by
filtration and collection of the supernatant liquid for
conductance measurements. The soil sample will be
thoroughly extracted with water and, after being
evaporated to dryness, the soluble material will be
analyzed for its chemical constituents by an alpha
particle instrument. This instrument is capable of
detecting 99 percent of the elements found in rocks
and soil, in most cases to the parts per million range.
Organic carbon analysis will be performed by direct
pyrolysis of the soil into a mass spectrometer. If
fragmentation peaks characteristic of complex organic
compounds such as amino acids are observed, an
ammo acid analysis will be undertaken. This analysis
involves a series of extraction and concentration steps,
with the final product analyzed by GC/MS tech-
niques. This experiment has the potential for identi-
fying the biotic or abiotic origin of any amino acids
found.
Figure 4-8 illustrates the chemical protocol steps.
Measurement of pH, Oxidation-Reduction Potential,
and Conductance
Objective: To determine the pH, oxidation-reduction
potential, and conductance of the sample.
Method. One gram of sample will be analyzed using
Colorado State University Soil Testing Laboratory
techniques (refs. 23, 24). The soil is moistened with
distilled water and, after 1 hour, the pH and oxidation-
reduction potentials of the slurry are measured with
electrodes. The soil paste is then vacuum filtered, and
the supernatant liquid is placed in a conductivity
bridge. Because these measurements are nondestruc-
tive, the sample is stored for future use.
Rationale: Any given species of terrestrial organism
survives in a relatively narrow range of pH, oxidation-
reduction potential, and dissolved salt concentration.
Thus, when preparing media for challenge organisms,
it is imperative that these parameters of the Martian
soil be known.
Design Requirements:
1. pH and oxidation-reduction potential measure-
ments. A container must be designed that is
capable of holding 1 g of Martian soil to which 1
ml of distilled water can be added. This contain-
er must be capable of sequentially accepting two
sets of electrodes that contact the moistened soil:
the standard glass-membrane reference electrode
used for measuring pH and an electrode for
oxidation-reduction measurements, each compat-
ible with an expanded-scale pH/millivolt meter.
2. Conductivity measurements. The vacuum-fil-
tered supernatant liquid will be placed on a
conductivity cell and measured by a standard
conductivity bridge.
Aqueous Extraction
Objective: To determine the total weight of aqueous
extractable materials and identify water-soluble
elements.
Method. A 250 mg sample will be weighed to the
nearest 0.1 mg and combined with 5 ml of distilled
water. After being agitated for 10 minutes and
centrifuged to cause particles to settle, the superna-
tant liquid is decanted, vacuum-passed through a
preweighed fme-porous-glass filtering crucible, and
saved. After this procedure is repeated three times, the
total sample will be washed on the filter (the wash
water is saved), air dried, and weighed in the filtering
crucible. The sample will be repeatedly washed, dried,
and reweighed until a stable weight is achieved (i.e.,
within 1 mg). The total weight of soluble material can
then be calculated.
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The supernatant liquid and the wash water will be
evaporated to dryness and the elemental composition
of the remaining material determined using the alpha
particle instrument (ref. 25).
Rationale. To anticipate possible changes in the
challenge cell culture that are caused by certain
elements dissolved from the sample, it is important to
know what material is extractable by water from the
soil
Design Requirements A system must be developed to
allow intimate mixing of the soil and water. In
addition, a centrifuge, vacuum filtration system, and
evaporator will be needed.
Elemental Analysis
Objective. To perform qualitative and quantitative
analysis of the elemental content of the quarantine
sample.
Method. The analysis is based on the use of an alpha
particle instrument with alpha, proton, and X-ray
modes developed by Economou and Turkevich (ref.
25). A 600 mg soil sample is held so that it covers the
instrument sample tray, the space between the sample
and the instrument head is evacuated to 1 torr or less,
and the sample is assayed. Upon completion of the
analysis (6 to 12 hours), the sample will be stored for
possible future use.
Rationale. Elemental analysis is desirable on the
quarantine sample to identify concentrations of ele-
ments that may interfere with media developed for
challenge organisms. The results of this experiment
will be compared to similar analyses done on the
Viking missions (ref. 17), confirming the soil's elemen-
tal composition.
This particular method of analysis was selected
because 99 percent of the elements (other than
hydrogen) present in igneous or sedimentary rocks can
be identified and determined without destroying the
sample (ref. 25). The instrument is ideal for space
experiments because it weighs only 2 pounds and will
be available for other elemental analysis should any be
necessary.
Design Requirements: Computer interfacing for con-
trol logic and memory storage will be necessary, along
with a mechanism for maintaining the sample on the
sample tray during analysis. A vacuum system and a
cryostat will also be essential for the functioning of the
instrument.
Organic Mass Spectrometry
Objective To measure the volatile organic carbon
contained in the quarantine sample.
Method: The analysis for volatile organic carbon in the
quarantine sample will be done with a quadrupole
mass spectrometer, capable of a resolution as high as
4000, which is controlled by an on-hne computer. The
computer will also record data, calibrate the mass
scale, normalize spectra, and control the visual display
of the spectrum.
Approximately 50 mg of Martian sample will be
weighed to an accuracy of 0.1 mg and heated to
500° C in a nickel container inside an oven connected
to the mass spectrometer ionization chamber. The
system will be calibrated with 1, 2, and 3 ppm samples
of n-tetracosane.
Rationale. The presence of significant levels of organic
carbon in the Martian soil could indicate life forms. If
organic carbon is found, attempts will be made to
isolate and identify specific ammo acids. The absence
of organic carbon in the soil sample may be used to
add credibility to negative evidence from the biologi-
cal protocol.
Design Requirements: A method for filling, weighing,
and transferring the soil samples to the sample oven
must be devised that ensures that the sample is kept
free from organic contaminants.
Amino Acid Analysis
Objective. To identify and characterize possible ammo
acids present in the quarantine sample.
Method. The method is based on reports by Lawless et
al. on ammo acid analysis of meteorites (refs. 26
through 29). A 5 g sample of pulverized quarantine
sample will be sealed in a stainless steel tube with 40
ml of water and heated to 110° C with agitation for 20
hours. Upon cooling, the water will be removed by
filtration and the solid washed with additional water.
After the sample is dried, the procedure is repeated
with 40 ml 6N HC1 instead of water. The dried,
estenfied sample is redissolved in water, charged on a
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Dowex 50 (H+) ion-exchange column, and eluted with
water and 2N NHiOH. The NH4OH eluate is
evaporated to dryness, and amounts as low as 2 X10-9
g of N-tnfluoracetyl esters will then be identified by
the GC/MS system.
Rationale: If the quarantine sample is found to contain
complex organic compounds, it must be determined
whether these compounds arose from life forms (ref.
30). Because ammo acids are the building blocks of
terrestrial life, the presence of a variety of amino acids
in the sample would suggest that they were generated
by Me forms, although other sources are possible. The
lack of amino acids indicates that terrestrial-type life
forms, at least, are not present.
Design Requirements: The techniques for extracting
and concentrating the sample in zero g (i.e., filtration,
hydrolysis, reflux, and evaporation) must be
developed.
Microscopic Examination of the Martian Soil
For many centuries microscopy has been an impor-
tant tool for visualizing biological microstructures. The
basic power of microscopy lies in the ability to vary
magnification, light illumination, and stains to permit
enhancing the appearance of a specimen. As has been
argued by Soffen and Sloan (ref. 31), microscopic
observation can be an important tool for detecting
microscopic life forms in Martian soil, especially if
Martian life has a chemical basis different from the
carbon-based chemistry of terrestrial life forms. Micro-
scopic observations of the sample will offer informa-
tion about the sod structure (e.g., regularity, size, and
morphology) as well as characteristics of replicating,
viable, dead, or fossilized biological forms (ref. 32).
Assuming that there are microorganisms in the Mar-
tian soil, it should be possible to visualize them when
using a combination of light, phase contrast, and
electron microscopic techniques, especially when
different dyes are used to enhance the difference
between cells and particulate matter. Thus the burden
of research lies in defining what methods will offer the
highest levels of discrimination and detection of life
forms. Many advances have been made in the tech-
niques for microscopically examining soils, and the
methods can be applied to the present protocol.
First, dry untreated soil or stained samples will be
microscopically observed in situ to determine if cells
are adhering to soil particles. (Terrestrial bacteria
often cannot be separated from soils by sonication or
centrifugation without destroying cellular membranes
or lysing organisms.) Then, if the results are negative,
the chances of observing cells will be increased by
attempting to wash the organisms off the soil particles
so that they will be more visible. A variety of
microscopic techniques as well as staining methodolo-
gies will be used to provide the maximum chance of
differentiating any cellular material from debris. In
brief, the methods of microscopic observation selected
to examine the Martian soil samples are:
1. Initial stereomicroscopic observation of large,
untreated Martian soil particles;
2. Scanning electron microscopic observation of
filters on which soil was collected,
3. Light and scanning electron microscopic obser-
vation of the homogeneous soil sample (dry soil
and supernatant of soil), both stained and in its
natural state;
4. Ultraviolet illumination of the sample to observe
fluorescent stains and to test for chlorophyll-
induced fluorescence.
Figure 4—9 illustrates the microscopy protocol
steps. The probability of successfully detecting life
using the microscopic protocol is shown in table 4-3
(Appendix A).
Stereomicroscopy
Objective: To provide gross examination of the Mar-
ban sample in a pristine condition under a light
stereomicroscope.
Method: The sample will be separated according to
soil particle size. Soil particles larger than 100 jam will
be transferred into a transparent container, examined
by a stereomicroscope at 10 X and 40 X magnifications
while under a Mars-like environment, and document-
ed. Any fossils or Me forms observed will be trans-
ferred into separate containers by a remote manipula-
tor for further observation under high-resolution
microscopes. If none are observed, the sample will be
ground and homogenized for use by the remainder of
the protocol.
Rationale: This step is designed to prevent the
grinding of any Me forms or fossils that are larger than
100 fan.
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Figure 4-9.—The microscopy protocol.
Design Requirements. Stereomicroscope with photo-
graphic and automated video (TV) scanning capabili-
ties, a transparent sample container, and a mechanical
means of removing objects from the sample container
are required.
Microscopic Observation of Filters
Objective: To search microscopically for life forms that
may have become attached to various bacteriological
filters that contact the soil during chemical and
biological studies.
Method Sections of the filters removed from the
sample containers wall be mounted on specimen
holders and vacuum evaporated with carbon and gold
palladium. Scanning electron microscopic observations
will be made of randomly sampled fields (10 percent of
the entire area) at 500 X while suspicious areas will be
observed and photographed at magnifications of
1000X to 5000 X. Other sections of the filters will be
embedded on agar plates, and after incubation the
plates will be observed microscopically.
Rationale. During experimentation in zero g, soil
particles and organisms may have drifted and impact-
ed on the container's filters. Scanning electron micros-
copy rather than optical microscopy is adopted be-
cause a scanning electron microscope has a depth of
view about 300 times greater than optical microscopes
(up to a few millimeters), has been used successfully
for examining filters (ref. 33), and permits viewing at
1000 X or greater magnification (ref. 34).
Microscopic Observations of the Homogeneous
Sample
Objective: To use many different microscopic systems
to maximize the chance of visualizing any life forms in
the sample (figure 4-10).
Method The initial direct observations of the sample
are made on unamended soil specimens. Slides with
dry material, a smear of soil suspension (1 g soil with 1
or 2 ml of sterile water), and slides of soil smears
prepared with several different stains are suggested for
observation. The selection of specific stains should be
based on the differential properties of dyes in their
capabiliues for staining various cellular materials (e.g.,
membrane, nucleus, etc.) and then- ease of application.
Actual selection of stain may be made according to the
following dye characteristics: (a) variations in the dye's
molecular weight—low «300), average (300 to 500),
and high (>500); (b) acid, basic, or amphotenc dyes,
(c) sensitivity to different cellular membranes and
cellular material, and (d) the counterstaining proper-
ties. Simple stains such as methylene blue, phenolic
rose Bengal, aniline blue, carbolfuschin, India Ink, and
capsule stains (e.g., Anthony's stain) have been suc-
cessfully used to view microorganisms in soil (refs. 35,
36, 37). Nucleic acid dyes such as toluidine blue or
azure B may be used to stain cellular materials such as
DNA. Fluorescent stains such as fluorescein isothiocy-
anate, acndine orange, or Mg-ANS are valuable
methods for tagging microorganisms in soil because
these tend to stain those microbes that do not react to
more conventional stains (refs. 38 through 42).
The slides are prepared for observation following
standard techniques for staining and fixation, modified
for zero g use.
1. A smear of untreated sample is observed under
light, phase contrast, ultraviolet, and scanning
electron microscope.
2. In general, simple stains for light and scanning
microscopic observations are preferable.
3. Fluorescent dye stains are also suggested for
fluorescence microscopy observations.
4. In addition to the above stains, specific slide
preparations for scanning electron microscopy
observations are also suggested. Soil specimens
for scanning electron microscopy are generally
prepared with glutaraldehyde fixation and
freeze-drying or freeze-etching methods, and
then vacuum coated with gold palladium. Slides
prepared for light microscopy can also be viewed
by a scanning electron microscope after they are
vacuum coated with gold palladium or carbon
(ref. 43).
Samples will be observed using a light, phase
contrast, and ultraviolet-fluorescent microscope at
450 X, and at 5000 X with the scanning electron
microscope. For each specific slide, a 10-percent
sample of fields should be photographically document-
ed, and suspicious fields observed at a greater mag-
nification. If any cell-like object is observed on a
specific slide, repeat observations will be made on
duplicate slide preparations. Attempts to culture the
organisms will then be intensified while the organism's
characteristics are compared to those of the known
terrestrial contaminants of the OQF. If the soil
specimen slides show no cell-like objects, then a small
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Figure 4-10.—The sequence of events involved in the microscopic examination of the sample.
amount (5 g) of soil will be combined with 25 ml of
sterile water and centrifuged to separate the particles
and supernatant. This supernatant will be stained and
observed as described above.
Rationale: Any living organism that is larger than
100 A (the limit of resolution of a scanning electron
microscope) should be observable under microscopic
light illuminations and (or) electron-imaging systems.
Bright-field light microscopy using stained and un-
stained soil smears has been successfully utilized to
identify microorganisms of varying sizes in soil (refs.
35, 44, 45). Infrared color photomicrography of
unstained soil smears, using a bright-field transmitted-
light microscope, offers an additional imaging system
for identifying microorganisms (refs. 46, 47). Phase
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contrast microscopy can also discriminate microbial
forms from soil mineral fragments when used at
varying amplitudes (ref. 48). In addition, ultraviolet
fluorescence microscopy, with selected stains, offers an
ability to visualize some microbial forms that cannot
be detected by white-light microscopy (ref. 44).
Although the threshold for microscopically detecting
microbial forms depends on their concentration in the
soil (refs. 49, 50), it has been suggested that scanning
electron microscopy can be used to examine suspect
areas observed by light microscopy because higher
resolution and magnification permit differentiation of
soil particles from microbial forms or microfossils (refs.
51 through 54). Small microbes adhering to soil
particles, as well as fractions of microbial forms, can
be viewed with a scanning electron microscope more
successfully than with conventional microscopy (refs.
55 through 57). In addition, various methods of
preparing soil specimens will offer different conditions
under which different microbial forms become more
visible.
Design Requirements and Instrumentation:
1. Conditions—Slides will be viewed under Earth-
ambient conditions. The sample must remain in
the containment cabinetry while the viewing
takes place remotely, from outside the cabinet.
2. Microscopes—The optical microscope used
should be capable of white-light and ultraviolet
illuminations, and should have a phase contrast
capability. Magnifications are required at the
levels of 100 X, 450 X, and 1000 X.
The scanning electron microscope (SEM) must
provide magnifications of 5000 X to 10000X
and the accelerating voltage requirement may be
10 to 50 kv. It is necessary to have a high-vacuum
evaporation chamber for specimen coating tech-
niques.
3. Slide preparation requirements—This area, en-
closed within the specimen holding cabinet, must
have the following equipment and supplies:
drying oven with a timer and a capability of
50° C to 110° C; freeze-drying chamber, centri-
fuge, staining tats (like those developed for
Skylab) (ref. 58) containing dyes, washing agents,
mordants, solutes, and drying agents, and micro-
bial kits containing micropipettes, droppers,
blotters, glass slides and covers, and petn dishes.
An automated video (TV) scanning and photo-
graphic attachment will be available for each
microscope, with built-in program for a random
sampling procedure consisting of a specified
number of field-photographs per slide.
Ultraviolet Microscopy
Objective. To detect the presence of chlorophyll-like
pigments in soil samples by their fluorescence.
Method: During the microscopic investigation of the
Martian sample, a long-wavelength, ultraviolet light
will be used to illuminate the sample. Any areas that
are fluorescing will be viewed with greater mag-
nification to determine if they result from pigment
fluorescence.
Rationale: Any technique that could call an observer's
attention to potential life forms within the sample
would be valuable, especially when the procedure
does not involve any additional effort. Because chloro-
phyll is known to fluoresce at a very characteristic
visible wavelength and because chlorophyll that is not
actively involved in photosynthesis (such as would
occur in a dormant organism) would fluoresce more
intensely (ref. 59), the presence of this pigment could
be easily detected. Because naturally fluorescing
minerals could mask any chlorophyll effect and a
nonchlorophyll photosynthetic pigment would not be
expected to fluoresce, the possibility of negative
results is fairly great. However, the simplicity of the
procedure warrants its inclusion in the protocol
because it would provide powerful assistance to the
microscopic survey.
Metabolic Experiments
The techniques selected for this phase of the work
are based heavily on the Viking experiment (refs. 7
through 10) and involve the detection of various
metabohcally derived products emanating from sam-
ples held under a simulated Martian environment. The
rationale behind these experiments is that if an
organism is provided with the proper growth condi-
tions, it will multiply and eventually its progeny will
be numerous enough to alter the sample's atmosphere
and soil chemistry, permitting detection of the
changes. These proposed experiments, however, rely
on analytical equipment that has a much greater
sensitivity to various gases and organic compounds
than did the Viking instruments, thus reducing the
amount of growth or metabolism needed to permit
detection. The most general assessment will be for
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evidence of any gas change above the soil; the kinetics
and patterns of any observed changes can be used to
differentiate between biotic and abiotic soil activity.
Evidence of CO 2 deriving from various radioactively
labeled organic substrates will be measured because
carbon-based life forms would be expected to release
CO 2 as the substrate is consumed. Furthermore, some
of the labeled atoms would be expected to become
incorporated into the organisms, thereby permitting
their detection by autoradiographic techniques. This
latter test phase assumes that autotrophic Me forms
would have to be an essential component in the soil in
order to prevent the eventual depletion of organic
compounds due to catabohc activity. Thus, evidence
of the incorporation of radioactively labeled CO 2 into
organisms will be sought. Finally, soil samples from all
tests will be assayed using the GC/MS for changes in
organic carbon levels at the termination of each phase
of incubation.
To enhance the possibility of life detection, a series
of environments that simulate conditions expected on
Mars will be used to maximize the probability of
inducing germination or permitting growth. Thus,
diurnal cycles of light and temperature will be altered
gradually from Martian winter to summer conditions.
Because moisture may be a limiting factor to a Martian
organism, low levels of moisture will be made avail-
able to the soil during the winter phase in one
experiment and during the summer phase in the other,
this dual approach is used because there is some
disagreement about the season in which the maximum
levels of free water would occur on Mars. In addition
to low moisture content, low levels of organic com-
pounds in the soil may also limit the growth of
organisms in the Martian soil. Furthermore, it is
possible that the low atmospheric oxygen levels may
restrict growth, since oxygen could be critical for the
production of metabolic water Thus, experiments
involve modifying various aspects of the sample's
temperature, light, moisture, and nutritional environ-
ment in the hope that conditions essential to Martian
organisms will be attained and growth or increased
metabolism will result.
The metabolic experiments are designed to be
performed in two parallel sequences using a minimal
amount of sample. By proper development of the
conditions around the sample, a large number of
environmental conditions can be established without
consuming additional Martian material. Obviously, if
at any particular photopenod/temperature re-
gime/moisture content/nutritional status/gas concen-
tration, evidence of life is detected, these factors will
be adjusted to optimize the growth.
The probability of detecting life forms by the
metabolic tests is shown in table 4-4 (Appendix A).
Figure 4-11 illustrates the metabolic protocol steps.
Gas Exchange Experiment: Dry Phase
Objective: To determine if temperature and photoper-
lod are environmental factors that limit the growth of
Martian organisms (as determined by measuring
changes in gas composition).
Method: The sod sample is electrostatically held in the
bottom of a metabolic chamber, beneath a window
transparent to visible and infrared light. The soil is
maintained in a dry state and exposed to a light/dark
cycle approximately equal to that of the Martian
winter at the sample collection site. The day/night
temperature fluctuations within the chamber would
mimic those expected on Mars several centimeters
below the soil surface. The photic and thermal
environment is gradually shifted over several weeks to
those conditions assumed to prevail during the Mar-
ban summer. Throughout the experiment, a sample of
the Mars-like gas above the soil is periodically with-
drawn through a microbiological filter and analyzed
by gas chromatography for CO 2, O2, N2, and an inert
gas standard that is used to calibrate the equipment.
The microbiological filter will be microscopically
investigated for trapped organisms.
Rationale: The germination of many spores and seeds
on Earth is dependent on their exposure to the proper
temperature and (or) light regime. Thus, by gradually
modifying these environmental parameters from win-
ter to summer conditions, the environmental stimulus
necessary for germination and growth may be at-
tained. By passively monitoring the gases above the
sample, it should be possible to detect any shifts in
their ratios (refs. 60, 61). By not adding water initially,
a gas release caused by a reaction of the sod with
water (such as is believed to have occurred with the
Vdang experiment) should be avoided. Although the
lack of exogenous water may not permit germination,
arguments could be made that enough metabolism
should occur in its absence to permit noticeable gas
changes.
If no gas changes are noticed, the data serve as
baseline information for successive experiments. How-
ever, observation of gas changes would then be
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Figure 4—11.—The metabolic testing protocol.
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Figure 4-12.—A schematic diagram of the metabolic chamber.
followed by detailed kinetic studies to determine
whether they were due to biological or nonbiological
activity.
Design Requirements: A gas-tight chamber capable of
holding 1 to 5 g of soil and about 50 to 100 cm3 of
atmosphere at Martian pressures will serve as the
metabolic chamber (figure 4-12). The soil should be
held on one surface by electrostatic charge, and the
opposing surface should have a window that is
transparent over the range of 380 to 2000 nm. A light
source that mimics the sun's spectral composition will
be used, and the intensity at the soil surface should
approximate solar radiation at the surface of Mars. A
gas sampling port, sealed with a 0.3-/un bacteriological
filter, will permit samples of the gas to be taken. Two
additional filtered ports will permit adding gases or
moisture during later experiments. If possible, a soil
subsample could be removed without disrupting the
chamber's gaseous interior. The interior of the cham-
ber will be capable of having diurnal temperature
cycles that may range from -40° to + 30° C.
COz Fixation Experiment: Dry and Moist Phase
Objective: To determine if atmospheric carbon dioxide
is incorporated into Martian soil when exposed to
diurnal light and temperature cycles.
Method: The dry soil sample within the metabolic
chamber will have small amounts of radioactively
labeled carbon dioxide gas added to the chamber. The
temperature and light cycles will be gradually modi-
fied from early Martian spring conditions to midsum-
mer. Periodically, the gas composition above the
sample will be monitored to determine if significant
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changes of gases occur, especially in oxygen levels.
Then the sample will be gradually humidified to
provide increased amounts of water, and incubation
under summer conditions will continue. At the end of
the incubation period, a subsample of the soil will be
removed, checked by autoradiography, and assayed
for organic carbon.
Rationale Autotrophic growth of organisms would be
essential in a world where organic compounds are not
readily available in the environment. Thus, if an
autotrophic organism that uses carbon dioxide has
germinated, it would remove some of the labeled gas
and incorporate it into its own organic compounds
(ref. 7). Furthermore, because the splitting of water is
the first chemical event in terrestrial photosynthesis,
moisture levels to which the organisms are exposed
may be very critical, therefore, the soil should be
gradually changed from dry to humidified.
Photosynthesis would be detected through the
presence of labeled organic compounds in the soil,
since oxygen is not necessarily released during photo-
synthesis.
The Viking results indicated that soil chemistry may
have caused a nonbiological carbon fixation that could
confound gas exchange experiments; thus, in addition
to kinetic studies on gas incorporation, and GC/MS
analysis of the soil for organic carbon, autoradiograph-
ic techniques would be used to permit visualization of
any regions fixing carbon, to determine if biologically
active organisms were present.
Design Requirements. See "Gas Exchange Experi-
ment: Dry Phase."
Metabolism of Organic Compounds: Nutrient
Enrichment Phase
Objective. To determine if organic nutrients are
decomposed to CO 2 with kinetics that are indicative of
living organisms.
Method: A mixture of organic compounds with labeled
carbon atoms will be formulated, based on the organic
composition of the Martian soil, if no orgarucs are
detected at a level of sensitivity greater than was
possible in Viking, then nutrient mixtures based on the
content of meteorites will be used. The mixture will be
frozen in a metabolic chamber at a temperature that
would be expected to occur below the sod during a
Martian winter. The light and temperature diurnal
cycles will be gradually modified during incubation to
attain Martian summer conditions. The amount of
carbon dioxide gas containing a radioactive label will
be assayed periodically. Since, according to the Viking
results, some labeled gas is expected to be released,
kinetic analysis and temperature effects on the rate of
production could indicate whether or not the release is
the result of biotic reactions. Finally, a subsample of
soil will be removed and studied with both autoradiog-
raphy (to determine if any label is concentrated within
organisms) and the GC/MS (to assay for metabolic by-
products).
Rationale Under Martian conditions both moisture
and organic nutrients may be limiting to growth. By
providing both elements over a variety of environmen-
tal conditions, it may be possible to establish the
conditions essential for growth or metabolism. As
metabolism begins, labeled CO 2 should accumulate in
the atmosphere, and as growth continues, the levels
should reach a point where the gases are readily
detectable (ref. 9). Autoradiographic investigations of
a soil sample will identify concentrations of label and
permit their microscopic visualization In addition,
assay of the organic compounds by GC/MS would
indicate if new organic metabolic by-products were
formed.
Design Requirements. See "Gas Exchange Experi-
ment: Dry Phase."
Metabolism of Organic Compounds: Enriched Oz
Phase
Objective. To determine if the metabolic destruction
of nutrients is enhanced by small increases in O2
levels.
Method The sample used in the nutrient enrichment
phase will have a 2- to 5-fold increase of O2 added to
the atmosphere, and will continue incubation under a
Martian spnng-to-summer environment. The release
of labeled gas will be monitored throughout incuba-
tion, and, at the conclusion of incubation, autoradio-
graphs of the soil will be taken.
Rationale: Oxygen is present in very small amounts in
the Martian atmosphere. Although such small concen-
trations could indicate that life forms do not rely on it
in their metabolic pathways, it could also be argued
that, like CO 2 in terrestrial systems, the gas may be so
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Figure 4—13.—The microbiological testing protocol.
vitally important to an organism's survival that it is
kept at low concentrations by metabolic activity.
Given the low moisture levels in the soil, evolutionary
pressures would have been enormous for the develop-
ment of pathways to produce metabolic water using
oxygen. Thus, enriching the atmosphere with oxygen
may provide the necessary gas concentrations to
permit growth.
Design Requirements. See "Gas Exchange Experi-
ment Dry Phase."
Autoradiographic Investigations
Objective: To permit visual localization of radioactive
compounds that have been incorporated into the soil.
Method. Soil samples that have been exposed to
labeled COz or labeled nutrients will be affixed as a
monolayer on a slide. Cursory radiation counts will be
used to establish approximate incubation times for
exposing the photographic film; a liquid autoradio-
graphic emulsion will be layered over the soil, incubat-
ed to permit decaying particles to expose the film, and
then developed. The emulsion will be microscopically
investigated to determine if there are regions of the
slide that have a greater density of radioactive
decompositions. Once detected, the soil beneath such
areas will be microscopically investigated to determine
if the label concentration is the result of soil absorp-
tion or biological concentration. Suspicious areas will
be more intensely investigated using scanning electron
microscopic analysis.
Concurrent with the autoradiographic investiga-
tion, a small sample will be chemically analyzed in a
manner dependent on its initial treatment. Carbon
dioxide incorporation into the sod will be assayed
using pyrolysis followed by scintillation counting, if
levels of radioactive organic compounds are detected,
the sample will be pyrolyzed and analyzed by GC/MS
to determine what organic compounds were produced
during incubation.
Sod samples to which labeled nutrients were added
will be analyzed by pyrolyzing the sod and using the
GC/MS to determine if additional carbon compounds
were synthesized
Rationale: Incorporation of radioactive compounds
into organisms, whether by way of photosynthetic use
of carbon dioxide or by metabolic utilization of
complex nutrients, results in the organism concentrat-
ing the radioactive label. Photographic emulsion in
close contact with the sod will gradually be exposed by
the decaying nuchdes; microscopic viewing of the
emulsion will then permit the localization of areas
indicating label concentration.
By focusing through the emulsion, it is possible to
investigate the sod regions that resulted in the
increased fogging. Such a technique will permit the
rapid discovery of sod regions or organisms that are
reacting with the various radioactive compounds.
Autoradiographic techniques have been successfully
used to localize and count metabolically active bacte-
ria present in sods and mixed with debns (refs. 62, 63,
64).
Analysis of the organic compounds within the sod
wdl augment information already obtained on the
nature of the metabolic products present in the sod.
Microbiological Protocol
One of the essential parts of the quarantine
protocol is to determine whether the Martian sod
sample contains viable organisms that can be cultured
(refs. 65, 66). Propagation would permit study of the
organism's physiology, chemistry, and environmental
requirements for growth.
Duplicate assays of the growth experiments wdl
require approximately 12 g of the Martian sample.
Subsamples of the sod wdl be placed on a solid
medium that contains a variety of substrates and
growth factors. Sod deposited on membrane niters will
be either placed on a minimal medium or held in a
freezer until other experiments define the proper
environmental conditions for growth by demonstrating
metabolic activity. Sod subsamples will also be added
to various aqueous systems ranging from water to a
rich medium and will be monitored for changes in
ionic composition (indicating biotic influences) by an
impedance device. To find the combination of envi-
ronmental conditions that permits growth of dormant
sod organisms, the cultures wdl be maintained at two
temperature ranges (psychrophdic and mesophdic),
whde the atmosphere would be aerobic, microaero-
philic, or anaerobic. Any indication of growth during
these experiments wdl be pursued by subculturing,
microscopic examination, and chemical analysis.
Figure 4-13 dlustrates the microbiological protocol
steps. The probability of detecting viable extraterres-
trial organisms, as predicted by the GERT chart, is
shown in table 4-5 (Appendix A).
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Figure 4—14.—A transparent plastic environmental chamber, designed for maintaining controlled conditions
around culture dishes.
Microbial Growth Experiment: Solid Medium
Objective: To determine whether the Martian soil
sample contains indigenous microorganisms that are
capable of growth under various conditions on a solid
medium.
Method: Various types of culture media containing a
solidifying agent such as agar or silica gel are prepared
on Earth and placed in transparent, gasket-sealed
plastic trays to prevent moisture loss, to maintain the
gaseous environmental system, and to minimize conta-
mination (figure 4-14). The types of media should
include:
1. A basal salt medium based on the Viking soil
analyses (ref. 15) containing oxides of silicon,
iron, sulphur, and aluminum.
2. A minimal medium containing a few carbon
sources such as acetate or formate, glycine, DL-
alanme, and basal salts.
3. A rich medium containing several E>L-amino
acids, vitamins, and growth factors—similar to
the M-4 medium used by Oyama, et al., (ref. 60)
and to that used in the Lunar Receiving Labora-
tory at Ames Research Center (ref. 61).
The empirical determination of each type of
medium, especially the basal salt medium, will require
extensive evaluation.
The soil samples are deposited on duplicate plates
of each type of medium in a fashion that disperses
them with approximately 3 to 4 mm between soil
particles. Two different incubation temperature
ranges based on Martian conditions will be used (ref.
67): a psychrophilic range of 0° to 10° C and a
mesophuic range of 15° to 25° C. The samples will be
incubated under varying gaseous environments (ref.
14), ranging from no oxygen to the oxygen levels
present in Earth's atmosphere: i.e., anaerobic (99
percent Nz, 1 percent COz), microaerophilic (98
percent Nz, 1 percent CO2, 1 percent Oz), and
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Figure 4-15.—The various environmental conditions under which the Martian soil samples are incubated
on plates.
aerobic (78 percent N2, 1 percent CO2, 21 percent
02). The relative humidity in the chambers should be
sufficient to prevent drying of the medium. The
suggested combinations of media, temperature, and
gas environments are shown in figure 4-15.
The sealed chamber (figure 4-14) can be removed
from the incubator every 24 to 48 hours and the plates
examined for evidence of growth. A stereomicroscope
with photographic capabilities can be used to examine
the duplicate plates by rotating the chamber 180
degrees. Any evidence of growth, such as the appear-
ance of colonies, would dictate subcultunng onto the
appropnate duplicate medium and the preparation of
slides for light and SEM microscopy. Incubation times
of 40 to 50 days are suggested, with each temperature
range starting at the lowest temperature and raised
1 ° C every 5 days.
The extra pair of culture plates is placed in the
chamber for sterility control and for use in the
subculture protocol.
Rationale. Any viable organisms contained in the
Martian sample are exposed to various environmental
conditions that can be found both on Mars and on
Earth. The range of conditions may provide the
Martian organisms with an environment suitable for
growth/reproduction. The soil is not separated from
the media because any organisms present may need
components from both the soluble and particulate
fractions.
69
SELF-SEALING
STOPPER
AQUEOUS
SOIL MIXTURE
IMPEDANCE
BOARD IMPEDANCE
CIRCUIT
Figure 4-16.—Chambers in which soil samples are continuously monitored for changes in impedance.
Design Requirements. The following are needed for
this experiment: a method of dispersing soil samples
onto agar plates; stereomicroscope, incubators with
two adjustable temperature ranges (0° to 10° C and
15° to 25° C); sterile inoculating loops; 72 50 X
12 mm agar plates with tight lids; and 6 plastic
chambers (170 X 110 X 30 mm) to hold the petri
dishes.
Microbial Growth Experiment: Impedance
Measurements
Objective: To detect metabolism by measuring the
increases of ionic compounds in Martian soil
suspensions.
Method: This experiment, like the previous one,
exposes soil suspensions to three different media, three
gaseous environments, and two incubation tempera-
ture ranges. Procedural differences include wetting
the sample with aqueous materials (refs. 20, 68, 69),
providing a varied range of nutrients, and recording
impedance changes automatically (ref. 70). The re-
quired media, gaseous environments, and tempera-
tures are as follows:
1. Native aqueous system—A 1.2 g sample of
Martian soil is added to 5 ml of sterile, tnple-
distilled water to make a soil suspension. (The
pH, electrical conductivity, and soil composition
have been obtained from the chemical analyses.)
Buffering the sample by adding salts of nutrients
during incubation is desirable.
2. Minimal medium—A medium such as Thornton's
salt medium (ref. 20) or a simulated Martian soil
medium with minimal organic nutrients is added
to 1.2 g of Martian soil.
3. Rich medium—A relatively nomonic medium
such as phytone or another plant peptone is
added to 1.2 g of Martian soil. This medium
should also include D-amino acids. In each
system, salts or nutrients could be added during
incubation.
The three media types will be incubated at 0° to
10° C or 15° to 25° C, and will be exposed to either
an aerobic, microaerophilic, or anaerobic atmosphere,
thus producing 18 different environments.
Each experimental impedance cell (figure 4—16) is
designed to be completely filled by 1 ml of the sample
(containing 0.2 g Martian soil) injected through a
flexible cover that prevents gas diffusion. During the
30- to 40-day incubation period, temperatures within
each range will be increased by 1 ° C every 5 days. The
impedance within each cell is automatically moni-
tored, and if it is different from controls, a sample will
be withdrawn, cultured on the appropriate medium
and environment, and examined microscopically. Even
if no impedance changes are noted, the samples will
be microscopically examined for any evidence of
growth (ref. 68).
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Rationale The use of an impedance system has several
advantages: It is an automated system, it requires little
crew involvement, it provides continuous readings,
and it is sensitive to impedance changes. Such changes
are indications that nutrients were converted to lower
molecular weight end products that leached out of the
organism and altered the electrolyte balance in the
medium. Thus, an increase in ion concentration may
indicate the activity of viable microorganisms (ref. 71).
Design Requirements: An impedance system such as
the one shown in figure 4-16 is required. The 16-
chamber unit uses 30 watts and has dimensions of 22
X 22 X 10 cm. The circuit board chambers can be
modified for the zero-g laboratory and the system
interfaced with a computer. Also needed are devices
to prepare the soil-medium suspensions, and to add
and remove samples from the chamber.
Growth of Organisms on Membrane Filters
Objective: To determine whether any soil particles
collected on membrane filters contain organisms that
can be detected by culturing.
Method. Any participate materials collected on mem-
brane filters used for filtering Martian soils will be
cultured on a basal salt solid medium. The culturing
plates will be sealed in clear chambers (figure 4-14),
maintained at low-temperature (0° to 4° C), in
anaerobic conditions, and examined at approximately
5- to 7-day intervals.
Challenge Culture Protocol
A major concern of an MSR mission is the prospect
of introducing into the biosphere an agent which is
potentially harmful to humans, other animals, plants,
or microorganisms essential to the function of biogeo-
chemical cycles (ref. 4). To investigate completely the
possibility of such an occurrence would require the
exposure of each of the hundreds of thousands of
Earth's species to the Martian soil under controlled
conditions (ref. 72)—clearly an impossible task in any
laboratory facility. However, as was discussed in
Chapter 2 (see "Characteristics of Potential Martian
Life Forms"), it is reasonable to assume that because
Martian organisms have not evolved in the presence of
terrestrial organisms, they would not demonstrate a
host specificity as is seen with Earth pathogens; if they
were pathogenic, then they could attack a variety of
different hosts (ref. 73) and would be detected by use
of representative terrestrial organisms as hosts.
The question then arises as to what constitutes a
representative organism. In a comprehensive study
conducted for the Lunar Receiving Laboratory (the
"Baylor Protocol") (ref. 74), 110 species of plants and
animals were proposed. This number was reduced by
about 50 percent in the actual lunar quarantine (ref.
75), and it has been suggested that it could be lowered
even further without reducing the credibility of the
results (refs. 1,72).
In the choice of species for such a challenge, a
number of biological constraints are imposed. The
organism must grow reliably under laboratory condi-
tions, be a sensitive indicator of pathogemcity, and be
well researched so that any change caused by exposure
to the sample can be easily recognized.
The small size of the orbiting facility places
additional constraints on species selection: Large
organisms are unacceptable, as are any test systems
that require complex support faculties or a large
number of maintenance personnel. For example, the
germ-free mice used in the Lunar Receiving Laborato-
ry required five full-time technicians for support, and
occupied an area approximately equivalent to that of
the proposed orbiting laboratory. An additional prob-
lem is that, even using moderately small organisms, the
inclusion of enough replicate individuals to provide a
statistically significant sample size would result in
overwhelming the available space.
The zero-g environment imposes still another con-
straint. It is necessary to understand not only the
normal biology of the challenge species, but the zero-g
biology as well. Organisms with minimal reaction to
zero g would be preferred to facilitate accurate
interpretation of the effects of Martian soil exposure.
Most of the organisms challenged in the Lunar
Receiving Laboratory would be unsuitable because of
anticipated abnormal reactions to zero g that would'
confuse interpretation of results.
The challenge system selected for this protocol
represents a major departure from the system used at
the LRL. In the protocol developed for the OQF,
whole organisms are replaced by cell cultures. Al-
though the use of cell cultures in the quarantine
facility will require a great deal of additional research,
because the number of flight-tested species is quite
limited, cell culture challenge systems provide several
advantages in an orbiting facility.
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1. Sensitivity—The use of cell cultures permits the
application of small quantities of soil while still
providing significant concentrations. In chal-
lenges of whole organisms, large amounts of soil
are necessary because of the dilution provided by
the large number of cells in the organism. Also,
many of the defense mechanisms that protect
whole organisms against pathogens are absent in
cell cultures.
2. Maintenance—Large numbers of cell cultures
can be maintained m a small space. Also,
maintenance can, to a great extent, be mecha-
nized. Cell culture systems of similar types were
maintained in Skylab for 59 days without any
intervention by crew members (refs. 76, 77).
3. Inoculation—It is possible to inoculate all of the
cultures through their perfusion feeding systems
without opening any containers. This reduces the
chance of contaminating the culture with extra-
neous terrestrial organisms. Soil can be mixed
with the culture medium and added directly to
the cultures. This can be accomplished without
the use of hypodermic needles, thus reducing the
danger of a crew member's being accidentally
injected. (Accidental self-injection is one of the
most common causes of laboratory-acquired
infections [ref. 78].)
4. Observation—With the use of a video camera-
equipped microscope, the cultures can be moni-
tored from the ground. This permits careful
examination of all the cultures by specialists in
the cytology of the challenge cell species. Be-
cause the chambers are small, all the cells can be
examined rather than just certain sample areas.
In addition, the cells can be observed directly
without the extensive sectioning and histological
preparation required of whole animal and plant
tissues.
5. Growth response—Whole plants and animals
exhibit a wide range of aberrations in zero g. Cell
cultures have shown little or no aberrations in
zero g (ref. 79).
The probability of detecting replicating, toxic, or
pathogenic responses by means of the challenge
culture protocol is presented in table 4-6 (Appendix
A). Figure 4-17 presents an overview of the challenge
culture protocol steps.
The laboratory is designed to accommodate 10
culture maintenance systems, thus permitting selec-
tion of tissues from organisms representing major
taxonomic groups: i.e., procaryotic cells, green plants,
fungi, vertebrates, and invertebrate species. Prior to
the quarantine, it is most important that the various
responses of the challenge species to disease and zero
g be fully understood.
The following challenge protocol for a mammalian
cell line presents the general procedure recommended
for the challenge system. Other species would be
handled similarly, except that media and environmen-
tal conditions must be determined individually for
each cell line.
Mammalian Cell Challenge Cultures
Objective: To determine whether Martian sod contains
biologically active agents capable of producing dis-
eases in, or reproducing within, cells maintained in
culture.
Method The cell cultures used in this experiment
should be chosen because they are representative of
various life forms, their cultures are stable, they are
sensitive to disease, and their reaction to zero g is
minimal. Human embryonic lung tissue (WI38) has
been flown in Skylab 3 (ref. 76), and other commonly
grown mammalian cell lines (i.e., African green
monkey kidney [GMK] or human embryonic kidney
[HEK]) may be flown prior to MSR.
The cells will be maintained on appropriate media
in 1.0 ml transparent chambers similar to those used in
the Woodland Wanderer 9 system of Skylab 3 (ref.
76). The culture chambers are shown emplaced in the
cabinet for the OQF system m figure 4-18. There will
be three sets of six chambers for each species. One
control set will be exposed to sterilized terrestrial soil,
a second control set will be treated with Martian soil
that has been dry-heat and (or) radiation sterilized
(refs. 11, 80), while the experimental set of six
chambers will be exposed to unstenhzed Martian soil.
Six hundred milligrams of soil will be mixed with
1.2 ml of the culture medium, and 0.2 ml of the soil-
medium mixture will be added to each culture. Prior
to the mission all cell lines will be tested for sensitivity
to particulate matter and, if unaffected, the culture
will receive the mixture of soil and culture media
directly. If the cell line will not tolerate particulates,
the media mixture will be filtered and the liquid phase
added to the cultures.
If filtering is required for a particular species, then
the filters will be sequentially incubated at 10° C and
35° C in petn dishes with the same medium solidified
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Figure 4-17.—77»e challenge culture protocol.
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Figure 4-18.—The system for microscopically monitoring the challenge cultures.
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with agar. (See "Growth of Organisms on Membrane
Filters," page 71)
Cultures will be incubated at their optimal temper-
atures and observed microscopically (lOOx) for 10
days, after which the tissues will be subcultured if
there are no observable differences between experi-
mental and control cultures. These subcultures like-
wise will be incubated and observed for 10 days. If no
effects are observed, one third of the replicates will be
fixed and stained for detailed microscopic examina-
tion, and another third will be challenged with a
known terrestrial virus to check for interferon produc-
tion (ref. 73). If these tests are negative, all remaining
cultures will be fixed for later study on Earth.
If at any time treated cultures appear different
from controls, tests will be conducted to determine
whether the difference is due to a replicating agent or
toxin. If a nonrephcating toxin is found, attempts will
be made to neutralize it so that the challenge can be
rerun.
In the event that half or more of the treated
cultures of one species are contaminated with terres-
trial organisms, that species culture will be rerun.
Design Requirements. The Woodland Wanderer 9
system (refs. 76, 77) must be modified so that 18
culture chambers can be individually observed micro-
scopically (figure 4-18) in zero g The microscope
should have 100X and 400 X magnification, bright-
field and phase contrast optics, and a video camera. A
system must be developed to inoculate cultures and to
remove cells for subculture. Additional research will
be needed to develop and select tissue culture strains
that are representative of a diversity of Me forms, yet
are compatible with the OQF conditions.
Second-Order Testing Sequence
An outline of the second-order testing sequence,
shown in figure 4-19, has been developed to indicate
possible activities that would follow the detection of
nonterrestnal Me forms during execution of the
planned primary protocol. Development of detailed
methods for the second-order protocol is deferred in
this study because it would be more appropriate to
develop such a plan in response to actual data
received from the primary protocol testing. Note that
in the event that the sample does not pose a threat to
Earth, the sample will be sent to Earth where it will
remain under controlled conditions to ensure that it is
not environmentally degraded. Curatorial accounting
procedures will be established to protect the soil from
loss or negligence while subsamples are loaned to
scientific investigators around the world.
Appendix A—CERT Used in Protocol
Planning
EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF GERT
SYMBOLOGY
This section describes the GERT symbology sum-
marized in figure 4-1, using the chemical analysis
protocol shown in figure 4—8 as an example to
illustrate the application of this method. The initiation
of the chemical analysis of solids is signaled by node
102. Before these tests can begin, three of the four
activities leading into node 102 (shown in figure 4-7)
must be completed: Gas analysis from the sample
container must be complete, the soil must be ob-
served, the soil must be processed into subsamples,
and the filter through which the sample's gases passed
must be analyzed. Because the last activity has three
outcomes, two of which do not indicate Martian Me
forms (i.e., no Me found or only terrestrial contami-
nants observed), only one outcome would connect to
node 102. When three activities are finished, then the
activities emanating from node 102 would be initiated
organic carbon analysis, aqueous extraction; elemental
analysis of solids, and pH, Eh, and conductance
measurements (figure 4-8) may all be initiated in
parallel with one another. This is indicated in the
figure by the fact that the output side of GERT node
102 is circular, it is a deterministic node—all activities
leading from that node must be accomplished. A node
with a probabilistic output side (i.e., a pointed side) is
illustrated at node 106 to account for the two mutually
exclusive outcomes of the organic carbon analysis:
complex orgamcs either are or are not observed. Each
outcome leading from node 106 (the completion of
organic carbon analysis) has a specific probability of
occurrence, as described in the following section.
Node 116 indicates the completion of the chemical
analysis. It is a deterministic node because the
information resulting from chemical analysis is a
prerequisite for initiating the other major quarantine
tests. Once chemical analysis is complete, this informa-
tion is forwarded to microbiological (node 402),
challenge culture (node 202), metabolic (node 502),
and microscopic (node 302) testing for use in prepar-
ing these experiments.
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Figure 4-19.—The second-order testing protocol.
Note in figure 4—2 that there are basically two
outcomes from each of the major protocols outside of
chemical analysis, either there is some evidence of
extraterrestrial life or there is not. In addition, all of
the experiments in the quarantine facility lead to one
of these two results, as indicated by connection to
node 902 (positive result) and node 912 (negative
result). There are four activities/outcomes leading into
node 912, all of which must be accomplished before
node 912 is activated, resulting in a recommendation
that the Martian sample be certified safe for transport
to Earth and further analysis. Node 902 is activated if
at least one quarantine test yielded evidence of
extraterrestrial life, as indicated by the five activi-
ty/event lines leading to the node. Realization of node
902 initiates second-order testing on the discovered
life form to determine its characteristics, and whether
it is pathogenic to life forms or harmful to processes in
the Earth's biosphere.
OUTCOME PROBABILITIES FOR GERT
NETWORKS
To calculate the probability of a certain outcome
using the GERT network, it is first necessary to assign
probabilities to each possible outcome for the probabi-
listic nodes This is difficult because the success of
each test depends upon the number of organisms
present in the soil, the sample size, the sensitivity of
the particular tests being performed, and the ability of
those tests to permit recognition of alien organisms.
Tables 4-3 to 4-6 present the outcome probabilities of
each of the major protocols. The combined probabili-
ties of all the protocols are given in table 4-7.
For purposes of illustration, the challenge culture
portion of the protocol is used here to demonstrate the
calculation of outcome probabilities (table 4-6), i.e.,
that if there is Me in the sample, it will be detected by
this particular step. There are four probabilistic nodes
in the challenge culture experiments (figure 4-17). The
first probabilistic node (node 214) is reached after the
introduction of Martian soil into challenge cultures.
Assuming that there are a certain number of organisms
in the soil, there is a specific probability that the
challenge culture will behave the same as the control
cultures (node 218) and another probability that the
challenge cultures will behave differently from the
control (node 216). It is estimated that if there is only
one microorganism per gram of the Martian soil, the
probability that the test will not detect it (resulting in
the experimental culture behaving the same as the
control) is 0.95; the probability that the experimental
culture will differ from the control is therefore 0.05
(i.e., the test ends at node 216). However, node 216 is
also a probabilistic node and has two possible out-
comes if activated. Either the effect noted would be
due to a toxic characteristic of the Martian soil
TABLE 4-3.—MICROSCOPY PROTOCOL DETECTION CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Start Node End Node Activity/Outcome Description Conditioned Probabilities With
1 org/g 1000 org/g 100000 org/g
Soil
306 308 Detection in field at 450 X
306 312 No detection at 450 X
308 310 Detection at 1000 X
308 312 No detection at 1000 X
310 314 Life structure confirmed w/SEM
310 318 Life structure not confirmed w/SEM
Supernatant
328 330 Detection in field at 450 X
328 334 No detection at 450 X
330 332 Detection at 1000 X
330 336 No detection at lOOOX
332 336 Life structure confirmed w/SEM
332 338 Life structure not confirmed w/SEM
3X10-7
i-(3xio-7)
0.5
05
1
0
3X10
0.75
025
1
0
3X10-2
1-<3X10-2)
0.90
0.10
1
0
3X10-'
Hsxio-7)
0.5
0.5
1
0
3X10-1
H3X10-1)
075
0.25
1
0
3X10-2
H3X10-2)
0.90
0.10
1
0
322
342
Summary
Life structures identified
Life structures not identified
0.001
0.999
0.367
0.633
1
0
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TABLE 4-4.—METABOLIC PROTOCOL DETECTION CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Start Node End Node Activity/Outcome Description Conditional Probabilities With
1 org/g 1000 org/g 100000 org/g 4 •
506
506
508
508
514
514
520
520
524
524
526
526
532
532
538
538
540
540
546
546
546
548
548
552
552
508
510
598
510
598
516
598
599
526
528
598
528
598
599
540
554
598
554
548
560
554
554
560
598
554
Dry Sample Cas Exchange Measurement
Gas change 0
No gas change 1
Indicates Me 0.865
Nonbiotic source 0.135
Evidence of photosynthesis 0
No evidence of photosynthesis 1
Evidence of photosynthesis 0
No evidence of photosynthesis 1
Labeled Cas Test
Labeled gas released 0
Labeled gas not released 1
Kinetics indicates life 0.865
Nonbiotic source 0.135
Kinetics indicates life 0
Nonbiotic source 1
GC/MS
Organic levels changed
Organic levels unchanged
Orgamcs indicate life
Nonbioric change
Autoradiography
Label diffuse
Label concentrated
No label
Nonbiobc
Possibly bionc
Appearance indicates life
Nonbiobc
0.04
0.96
0.90
0.10
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
598
599
Summary
Extraterrestrial life detected
Extraterrestrial life not detected
0.036
0.964
1
0
1
0
(resulting in ending at node 218—no life forms) or it
would be due to a replicating organism (end node
248). The probability that, with one organism per
gram of soil, the positive results could be reconfirmed
is assumed to be only 0.45. It is possible at this point to
calculate joint probabilities using Baye's theorem:
P(AnB) = P(A/B)P(B) = P(B/A)P(A)
where:
A
B
= Outcome: challenge culture different
from control culture;
= Outcome: difference confirmed;
B/A = Outcome: difference confirmed given
that challenge culture is different
from control culture;
A n B = Outcome: difference confirmed and
challenge culture is different from
control culture;
P(A) = Probability that the challenge culture
is different from control culture =
.05;
P(B/A) = Probability that the difference is
confirmed given that the challenge
culture is different from control cul-
ture = .45;
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TABLE 4-5 —MICROBIOLOGICAL PROTOCOL DETECTION CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Start Node
408
408
416
416
414
414
418
418
End Node
416
420
420
422
418
420
420
422
422
420
Activity /Outcome Description
Plates
Growth
No growth
Terrestrial
Nonterrestnal
Impedance
Growth
No growth
Terrestrial
Nonterrestnal
Summary
Extraterrestrial life indicated
No extraterrestrial life indicated
TABLE 4-6 —CHALLENGE CULTURE PROTOCOL
Start Node
214
214
216
216
232
232
234
234
242
242
244
244
248
248
250
250
256
256
252
252
254
254
220
220
222
222
224
224
End Node
216
218
248
218
234
236
248
236
244
246
248
246
250
252
256
298
204
299
204
298
298
299
222
226
224
298
204
226
298
299
Activity /Outcome Description
Different from control
Same as control
Confirmed different from control
Same as control
Different from control
Same as control
Confirmed different from control
Same as control
Different from control
Same as control
Different from control
Same as control
Replicating agent
Toxic process
Terrestrial
Nonterrestrial
High-level forward contamination
Low-level forward contamination
Toxicity neutralized
Toxicity cannot be neutralized
Interferon detected
Interferon not detected
Growth
No growth
Terrestrial
Nonterrestnal
High-level forward contamination
Low-level forward contamination
Summary
Extraterrestrial life detected
Extraterrestrial life not detected
Conditional Probabilities With
1 org/g 1000 org/g 100000 org/g
0.18
0.82
0.0001
0.9999
033
0.67
0.0001
0.9999
0.45
0.55
1
0
0.0001
0.9999
1
0
0.0001
0.9999
1
0
1
0
00001
0.9999
1
0
0.0001
0.9999
1
0
DETECTION CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Conditional Probabilities With
1 org/g 1000 org/g 100000 org/g
0.05
0.95
0.45
0.55
0.02
0.98
0.45
0.55
0.01
099
001
0.99
0.75
0.25
0.0001
09999
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.25
0.75
0.05
095
0.0001
0.9999
0.50
0.50
0.47
0.53
0.75
0.25
0.95
0.05
095
005
0.95
0.05
0.95
0.05
095
0.05
0.50
0.50
0.0001
0.9999
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.95
0.05
0.0001
0.9999
0.50
0.50
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
025
0.25
0.75
0.0001
09999
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.95
0.05
0.0001
0.9999
0.50
0.50
1
0
81
TABLE 4-7.—COMBINED PROTOCOLS DETECTION CAPABILITY ANALYSIS
Start Node End Node Activity/Outcome Description Conditional Probabilities With
1 org/g 1000 org/g 100000 org/g
502
502
302
302
408
408
202
202
598
912
322
390
422
912
902
912
902
912
Metabolic protocol — life
Metabolic protocol — no life
Microscopy protocol — life
Microscopy protocol — no life
Microbiological protocol — life
Microbiological protocol — no life
Challenge culture protocol — life
Challenge culture protocol — no life
Summary
Initiate second-order testing
Return sample to Earth
0036
0.964
0001
0999
0.45
0.55
0.47
0.53
0.719
0.281
1
0
0.367
0.633
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
P(AnB) = Probability that challenge culture is
different from control culture and
the difference is confirmed =
(.05) (.45) = .0225.
This process of calculating joint probabilities, using
the estimated chance of success for each aspect of the
testing program, continues sequentially throughout the
challenge culture protocol, ending at the two out-
comes (node 298 and node 299). If a sample of Martian
soil with one microorganism per gram were exposed to
a variety of challenge cultures, the probability of not
detecting the organism (node 299) is 0 53, so that the
chance of successful detection is 0.47. As the microor-
ganism population increases, the probability of detec-
tion at each node would have to be adjusted to reflect
an increased probability of detecting life. The calcula-
tions illustrated in table 4-6 reflect the initial testing of
Martian soil, and even retestmg (if any toxins can be
neutralized). They do not, however, reflect testing
initiated from other protocols such as microscopy or
metabolism.
PROJECTING RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS
Another advantage of the GERT network is that it
permits projecting the requirements for resources such
as the Martian soil, experimentation time, power, etc.
Using the chart, it is possible to predict how many
times each section of the protocol would have to be
repeated to have a certain probability of success. Thus,
if one wishes to set an arbitrary attainment level of
0.95 probability for detection, then by inspecting a set
of probability distributions produced by the GERT
computer simulation program, the number of replicate
experiments needed can be determined. With this
information, it is possible to realistically calculate the
quantity of resources needed to attain that degree of
success.
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Chapter 5
The Laboratory Module
Of the five modules comprising the Orbiting
Quarantine Facility (see Chapter 3), the most impor-
tant in terms of the objectives of this study is the
Laboratory Module. This module must provide not
only an extensive research capability to permit execu-
tion of the protocol, but also the flexibility to
accommodate second-order testing if nonterrestnal
life is discovered in the sample. All experiments done
in the Laboratory Module must be performed within
biocontainment barriers that protect the sample and
the researchers from cross contamination, i.e., they
must prevent escape of soil-associated organisms while
protecting the sample from contamination by terrestri-
al organisms (ref. 1).
GENERAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The attainment of these goals—extensive research
capability, flexibility, and safety—was the primary
consideration in design proposals for the Laboratory
Module, although several other factors were also
considered. The use of the basic Spacelab-type module
imposed a series of physical constraints including the
location of equipment attachment points and cargo
mass and volume. The exteriors of the biocontainment
cabinets were shaped to conform to the slightly
crouched or slumped body position assumed by
persons in zero g, thus increasing crew comfort and
reducing fatigue (ref. 2). The interior of the cabinets
must be capable of maintaining the wide range of
environmental conditions required by the protocol
(see table 5-1). Finally, the design of the laboratory
was made flexible to permit the laboratory to be easily
adapted to general life sciences research after the
completion of the primary MSR task (see Chapter 8).
CONTAINMENT CONSIDERATIONS
For the quarantine to be successful, the laboratory
personnel must be protected from exposure to the
sample (back contamination) and the sample isolated
from terrestrial organisms (forward contamination).
The design and configuration of the laboratory reflects
the accomplishment of these two objectives. The high-
hazard containment facility at the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) served as a terrestrial model during
planning. That facility was developed to handle Class
IV pathogens (see page 21), and it has proved highly
effective in this regard.
TABLE 5-1.—ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS REQUIRED WITHIN THE CONTAINMENT CABINETS
Environment
Area Atmosphere Temperature Pressure
General laboratory
Initial sample inspection, processing, and
storage
Biological safety cabinets, class III'
Earth
Mars
Nitrogen 2
21°-22° C 1 atmosphere (14.7 psi)
-40° C 0.006 atmosphere (0.09 psi)
21 °_22° C 0.995 atmosphere (14.63 pa)
1
 See ref. 1.
2
 Special areas are (a) aerobic (21 percent Qi, 79 percent N2, 1 percent CO;), (b) anaerobic (99 percent Nt, 1 percent CCfc), and (c)
microaerophilic (1 percent Ch, 98 percent N?, 1 percent CO;).
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Back Contamination
The extraterrestrial quarantine facility provides
three separate barriers to prevent escape of organisms
into the Earth's biosphere. The primary barrier is
formed by the sealed walls of biological containment
cabinets (Class III type), within which the sample is
retained (figure 5-1). Nothing is permitted to enter the
cabinetry, including all water, air, and supply materi-
als, without first being sterilized. The cabinet atmo-
sphere is maintained at a slightly lower pressure than
in the laboratory, so that any barrier punctures would
result in air flowing into the cabinet, thus preventing
the escape of quarantined material. Air that is free of
microbes is continually passed over the external face
of the cabinet, so that chance organisms escaping the
cabinets would be swept away from the workers and
trapped in filters.
The rubber gloves that are usually used for manipu-
lating objects inside cabinetry are the least reliable
aspect of a containment system (ref. 3) because they
are easily burned, torn, punctured, or cut. In lieu of
rubber gloves, mechanical hand manipulators con-
structed from continuous welded stainless steel will be
used throughout the cabinet line (figure 5-1). Even
though a single sheet of steel is used, normal arm
motions are possible due to a unique rotary restraint
linkage and steel bellows. To provide additional
protection against leaks, the manipulators will contain
a rubber lining. A variety of interchangeable end-
effectors will be available in the cabinet to permit
accomplishing different tasks. The effector is mechani-
cally sealed at the end of the arm, yet provides the
wrist motion, grasp, and force control to permit the
operator to handle samples and laboratory equipment.
(See Appendix A for additional details.) Extensive
studies (refs. 3, 4, 5) on using remote handling devices
for biological analytical techniques suggest that their
use is feasible for this purpose. It is assumed that by
the mid-1980s, such manipulators will be perfected
and available for biological analysis of highly patho-
genic organisms.
The secondary barrier (the Laboratory Module
itself) restricts or prevents, by use of physical and
procedural barriers modeled after those used at the
CDC, further passage of material that may have
escaped from the cabinets. First, all equipment,
materials, and consumables leaving the laboratory are
sterilized and packaged in leak-proof containers. Any
personnel leaving the laboratory pass through a
decontamination area before entering the adjacent
module. The air within the Laboratory Module is
continuously filtered to remove any free-floating
contaminants. In addition, the atmospheric pressure in
the laboratory is slightly less than that of the other
modules, ensuring the containment of organisms with-
in the secondary barrier. Therefore, the probability is
low that any material which escapes the primary
barrier will also pass through the secondary barrier to
an adjacent module.
The third barrier protecting the Earth is one that is
not available to terrestrial facilities: the envelope of
space. In the event of a failure in both the primary and
secondary barriers, the Earth's biosphere is still
protected. The exposed crew is retained in isolation
while quarantine personnel on Earth evaluate the
situation and devise plans to deal with the emergency.
Any particle released from the facility would remain in
orbit for extensive periods of time under exposure to
high fluxes of ultraviolet and cosmic radiation and
extreme temperatures before eventual entry to the
Earth's atmosphere.
Forward Contamination
A series of procedures and barriers have also been
incorporated into the system's design to minimize the
chance of contaminating the sample with terrestrial
organisms. These include constructing physical barri-
ers around the sample, reducing the number of
microorganisms within the system, and adopting
procedures that minimize the quantity of sample
contaminated if a breach occurs.
To begin with, physical barriers designed to pre-
vent back contamination also reduce the chance of
forward contamination; the sample will always be
within containment cabinets into which nothing can
be placed without prior sterilization. While rubber
gloves under negative pressure can contaminate the
sample with water and oxygen, the stainless steel hand
manipulators recommended for use in the OQF do not
carry that nsk. In addition, the Martian material not
involved in the quarantine is retained in a leak-tight
container which is sealed and physically isolated from
the cabinetry where experiments are performed. Thus,
any leaks would jeopardize .only the protocol sample—
not the entire sample. However, the protocol sample is
also physically protected because only small quantities
will be exposed within the cabinet, or "glove box," at
any one time. The remainder of this sample will be
retained in sealed containers or test chambers, where
it is less susceptible to contamination. While these
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Figure 5-1.—A section of the btocantainment cabinet line within which the protocol will be executed.
Note that the interior is accessed only with stainless steel "gloves."
precautions should be sufficient to protect the Martian
material from forward contamination, an additional
physical barrier could be added by constructing the
cabinets with double walls. A partial vacuum main-
tained between the walls would ensure that if leaks
developed in either wall, contaminants would be
swept between the two walls and not into the cabinet
proper. Although this system could not be used in the
high-vacuum sample receipt and inspection section,
the pristine MSR material could be protected by an
additional container while being stored.
To reduce the number of microbes in the quaran-
tine facility, components and assemblies will undergo
dry heat or gas sterilization prior to being assembled
under clean-room conditions. Before the completed
laboratory is placed in orbit, it will be filled with
formaldehyde gas to kill microbes that are exposed on
surfaces (ref, 6). After a contact period of 16 to 18
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hours, the vapors will be vented from the laboratory
and replaced with sterile, filtered air. Additional
decontamination treatments of the cabinetry system
will be performed in space.
To maintain low levels of terrestrial contaminants
once the laboratory is in use, the air will be continually
recirculated through a series of high efficiency particle
accumulator (HEPA) filters to trap airborne particles
and bacteria. The cleaned air will be directed from the
ceiling across the face of the biocontainment cabinets,
exiting through the floor. Bacteria dislodged from or
expelled by laboratory personnel will thus be swept
away from the sample area and eventually trapped by
the HEPA filter system. Also, by this means any air
leaking into the cabinets would have low levels of
contamination. Similar systems are routinely used in
manufacturing and biological facilities to prevent
contamination of materials (refs. 7, 8).
To estimate the maximum number of particles per
liter of air expected in the quarantine laboratory, the
following formula can be used (ref. 7).
N =
aKV 1 - exp(-oKt)
where
N =
V =
K =
G =
t
a
number of particles per liter present at any
given time (t) in seconds;
volume of clean room in liters (6.52 X 104);
number of complete changes of room air
volume per second (0.036, based on a flow
rate of 236 liters/sec through each of 10
filters);
total number of particles per second enter-
ing the clean room (500, based on one
worker without face mask expelling 250
bacterial aerosols/sec) (ref. 7),
time, in seconds;
efficiency of the filter (99.97 percent).
If we assume continuous operation (worst case), a
value of N = 0.21 particles/liter (6 particles/cubic
foot) is obtained, which is well under the 3.5
particles/liter (100 particles/cubic foot) required of a
Class 100 "clean room" facility. As a further improve-
ment, laboratory personnel will be outfitted with high-
efficiency contagion masks (ref. 8).
LABORATORY LAYOUT
Options Considered
Two configurations were considered for positioning
the glove boxes within the laboratory (figure 5-2):
1. Extending the cabinets longitudinally down the
center of the module, anchored to the floor and
ceiling;
2. Adopting a configuration similar to that used in
Spacelab, with glove boxes located on either side
of the center aisle (ref. 9).
A comparison of the two arrangements and their
relative advantages, summarized in table 5—2, resulted
in the selection of the first configuration.
Configuration Chosen
The key structure in the laboratory is the centrally
located containment cabinet system (figures 5-3 and
5-4). At the lower left of the cabinetry, there is an area
dedicated to sample receipt (the airlock) and to the
initial inspection, handling, and processing of the
Martian material. A major concern is that contamina-
tion on the surface of the sample canister (dust
particles, propellant residue, micrometeontes, etc.)
could be introduced with the sample into the initial
inspection and processing area. Levin and Hall (ref.
10) have proposed a scheme whereby in-flight inciner-
ation of the MSR canister's outer covering would
remove the contaminants, although such consider-
ations for the mission are only speculative at this time.
If the MSR canister was returned "dirty," the sample
airlock could be adapted to stenli/e and cleanse it of
surface contaminants before opening. The sample is
moved to the initial processing and storage area, which
is maintained at a Mars-like environment with atmo-
spheric pressure of 0.09 psi and temperature of
-40° C. Because of the low pressure in this area, all
handling and processing of the sample must be done
with mechanical manipulators. After a gas sample is
taken, the MSR canister is opened, gas sampling of the
subsample container(s) is performed, and 100 g of
material is removed for the quarantine testing; the
remaining 900 g of material is repackaged in a
leakproof container and kept in the Mars-like environ-
ment until completion of the protocol. The quarantine
sample then undergoes visual inspection with a stereo-
microscope and is sieved, ground, and packaged for
the various protocols. (See figure 4—4.) (The details of
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Figure 5-2.—Cross sections of two options for the location of biocontainment chambers in the Laboratory
Module.
TABLE 5-2.—A COMPARISON OF TWO LABORATORY LAYOUT OPTIONS
Volume available
Assurance of containment
Sample transport
Design requirement
Central Configuration
20 m3
Compact arrangement of
sample work space and
single line of sample trans-
port reduce risk of breach
of containment
Central arrangement facili-
tates transport of materials
between experiment sta-
tions.
A new design needs to be
developed for use in the
OQF.
Watt-mount Configuration
18 m3
Double line sample trans-
port system presents higher
nsk of breach of contain-
ment.
Transport of materials from
one point to another, or
across aisle, presents a ma-
jor difficulty.
Existing rack designs for
conventional Spacelab mis-
sions possibly could be
modified for use.
the equipment designed to perform these tasks in zero
g without handling the sample are described in
Appendix B of this chapter.) For experiments requir-
ing a pristine sample (i.e., metabolic tests) or oxygen-
free material (i.e., anaerobic culturing) the sample will
be sealed in an airtight chamber to protect it while it is
being moved through the cabinet line.
The protocol samples are brought through the
airlock into the cabinets where the protocol experi-
ments are conducted. Contained within the cabinetry
is the equipment required for the quarantine protocol.
Equipment such as the freezer, refrigerator, incuba-
tors, and centrifuge are housed m the lower part of the
containment cabinet (figures 5-1 and 5-5), and are
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Figure 5-3.—A longitudinal view of the Laboratory Module.
accessible through a door in the work platform, so that
the work surface is unbroken.
The gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer and
scanning electron microscope also have their major
components housed beneath the cabinetry. By locating
the major mechanical components of these systems
outside the primary barrier, repairs are facilitated To
facilitate viewing of slides with the light microscope,
an overhead TV screen will be used, as shown in figure
In the cabinet's center, there is a section that is
accessible from either side for storing equipment and
(or) transferring materials across the cabinet (figures
5^4 and 5-5). Two areas (located at the lower right
side of figure 5-3) are separated from the rest of the
cabinetry to permit maintaining the two controlled
environments required in the microbiological section
of the protocol, once the sample has passed through
the airtight doors, these chambers are purged of the
aerobic atmosphere, and the anaerobic or microaero-
phihc atmosphere is introduced for the culture
experiments.
To resupply the cabinet system without contami-
nating the sample, a double-door autoclave/heat/gas
sterilizer is located on the left end of the cabinets
(figure 5-3). Supplies are brought into the decontami-
nation area, placed in the sterihzer, sterilized by the
appropriate means, and then passed into the cabinet
line through the inner door. Expendables exit in the
reverse manner and are placed in the waste storage
area beneath the module, such sterilized materials do
not constitute a contamination hazard to the crew.
Another feature noted in the floor plan (figure 5-3)
is the decontamination area located at the left end of
the module. In addition to providing access to the
laboratory from the Docking Module, the decontami-
nation area is a major feature in establishing the
Laboratory Module as a secondary barrier against
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Figure 5-4.—A cross-sectional view of the Laboratory Module.
back contamination (see "Containment Assurance
Procedures," page 95).
Work space, communications equipment, and data
terminals are located around the perimeter of the
cabinet system.
LABORATORY EQUIPMENT
Rationale for Equipment Location
The position of each piece of equipment within the
cabinetry, as shown in figure 5—3, was selected after
considering the size of the equipment, its frequency of
use, environmental requirements, support equipment
requirements, material handling, and maximum utili-
zation of available space. For example, the microscopy
area is designated to be at an extreme comer of the
cabinet system because lengthy microscopy studies are
anticipated. Consequently, laboratory personnel en-
gaged in these studies will not be disturbed by
concurrent activities in the laboratory. On the other
hand, the GC/MS is centrally located because it is
required for a number of experiments.
Required Equipment
The list of laboratory equipment for the OQF (table
5-3) has been compiled based on the needs of the
protocol experiments. The equipment listed is in
various stages of development, ranging from space-
ready hardware to items only in a conceptual stage;
additional comments on projected development time
and specifications can be found in references 9 and 11
through 15. Specialized equipment must also be
designed and developed to carry out the many
manipulations required by the individual experiments
(table 5—4) in a zero-g environment. Although these
tasks are easily performed on Earth, basic research will
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Figure 5-5.—Laboratory personnel viewing slides with a light microscope.
be needed to determine how best to perform them in
the absence of gravity.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
The environmental control and life support (ECLS)
system in the Laboratory Module is almost identical to
that in the Habitation Module, except that the
laboratory's ECLS system is self-contained, using
filtered, recirculated air throughout the module. Air is
decontaminated by passage through a series of HEPA
filters (ref. 7) which remove 99.97 percent of particles
0.3 jum or larger. The air exiting the filter is distributed
in a laminar flow field across the face of the cabinets
so that any contaminants leaking from the cabinet will
be swept down and away from the personnel (this also
protects the sample because the air pulled through any
leak will be stenle). The air then passes through
ductwork back to any of 10 HEPA filters arranged in
banks of five on each side of the glove box (figure 5-4).
This ECLS system will meet the standards of a
Class 100 (refs. 15, 16) clean atmosphere because: it
will not exceed 3.5 particles per liter of air; it is a
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TABLE 5-3.—EQUIPMENT LIST FOR THE OQF LABORATORY
1
2.
3.
4.
5
6.
7.
8
9
10.
11.
12.
13.
14
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Item/Specifications
Alpha particle instrument
Autoclave
Autoradiograph
Camera, roll film
Camera, video (color)
Centrifuge
Dry heat sterilizer, drying oven
Electroanalybcal apparatus, conductance
bridge
Freezer, freeze dryer
Gas bottles
Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer
Impedance bridge
Incubator
Kits, microbiology
Liquid nitrogen dewar
Mass measurement device, micro
Micromampulator
Microscope, compound, phase contrast, UV
Microscope, scanning electron
Microscope, stereoscopic
Mixer/shaker
Plate scanner, counter
Refrigerator
Scintillation counter
Spectrophotometer, UV, visible
Tissue culture chamber and maintenance sys-
tem
Ultrasonic cleaner
Vacuum cleaner
Vacuum dessicator
Vacuum evaporator
Vacuum filter
Power (W)
2
300
0
0
70
2X103
50
10
300
0
50 "
1
60
0
0
1
10
25
500
30
10
20
50
10
10
10
30
10
0
0
0
Weight (kg)
1.8
11.0
1.0
2.0
7.0
100.0
2.3
9.1
15.0
68.0
10.0'
1.0
10.0
1.0-
50.0
2.0
20
5.0
700
12.0
2.2
90
10.0
4.5
2.3
15.0
10.0
1.0
4.0
4.0"
40«
Volume (cm3)
81.0X10°
34.7 X103
1.0X103
2.0 X103
6.2X103
5.0X105
8.5 X103
28.3 X 10 3
61.0X103
141.6X103
27.0X103 •
1.0X103
20.0X103
10X103
56.6 X103
1.0X103
14.0 X103
14.0 X103
5.0 X105 •
22.0 X 10 3
8.5X103
28.3 X103
25.0X103
5.6 X103
28.0 X103
16.0 X103
28.3 X103
2.0 X103
56.0 X103
50.0 X103 •
50.0 X103 '
Ref No.
12
1, 9
11, 13
13
9, 11
9, 11
9, 11
9, 11
9, 11
14
9, 11
9, 11
9, 11
4
9, 11
9, 11
9, 11
9, 11
9, 11
11, 13
11, 13
11, 13
9, 11
11, 13
11, 13
•Estimated
closed system; particles 0.5 fan and larger are removed
from the air, and it maintains the required tempera-
ture, humidity, and pressure. The Class 100 standard is
currently used in medical, research, and industrial
applications requiring strict control of contaminants.
Thermal control of the Laboratory Module is
maintained by using a system that employs both
gaseous and liquid coolants for removing heat pro-
duced by equipment and laboratory personnel (figure
5-6). To remove heat from inside the cabinets without
breaching containment, the equipment contacts a
surface (a cold plate) that is cooled from the cabinet's
extenor by chilled liquid The laboratory personnel
and equipment located outside the primary contain-
ment are cooled by air that is recirculated through an
air-hquid heat exchanger. The liquid from the heat
exchanger and the cold plates is pumped to the Power
Module, where the heat is radiated to space. (See
Chapter 6.)
CONTAINMENT ASSURANCE PROCEDURES
To reduce the possibility that microbes released
from the experiment cabinets are inadvertently earned
to other modules by crew members, decontamination
procedures similar to those used at CDC have been
adopted. These procedures also help reduce the
terrestrial microbial load in the Laboratory Module,
thus lowering the chance of forward contamination.
Before entering the laboratory, personnel will
disrobe and store their clothes in the Habitation
Module. After passing through the pressurized Dock-
ing Module into the decontamination area of the
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TABLE 5-4.—MANIPULATIONS REQUIRED FOR PROTOCOL EXPERIMENTS
Experiment
si
!3 *^ 2
Manipulation O a;
Agitate
Dispense X
Disperse
Dry
Filter X
Hold In X
volume
Hold on
surface
Mix
Wash
Weigh X
Heat/cool
Pulverize
Transfer X
Evaporate
Notes.
I l l
X
X X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X X X
X X
X
$ 1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
x/ x/
X
1
i
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
x/
X
X
2
CA ®* *»3 8 i
X X X
X X
X X X
X
X X
x/x x/x x/x
X X X
3 4 5
i
X
X
X
X
X
x/x
X
X
6
1
X
X
X
X
X
x/x
X
'Mix with HQ
2Fixabon, staining, etc , some at Mars conditions (see tables 4-1 and 4-2).
3
 Mars conditions, gas sampling, soil subsamphng, layered emulsion (autoradiography)
'Radioactive CO: , Mars conditions, gas sampling, soil subsample, layered emulsion (autoradiography).
5Mars conditions, gas sample, autoradiography
^anous conditions required.
laboratory (figures 5-3 and 5-7), they close the
Docking Module's airtight door. The workers are then
subjected to high-velocity, sterile air, which dislodges
loose particulate matter and sweeps it to HEPA filters.
Each person then uses a moist, disposable towelette
impregnated with disinfectant to wipe the more
heavily contaminated areas of the body (i.e., the
hands, face, and neck) before dressing in protective
laboratory clothing (including a head cap) obtained
from the moist-heat sterilizer. To further contain
bodily bacterial flora, the worker dons surgical rubber
gloves and a high-efficiency face mask before opening
the airtight door to the laboratory. To exit the
laboratory, the person removes all garments in the
decontamination area, places them in the moist-heat
sterilizer, disinfects the exposed portions of his or her
body, and remains in the air shower for a set period of
time. When the decontamination area is not occupied,
ultraviolet lamps irradiate the area to kill microbes not
trapped within the filters.
Materials destined for the laboratory area are moist-
heat sterilized or (if they are heat labile) are given an
air shower, wiped with disinfectant, and exposed to
ultraviolet light for intervals long enough to deconta-
minate their surfaces.
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Figure 5-6.—Schematic for removal of heat from the laboratory.
Breach of containment could be caused by such
obvious failures as direct puncture of the cabinetry or
breakdown of an air filter located between the
laboratory and cabinets. However, procedural failures,
such as incompletely sterilizing materials being re-
moved from the cabinets or accidentally increasing the
cabinet's air pressure above that maintained in the
laboratory, will produce the same result.
The remedial procedures followed after contain-
ment failure will depend on the type of malfunction
and on whether personnel were exposed. For example,
a small puncture of a cabinet that maintained negative
pressure and did not expose personnel would be sealed
with no additional consequence. However, if person-
nel and (or) the laboratory can be considered to be
exposed, the contaminated worker will enter the air
shower, undress, and don new laboratory clothing. A
protective suit with a self-contained oxygen supply
(such as is used at CDC) is put over the laboratory
clothing (figure 5-8), and the suit is pressurized to
protect the worker from further back contamination.
The worker reenters the laboratory and accomplishes
the necessary repairs; he then wipes the protective
suit's exterior with disinfectant, enters the air shower,
and undresses. The laboratory (except for the contain-
ment cabinets) is treated with formaldehyde gas,
which, after effectively decontaminating all exposed
surfaces, is chemically neutralized to make the labora-
tory once again functional. If, however, it cannot be
established with a high degree of confidence that
laboratory decontamination was successful, and (or)
that the primary barrier's integrity was reestablished,
the protocol can still be completed by crew protected
by the pressurized suits. Contingency plans for han-
dling exposed laboratory personnel are described in
Chapter 6.
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Appendix A—Metal Manipulative Arm
Of primary concern in the MSR facility's design is
how to perform the quarantine protocol on Martian
samples with maximum assurance of complete con-
tainment and reliability, yet without sacrificing flexi-
bility and manipulative capabilities. Initially, teleoper-
ators were being considered as the means of handling
samples within the cabinets, until it became apparent
that this approach was unacceptable because of its
cost and the technological risks associated with its
development. As a result, a hand-operated metal
manipulator (a concept developed by H. C. Vykukal at
NASA's Ames Research Center) is being proposed
because it appears to provide almost as high a
containment assurance as the teleoperators but with
greater reliability.
The hermetically sealed, metal bellows manipula-
tive arm shown in figure 5-9 utilizes proved, highly
reliable technology. The device incorporates a contin-
uous welded stainless steel structure with flexible
metal bellows at the shoulder, elbow, and wrist joints.
The external rotary restraint linkage, a recent develop-
ment at NASA's Ames Research Center, allows for
normal human arm motions without the need for
rotary seals in the exoskeleton structure. Despite the
high pressure difference between the laboratory and
that portion of the cabinetry maintained under a
simulated Martian atmosphere, no noticeable force is
required to flex the various metal bellows joints
because the linkage geometry is such that flexing
forces needed to bend the arm are balanced.
Metal bellows were first used in the highly success-
ful Ames Hard Space Suit development program,
which demonstrated that the technology was feasible.
Reliability of such a manipulator was shown in tests
that used standard, off-the-shelf industrial metal bel-
lows, rather than units made to NASA's specifications.
After welding, the bellows were found to have a
leakage rate of 1 X 1Q-8 SCC/sec of helium, a value too
OXYGEN AND COOLANT
HOSE ATTACHMENTS
TEMPORARY
OXYGEN SUPPLY
Figure 5-8.—The protective suit to be used during breaches of containment.
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Figure 5-9.—A cutaway view of the hermetically sealed metal bellows manipulative arm proposed for use
within the cabinets (courtesy of H. C. Vykukal).
low to be measured by standard leak detectors. A
flexural life of over 200 000 cycles with no failure was
also demonstrated using a standard industrial metal
bellows. The performance of such units undoubtedly
can be improved significantly by additional quality
control, better materials selection, and frequent
inspection.
The effector located at the end of the arm provides
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a positively sealed, mechanical means by which the
operator has wrist rotation, grasp, and force control in
handling samples and associated laboratory materials.
A variety of interchangeable effector configurations
would be provided within the work area for selection
by the human operator.
APPENDIX B—Sample Receipt and
Processing
In planning the MSR mission, NASA is considering
many possible configurations for the canister that will
be used to return the sod. As has been discussed, these
vary from a canister containing loose soil to one that
contains 10 individual, hermetically sealed containers
(see Chapter 3, figure 3-3). The exact design chosen
will weigh mission costs and technological constraints
against the information to be gained by having a more
complex return system. (It should be noted that with
designs using more than one sample container it would
be more difficult to get a representative sample for
testing because each subsample container would need
to be opened and processed.) Whatever design option
is selected, the procedures described in this appendix
can be easily adapted to it. For purposes of illustra-
tion, however, and for the sake of simplicity, the
procedures outlined here are based on the use of only
one (of 10) subsamples to compnse the quarantine
sample for testing.
Because the materials handling system must process
the samples in zero g, much equipment that would not
be needed on Earth must be included in the design. To
retrieve the MSR canister from the incoming IUS-
TELLE transfer vehicle and bring it into the OQF, a
collapsible structure located in the airlock, similar to
the one designed for Spacelab (ref. 9), is used (figure
5-10). After the craft is guided into position by the
docking cone, a trigger mechanism and clamp acquire
the sample canister and draw it into the canister
housing by means of a linear actuator. The docking
cone and transfer vehicle are then jettisoned, the
retractor structure is collapsed, and the outside airlock
door is closed. If the MSR canister has not been
sterilized en route from Mars, it can be decontami-
nated and cleaned in the airlock as described earlier.
Before the inner airlock is opened, the atmosphere
within the airlock is brought to a Mars-like environ-
ment. (See table 5-1.)
The canister housing is then rotated about the
canister's midpoint (figure 5-11) so that the bottom of
the sample canister faces into the initial processing
area to permit gas sampling. The linear actuator
pushes the container against a needle (figure 5-11) and
the gas passes into a previously evacuated container,
from which it goes to the GC/MS for analysis.
Puncturing the container was considered preferable to
using a valve; a valve would probably leak during the
year-long voyage from Mars.
To open the MSR canister (figure 5-11) a mecha-
nism similar to a can opener is used to remove the
sample canister's bottom. Once this is done, the 10
individual quarantine sample vessels within the MSR
canister are exposed to a simulated Martian environ-
ment maintained in the processing area of the glove
box. The quarantine sample vessels are slightly ta-
pered to facilitate sample removal, and an easily
dislodged end plug holds the sample in the vessel after
it has been removed from the MSR canister (figure 5-
12). Gas sampling of the selected quarantine vessel is
similar to that performed on the MSR canister, in that
a needle is pushed through the thin labyrinth seal, and
after the gas flows into the evacuated container, it is
twisted so the needle seals itself and breaks. The gas
sampling container is then taken to the GC/MS for
analysis. A clamp is tightened on the quarantine vessel
and it is unscrewed from the MSR canister, using a
manipulator, and transferred to a sample container
unit in the processing area. After the vessel is removed
from the canister, the remaining subsample containers,
still in the canister, are stored in a leakproof structure
to ensure their pristine status. (In the case of a
composite quarantine sample, the mixing of material
from each subsample takes place immediately after gas
sampling, and the 10 original subsample vessels are
then resealed and stored.)
The absence of gravity in the OQF presents serious
problems in processing the Martian material. It is
necessary to provide forces on individual sample
particles both to move them about and to hold them in
a fixed position (as for microscopic examination). Since
an artificial gravity for the OQF was dismissed early in
the design process due to its cost and extensive
developmental needs (see "Hardware Considerations,"
page 21), substitute forces must be provided within
the material-handling equipment contained in the
cabinetry.
The required forces could be provided as body
forces, developed within the mass of the particles
themselves. In addition to gravity, body forces are
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Figure 5-10.—Acquisition of the sample canister by the Laboratory Module.
produced by magnetic, electrostatic, and centrifugal
rotational fields. Alternatively, surface forces could be
generated by actually pushing the particles with
moving objects such as hand- or motor-driven mecha-
nisms, magnetic vibrators, remote magnetic actuation,
peizo-electric actuation, etc. It is also possible to
generate surface forces by discharging pressurized,
simulated Martian gas to a gas sink, resulting in sample
movement.
Of these possibilities, use of centrifugal force to
move and hold the sample was selected for prune
consideration because this method seems to be techni-
cally possible, although developmental effort would be
necessary. One feasible design for such a system is
shown in figure 5-13. The central processing unit
consists of a sample container unit whose interior
design facilitates the various operations to be per-
formed upon the quarantine sample. A centrifugal
drum (figure 5-13) enclosing a simulated Martian
atmosphere has rotating arms a (supported by bearing
b in the drum enclosure) that spin the sample
container unit and the quarantine vessel (which is
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Figure 5-11.—The mechanism for acquiring a gas sample from the sample canister and for opening the
canister within the containment cabinetry.
screwed into it), thereby developing centrifugal forces
on the soil particles. The material is forced out of the
vessel and against interior surface A so that a TV
camera, movably mounted on arm c, can continuously
observe the sample particles (the TV camera is
powered through slip rings located at bearing b).
Rotation of the processing unit on bearing c causes
centrifugal forces to distribute the particles over
various internal surfaces to permit sieving, mixing,
dispensing, or grinding of the materials.
Figure 5-14 shows a detailed cross-section of the
sample container unit, in which all handling and
processing operations necessary to prepare the proto-
col sample can be performed via the following
sequence:
1. The unit is initially rotated on bearing c to orient
the centrifugal forces in direction A. The loosely
fitting plug is forced out of the vessel by the
increased weight of the sample behind it, al-
though a short internal chain prevents the plug
from moving with the sample material to the
opposite wall. To facilitate emptying the vessel,
the pulverizing probe p may be used to agitate
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Figure 5—12.—The mechanism for acquiring a gas sample from a quarantine sample vessel and for
removing the vessel from the sample canister.
Figure 5-13.—The centrifugal device employed to
sieve, separate, grind, and visually inspect the
quarantine sample.
the sample vessel, or the unit can be rotated
faster to increase centrifugal forces.
2. Particles less than 100 /tm in diameter are
separated by orienting the processing unit to
direct the centrifugal forces toward a 100-/tm
screen (figure 5-14). Small oscillation about point
c would agitate the sample across the screen so
that all small particles pass to the compartment
below.
3. Realignment of the processing unit to orient the
forces in direction C will cause sample particles
larger than 100 /on to spread along the interior of
glass plate g, while retaining the particles that
passed through the screen in recess d. Microscop-
ic examination of the larger particles is accom-
plished using the stereomicroscope TV assembly
(figure 5-14), which is moved to observe the
entire surface of the glass plate.
4. To grasp and manipulate selected particles on
the glass plate, a micromampulator housed in the
auxiliary unit "above" the sample container unit
(figure 5-13) is inserted into the processing unit
and removes sample material for storage in the
auxiliary unit.
5. Clockwise movement of the processing unit (as
viewed from figure 5-14) toward D results in
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Figure 5-14.—A cross-sectional view of the sample processing unit.
centrifugal force urging all larger particles
toward the pulverizing probe p. Actuation of this
probe at suitable frequencies grinds larger parti-
cles. The particles below the screen are retained
in a pocket e.
6. After pulverizing, counterclockwise rotation re-
turns the pulverized particles to the 100-jum
screen, where oscillations between directions A
and D serve to increase the passage of particles
through the screen and permit mixing of the
sample in the lower compartment.
7. Orientation of the processing unit so that forces
are toward the sample vessel results in the
screened quarantine material moving into con-
tainers that, after being removed from the
processor, are used to distribute the homoge-
neous sample to the various protocol experiment
stations.
The above discussion illustrates the technological
design challenges to be encountered in developing a
system for processing the MSR material under zero-g
conditions. Considerable development of equipment
unique to this mission is required to perform opera-
tions considered routine in laboratories on Earth.
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Chapter 6
Support Systems of the Orbiting Quarantine Facility
The preceding chapters have outlined the general
design of the OQF, described the mission rationale
and experimental protocols, and defined the hardware
required for the protocols This chapter describes the
physical support systems, the personnel management
structure, and the contingency systems necessary to
permit the OQF to function as an integrated system.
The interactions between the subsystems within the
preassembled modules are illustrated in figure 6-1.
The Power Module generates and distributes electrical
power throughout each of the four modules, stabilizes
the OQF's attitude, and dissipates heat generated
throughout the system The Habitation Module is a
multifunctional structure designed to monitor and
control all aspects of the system's activities. Through
its command console it processes incoming and outgo-
ing data and controls communications with the ground
and within the OQF; its life support equipment
provides air regeneration, water purification, and
waste treatment; and the habitation area provides the
crew with Irving quarters and medical facilities. The
Logistics Module stores the supplies needed for 30
days of operation and provides storage for waste
materials generated during the mission. Monthly
supply of the facility is accomplished by exchanging
the Logistics Module with a new unit transported to
the OQF by the orbiter portion of the Space Shuttle.
The Laboratory Module contains the equipment
necessary for executing the protocol, as well as an
independent life support system Its design and
functions were described in Chapter 5.
All of the physical support systems have backup
components that are designed to operate during a
malfunction of the primary component. Contingency
plans have been formulated to deal with emergencies
such as fire, crew illness, a break in the sample
containment that exposes the crew to potentially
hazardous material, and equipment failures. A man-
agement scheme has been developed that specifies the
personnel requirements, management procedures, and
work schedules.
MODULES
General Structural Aspects
The component modules of the OQF utilize a
common primary structural design, although the
internal arrangement, furnishings, and equipment
within each differ. A primary constraint on module
design is imposed by orbiter limitations on payload
size and mass, and weight distribution (ref. 1). Because
these requirements and subsequent designs have been
well detailed for the orbiter (refs. 1, 2), only a bnef
overview will be made here.
Modules will be designed for a minimum functional
lifespan of 15 years in orbit. Each module will be
fabricated from a series of section rings, constructed of
waffled 2.5-cm thick aluminum panels that are longi-
tudinally welded together and formed into rings
(figure 6-2). Each section is thoroughly insulated on
the inner surface and is provided with an overhead
viewing window. The conical end caps are formed
from chemically milled and machined panels that have
a 1.3-m wide portal with scalable hatch and small
docking viewports. Assembly of the end caps and
section rings is accomplished with bolted flanges and
airtight seals; the resulting module is suitable for
orbiter transport and can be docked with other units
in space, where it is pressurized to approximate Earth
atmospheric conditions.
Within the shell, internal furnishings which are
essential to the module's particular mission are bolted
or bonded in place to resist impact loads of 136 kg
(300 Ib). The floor is an aluminum-beam frame
supporting honeycomb sandwich panels having a
capacity of 500 kg/m2 (102 lb/ft2). The area below the
floor is used for storage and to house the ECLS
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Figure 6-1.—An overview of the support network that allows the OQF to function as a system.
system. An integral component of the modules is an
electronic network that permits communication
throughout the entire system or with the ground from
anywhere in the craft.
Power Module
In designing the OQF, it has been assumed that
power modules capable of providing substantial quan-
tities of electricity while maintaining a stable orbit and
exercising system-wide thermal control would be
available in the 1980s (ref. 3).
As conceived by McDonnell Douglas (ref. 4), the
Power Module is transported to orbit by the orbiter
with its solar cell arrays folded as illustrated in figure
6-3. Deployment of the panels to their full 631 m2
(6790 ft2) of surface area exposes 636480 solar cells,
permitting the generation of 25 to 35 lew of electricity
(ref. 3). The power is stored in batteries to provide
energy for general applications, the scientific instru-
ments, life support, and emergency use. Power is
channeled through the system by the command
console, so that the console remotely controls energy
distribution.
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Figure 6-2.—A generalized view of a section ring
and an end cap (adapted from ref. 13).
In addition to providing electricity, the Power
Module will stabilize and reorient the entire facility in
response to both internal and ground commands. The
Power Module provides uninterrupted electrical pow-
er, despite any orbital or attitude changes, by redirect-
ing the orientation of the solar arrays. The specifica-
tions for a system that meets these requirements have
been developed by McDonnell Douglas (ref. 5) and
have been adapted for the OQF.
Heat produced throughout the system is dissipated
by the thermal control system located in the Power
Module. A system similar to one designed by McDon-
nell Douglas is diagrammed in figure 6—4, cold fluid
(1.7° C), continually cools the storage batteries to
increase their efficiency, then enters the various
modules to cool equipment (by means of cold plates)
and air (by means of heat exchangers). Control valves
can shunt all or part of the resulting hot fluid to
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Figure 6-3.—One concept of a power module (adapted from ref. 4).
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Figure 6-4.—The thermal control system proposed
for the OQF (adapted from ref. 5)
radiators located on the Power Module to adjust
temperature within the facility (see refs. 1 and 5
through 7 for additional information). Finally, the
module is responsible for transmitting and receiving
data and communications between the OQF and the
ground by means of a directional antenna.
Habitation Module
The Habitation Module provides five crew mem-
bers with the support equipment, furnishings, and
supplies necessary for efficient and safe working
conditions. The structure adopted (figure 6-5) is based
on designs for Spacelab (ref. 1) and studies by
McDonnell Douglas (ref. 6) and Grumman (ref. 8).
The unit is constructed of four ring sections and two
end caps with overall dimensions of 12.4 X 4.1 m.
Approximately one half of the module's 139 m3 volume
js allocated for equipment and nonhabitable uses (ref.
6).
Each crew member has private quarters (although
dual occupancy may be required during crew rota-
tion), with a storage locker, sleeping bag, and fold-
down desk as shown in figure 6-6. The size of these
areas was determined by the free volume (ref. 9)
recommended for each crewman (5 to 6 m3, or 176 to
212 ft3). A food service/recreation area has a galley
and dining area that can also be used for passive
recreation such as watching television or playing
computer and board games. During food preparation,
the tables will be stowed flush with the floor to
increase space and permit unhindered access to the
small food storage area across the aisle. An area for
active recreation provides space for exercise on a
treadmill, ergometer, and a universal exercise machine
modified for use in zero g. Personal hygiene accommo-
dations include a toilet, a shower, and a grooming
station similar to those on Skylab and the orbiter (ref.
10). A waste management system provides a closed
water loop for regenerating 5 kg of potable water per
crew member per day (refs. 4, 6). A small workshop
contains equipment (ref. 11) that will permit routine
maintenance as well as emergency repair of hardware
in zero g. A medical facility is located at one end of
this module so that there is direct access to the
Laboratory Module m the event of a laboratory
emergency requiring an isolation procedure. The
command console permits system monitoring and
communication, both throughout the OQF and with
the ground, guidance control, power distribution, and
data handling (figure 6-7). Throughout the module,
additional storage is provided in overhead cabinets
and those regions beneath the floor not occupied by
the ECLS system. The ECLS system (refs. 11, 12, 13)
LS designed to maintain the craft's atmosphere at
conditions approximating those at sea level (i.e., 1
atmosphere of pressure, with 21 percent Ot and 79
percent N2), regeneration is accomplished according
to the techniques developed during earlier manned
missions (ref. 7).
Logistics Module
The Logistics Module is made from a single ring
section and two end caps, and contains numerous
storage compartments radiating out from the central
access aisle (figure 6-8). The rectangular compart-
ments permit greater organization of and easier access
to the stowed materials within this very limited
maneuvering space. Space between the outer ends of
the compartments contains permanently stowed items
(e.g., gas canisters, emergency power systems, refnger-
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Figure 6-5.—An overhead view of the Habitation Module.
ation equipment, and back-up life support
equipment).
Within the compartments, all of the supplies
required to support a 30-day mission are stored.
Relocation of supplies to the other modules is noted on
the command console so that inventory control can be
maintained. Waste materials from the Habitation
Module are stored in the emptied compartments.
Waste generated within the Laboratory Module,
however, is retained in that unit to avoid the risk of
contamination.
Docking Module
To link the component modules of the OQF in the
configuration pictured in figure 3-10, a separate
module will be used to provide a common interface.
Owing to the general applicability of a docking
module to other space missions, it has been assumed
that a unit capable of connecting four to six modules
will be available in the 1980s and that its structure will
be heavily based on existing hardware.
All modules (and the orbiter) are equipped with an
international docking mechanism (ref. 12) that can be
mated with other international docking mechanisms
when one is in the active position and the other is
passive (figure 6-9). The modules are brought together
(using the orbiter remote manipulator system to ensure
a slow closing velocity) until the latches engage; then
the guide ring is retracted and additional latches are
set in place to ensure formation of an airtight seal.
Disengagement of the docking mechanism permits
rapid separation of the modules for their return to
Earth.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
The final design of the OQF will have redundant
systems to handle possible equipment and system
malfunctions. In this study, particular attention has
been paid to the following major emergencies: a
failure of the life support system, loss of air pressure,
fire, crew illness, and exposure of personnel to
potentially hazardous material from the Martian
sample.
The Me support systems are run by electricity from
the Power Module, which in turn has built-in redun-
dant backup circuits. This assures a stable power
supply for the life support systems. Normally, the
ECLS system for the Laboratory Module functions
independently of the atmospheric regeneration system
in the remainder of the OQF. However, if the ECLS
system within the Habitation Module failed, the
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Figure 6-6.—A cutaway view of the Habitation Module showing a crew member's cabin and galley. Note
removable floor sections and subfloor. One table is shown in its collapsed position.
Laboratory Module's system could be interconnected
to support the entire OQF. In addition, a backup
ECLS system in the Logistics Module can be activated
in case of a failure in the main systems. The various
contingency systems can sustain the crew for twice the
maximum time needed to prepare and dispatch a
rescue mission from Earth. In the event of a total
system breakdown, the pressure suits located through-
out the facility could be linked to bottled air stored in
the Logistics Module.
To prevent depressunzation of the entire OQF in
the event of an air leak, the interconnecting hatches of
the leaking module would be sealed. Access from
space to the depressunzed module could be made
through any of the undocked hatches (in the Docking
Module or at the far end of the other modules) using
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Figure 6-7.—An artist's conception of the command console (adapted from ref. 6).
pressure suits, and repairs could be made. During such
cnses, personnel movements to the other modules
would be unaffected unless the depressunzation oc-
curred m the Docking Module, in this circumstance,
extravehicular activity would be essential for intermo-
dular movements. If the module is not repairable, a
replacement unit could be sent up from Earth.
Fire in a spacecraft, a frightening thought to many,
is not a likely possibility in the OQF for several
reasons. The OQF maintains a partial pressure of
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Figure 6-8.—A design conception of the Logistics
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oxygen equivalent to 21 percent oxygen at sea level. A
gas mixture with this concentration of oxygen is far
less flammable than, for example, the 100 percent
oxygen system used at the time of the Apollo fire in
which three astronauts died. Materials used in the
OQF will also meet the rigid flame-suppressive re-
quirements currently employed in manned space
missions. Furthermore, because gravity is required to
induce the convection currents that bring oxygen-rich
air to the fire, flames in areas of the OQF where air is
not circulating rapidly would have difficulty obtaining
enough oxygen to continue burning in zero g. As an
additional precaution, smoke and ionization detectors
located within the air ducts will alert the crew in time
to put out the fire. In the event of an extensive fire in a
module, the crew will institute decompression proce-
dures and then leave the module.
Illness of crew members in the OQF presents a
serious problem because an illness may be caused by a
terrestrial infection, an organic malfunction, or a
Martian pathogen. To minimize terrestrial infections, a
strict quarantine of all crew members will be initiated
3 weeks prior to launch. In addition, the interior of the
orbiter will be surface-decontaminated immediately
before launch, and the crew will be transported to it in
protective garments. A prelaunch quarantine will not
guarantee health, nor will it reduce significantly the
number of pathogens that are earned into space, but it
will reduce the chance that the crew will be exposed
to a strain of pathogen to which they are not immune.
However, during the crew rotation the arriving crew
will be exposed to the microbial flora of the previous
members, resulting in an increased chance of illness.
If a crew member does become ill after receipt of
the Martian sample, he or she will be held in
quarantine within the OQF until tests can confirm
that the condition is either nomnfectious or of terres-
trial origin. The patient will be placed in one of two
flexible isolators (figure 6-10), which are stored in the
sickbay. The air for the isolation unit is exchanged via
HEPA filters, which are balanced to maintain a slight
negative pressure within the unit. Supplies can be
introduced through a decontamination lock in the
isolator's side, and manipulations are performed using
the attached rubber gloves. If the illness is discovered
to be caused by a terrestrial microorganism (or is of
nonpathogenic origin), and its treatment is not possible
in the OQF, the patient could be returned to Earth for
additional treatment. A strict isolation procedure will
be required during transport of the patient in the
orbiter if the illness appears to be highly contagious.
In the event that the crew member is suspected of
having an illness caused by exposure to the Martian
soil or has a condition that cannot be diagnosed, the
patient will remain in the isolator and be treated
within the OQF in consultation with the ground
medical personnel and the authorities responsible for
making quarantine decisions. If there is a containment
failure, decontamination of the laboratory and cleanup
of the "spill" (the released contaminated material) will
be performed as described in "Containment Assurance
Procedures," Chapter 5. A crew member must be
isolated if he or she is considered to be contaminated
by Martian sod; i.e., if he inhaled and (or) ingested
particles or aerosol of Martian soil (or materials that
were potentially contaminated with the soil), or the
material penetrated into the circulatory system
through a skin lesion or through the mucous mem-
branes. After such an exposure, the person takes an air
shower and moves into an inflated isolator, which is
positioned in the laboratory airlock hatch. The ex-
posed crew member will be confined, monitored, and
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Figure 6-9.—The Docking Module, at center, with its docking system in the passive position, being mated with a
replacement module, on the right. The international docking system on the incoming unit is in the active
position (note extension of docking guide ring).
attended in the isolator for up to 21 days (ref. 14) for
any pathological symptoms. If symptoms that cannot
be considered as resulting from terrestrial organisms
develop, the location and course of treatment will be
determined by ground personnel whose responsibility
it is to ensure the quarantine's adequacy.
PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND
MANAGEMENT
Crew Size and Capabilities
The protocol has been designed to permit as much
automation and as many remotely executed tasks as
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Figure 6-10.—A medical isolator suitable for zero g quarantine and transport of the patient to Earth.
possible, however, man's manipulative and judgmental
skills are essential for experiments that require situa-
tional decisions. The tasks that must be performed by
the crew members can be divided into two major
categories:
1, Operation and maintenance of the overall facility:
a. Vehicle guidance and control (i.e., rendezvous
with MSRV, berthing, attitude maintenance);
b. Command decisions (i.e., system safety, man-
agement, and crew scheduling),
c. Systems management (i.e., medical exams,
inventory, communications, housekeeping,
and repair of equipment).
2. Laboratory work: Execution of the protocol and
maintenance of laboratory equipment-
a. Experimental operations (i.e., sample handling
and specimen preparation);
b. Data handling (i.e., recording observations
and processing the data);
c. Containment decisions (i.e., laboratory safety
considerations and quarantine maintenance).
To determine how many crew members would be
required to accomplish the mission objectives and
perform these tasks, several factors were evaluated.
Safety considerations prohibit one person working
alone in the laboratory, but more than two persons in
the laboratory would find then- movements somewhat
impeded. The optimal research crew was therefore set
at two persons working in the laboratory for 8 hours. A
second shift of two workers (increasing the research
crew to four) is essential to provide the manpower to
complete the protocol, but the possibility of having a
third shift was dismissed, the reduced man-hours in
the lab was believed to be offset by the increased
performance resulting when the crew's sleep periods
coincide and are not interrupted by some of the crew
being active. One nonscientist crew member is needed
to maintain the entire system, increasing the minimum
crew size to five. This number is consistent with that
suggested in other studies (ref. 15). In selecting the
crew members for the mission, consideration should be
given to the type of training, versatility, and back-
grounds of scientists to ensure that the crew will be
capable of performing a variety of tasks ranging from
operating control functions to interpreting laboratory
data. One suggested distribution of crew expertise is:
Commander— An astronaut with engineering
training (electrical and (or) me-
chanical) and proved administra-
tive ability;
Scientist 1— A medical doctor who is an expe-
rienced clinical researcher;
Scientist 2— A research geobiologist with expe-
rience in the geochemical sciences;
Scientist 3— A biochemist with a research em-
phasis in the microbiological sci-
ences;
Scientist 4— A biologist who has had extensive
research experience in many
phases of the biological sciences,
including biostabstics.
Selected crew members will undergo a vigorous 2-
year training program. They will be taught the skills
needed for general housekeeping of the facdity and for
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repair and maintenance of the laboratory equipment,
as well as how to execute the protocol.
Work Scheduling
Several considerations influenced the scheduling of
crew activities during the quarantine mission. The
experiences with Skylab (ref. 16) indicate that during
any 24-hour crew day, 8 (±3) hours can be dedicated
to experimental work. The remaining 16 hours are
allocated as follows: 5.5 (±1) hours for eating,
hygiene, and recreation; 2.5 (±2.5) hours for system
maintenance; and 8 (± 1) hours for sleep (figure 6-11).
In general, one crew member, usually the commander,
will be engaged in the system maintenance functions,
while two crew members are in the Laboratory
Module conducting experiments and functions in
support of protocol testing. The laboratory work
schedule is based on two 4-hour penods for each
scientist, staggered so that the laboratory is manned
for 16 hours per day (figure 6-12). The normal mode of
operation specifies two crew members in the Labora-
tory Module; however, during crew rotation and
during periods of maximum activity (such as initiating
the experiments), more than two may be present. In
the former case, the second shift would obtain
briefings on the status of the experiments, while during
high activity phases of the protocol, extra persons
would be essential to help set up the experiments.
During nonwork intervals, the crew members will be
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Figure 6-11.—Allocation of a crew member's day.
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Figure 6-12.—A chart of the laboratory work and sleep schedules.
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engaged in system maintenance and activities related
to personal needs. When the entire crew is sleeping,
ground-based specialists and investigators will remote-
ly monitor the experiments and other system mainte-
nance functions.
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Chapter 7
Cost Analysis
Editor's Note—Estimated system costs presented in this section
should be treated with caution A detailed and accurate cost analysis
was not a prune objective of the design study. Rather, this section is
intended to illustrate a method by which costs could be estimated
for a system as complex as the one described here As a result, it
does not represent the product of a detailed and comprehensive
analysis Hie figures are based heavily on calculations used for
estimating cost for similar concepts They are also highly dependent
upon assumptions made regarding the treatment of the many
variables that characterize the system. Costs were estimated in 1978
dollars at the time of the study, and no effort has been made since
then to refine the estimates further This section is included for the
sake of completeness, and its value to the overall study lies in the
methodology of, and approach to, the cost calculations
COST CONSIDERATIONS AND GUIDELINES
In the course of this study, an analysis was
performed to predict the total cost of the OQF
mission. However, several variables were encountered
that, depending on the constraint selected, yielded
quite different versions of an "accurate" cost estimate.
One variable that is impossible to predict is the length
of the quarantine mission. On the one hand, if no
extraterrestrial organisms are identified by the quaran-
tine protocol, laboratory work on the sample would
terminate after 60 days. At the other extreme, it is
possible that the quarantine protocol might detect
pathogenic extraterrestrial organisms, in which case
the quarantine protocol and second-order testing
might be extended by as much as several years. This
uncertainty was treated in this analysis by accumulat-
ing costs for two alternative mission scenarios:
1. Minimum mission time—It was assumed in this
scenario that the results of the quarantine proto-
col are negative, with no indications of any
extraterrestrial organisms. In this case, after the
60 days required to perform the protocol, the
sample would be released to an existing maxi-
mum containment facility on Earth for further
scientific investigations. Making an optimistic
estimate of the time required for the mission,
beginning with the in-flight system check,
through the testing of one returned sample (see
figure 3-1), the OQF modules would be dedicat-
ed to the mission for 2 years.
2. Maximum mission time—This scenario assumes
that a positive indication of life is encountered,
requiring second-order testing to assess the
pathogemcity of the life form. In addition, the
organisms are considered to be harmful in some
manner to the Earth's biosphere, necessitating
extensive scientific studies in the OQF. Under
this circumstance, it is assumed that the OQF
modules would be involved with mission activi-
ties for &/2 years.
A second variable that makes a cost estimate
difficult is the proportion of the OQF design, develop-
ment, testing, and engineering (DDT&E) costs to be
added to the total mission expense. It would seem
reasonable that, because the various OQF modules are
of a general design, they will be used for other
missions after (and possibly before) they are assembled
for quarantine purposes. This would suggest treating
DDT&E costs in the same manner as they are treated
for the Space Shuttle: i.e., as fixed costs which are not
allocated to specific missions (ref. 1). On the other
hand, it is possible that the Mars sample quarantine
will be the only use of these modules, in which case a
more accurate representation of total mission cost
would include a substantial portion of the facility's
DDT&E costs for each of the OQF modules.
With the assumption that the modules will be used
for missions in addition to the Martian sample testing,
the proportion of the DDT&E costs assigned to the
quarantine mission changes with the length of time
needed to complete the protocol. For instance, be-
cause all the modules are expected to have a useful life
span of 15 years, a mission utilizing these modules for
the minimum scenario would be allocated a smaller
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share of the production costs than would one using the
maximum scenario.
Based on the above considerations, four different
estimates of total cost have been generated a 2-year
mission duration, determined with and without
DDT&E costs, and a 6V2-year mission, also calculated
with and without DDT&E costs.
Dangers inherent in any cost estimating effort
include neglecting, double-counting, and inaccurately
estimating cost elements. A detailed work breakdown
structure as shown in figure 7-1 has been employed to
address the first two dangers. This figure is based on
the Manned Orbital Systems Concept (MOSC) study
developed by McDonnell Douglas (ref. 2), modified to
reflect a five-man crew, variable mission length, and
the quarantine facility as the payload.
The MOSC study by McDonnell Douglas conclud-
ed that the optimal way to accommodate a series of
extended duration missions (those greater than 30
days) would be to build two manned craft—one
placed in a 28.5 degree orbit, and the second in a polar
orbit (ref. 3). In addition, these faculties should have a
functional life of 8 years, during which period they
would accommodate 26 missions. Although two
manned orbital systems are a possibility for the
quarantine mission, it is questionable that enough
additional benefit would be derived from the second
system to offset the additional expense. Thus, cost
estimates in this report have been modified from those
developed in the MOSC study to reflect the design
study group's assumption that only one manned orbital
system will be built, that the projected life span of its
components will be extended to 15 years, and that a
smaller crew will be involved. In addition, the costs
used by McDonnell Douglas were adjusted from a
1975 to a 1978 fiscal year base with an annual inflation
rate of 7.2 percent. Finally, the MOSC cost estimates
were modified to eliminate savings resulting from,
increased efficiency while constructing the second
unit (due to learning from the first); the use of
common ground support equipment for the two units,
and production cost differentials between building one
and two units.
Another important consideration for a mission on
the scale of the OQF mission is the distribution of
funds as a function of tune. The estimates of total cost
for the mission phases (DDT&E, production, and
operations) are of limited value for planning purposes
unless distributed over the time periods in which they
are incurred. Figure 7-2'illustrates the programmatic
time schedule used in distributing the mission costs for
the four conditions described earher.
MISSION PHASES FOR COST ANALYSIS
The OQF's mission work breakdown structure
(figure 7-1) is a task-oriented display of both hardware
and major functions required to complete each of
three phases of the quarantine mission: (a) DDT&E,
(b) production, and (c) operations (see figure 7-3).
The DDT&E phase includes costs for items such as:
development engineering and development support,
major test hardware, captive and ground tests, ground
support equipment, tooling and special test equip-
ment, site activation; and simulation of protocol
testing.
The production phase consists of hardware assem-
bly and functions associated with producing flight-
certified hardware. It includes all costs associated
with.
1. Fabrication, assembly, and checkout of flight
hardware;
2. Ground test factory checkout of flight hardware,
3. Initial stocks of spare components;
4. Maintenance of tooling and special test equip-
ment;
5. Payload experimental and support equipment.
The operations phase begins when activities re-
quired to support the mission are performed and
materials are acquired. It includes costs associated
with:
1. Support operations—Replacement of spare parts,
engineering support, and maintenance of ground
support equipment;
2. Launch operations—Receiving flight hardware,
prelaunch assembly into orbiter vehicle, test and
checkout, servicing, launching, and postlaunch
support;
3. Mission operations—Mission control, mission
planning and management, flight crew training,
simulation aids for crew training, in-flight mission
costs, and shuttle support flights;
4. Maintenance and refurbishment opera-
tions—Activities required to maintain and re-
store a previously flown, reusable module to a
flight readiness condition.
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Figure 7-1.—Work breakdown structure for the OQF program.
MISSION COST ESTIMATES
The summary of the DDT&E cost estimate accord-
ing to the categories used in the work breakdown
structure (figure 7-1) is shown in table 7-1. As was
discussed previously, it is possible to consider these
costs as being expended partly in support of missions
other than the OQF since the modules are of general
design. Alternatively, these costs can be assessed
wholly to the quarantine mission.
The total costs required for production of the
system, according to the work breakdown structure in
figure 7-1, are given in table 7-2. Because the
minimum mission scenario would demand use of the
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Figure 7-2.—Programmatic time schedule for the OQF mission.
modules for 4V2 years less than the long mission
scenario, its share of the production costs is propor-
tionately less. Most of these costs are directly propor-
tional to mission length. Some costs, however, are
OQF mission specific and are treated differently. For
example, in a maximum mission scenario, it is assumed
that the total production cost of the Laboratory
Module will be allocated to the Mars sample quaran-
tine mission. This assumes the worst case, namely that
the Laboratory Module will be contaminated to such
an extent that it cannot be used for other missions.
Total operations costs are listed in table 7-3; these
figures reflect the costs for missions of various lengths.
Most costs are assumed to have a fixed component
(one-half the estimated operations cost over 15 years)
and a variable component that is directly proportional
to mission length. Work breakdown structure elements
40, 50, and 110 are mission specific and have been
treated differently. The operations costs associated
with integral experiments (work breakdown structure
element 40) for a maximum scenario are assumed to be
three times those for a minimum scenario. The
operations costs associated with experiment integra-
tion (work breakdown structure element 50) for a
maximum scenario are assumed to be two-and-a-half
times those for a minimum scenario. Flight operations
are strictly a function of mission length.
MISSION LENGTH COST EXTENSIONS
The OQF programmatic time schedule, as shown in
figure 7-2, permits the mission costs to be spread over
time. Once funding is approved, the expenditures by
mission phase (and even within phases) are predictable
given the programmatic time schedule. The cost
extensions over time, for the four conditions described
at the beginning of this chapter, are given in table 7-4.
These cost estimates are shown graphically in figure
7-4.
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TABLE 7-1.—DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, AND ENGINEERING COSTS'
Work Breakdown
Structure Category Cost Element Description Mission Cost
10
20
30
31
32
33
34
35
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Project Management
Systems Engineering and Integration
Orbiting Quarantine Facility
Logistics Module
Habitation Module
Power Module
Laboratory Module
Docking Module
Integral Experiments
Experiment Integration
Ground Support Equipment
Systems Test and Evaluation
Logistics
Facilities
Ground Operations
Flight Operations
Total
64
175
552b
55
134
194
118
51
14
10
116
160
—
9
—
86
1186
• Based on FT 1978 dollars, in millions.
b
 Sum of following five module costs
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TABLE 7-2.— PRODUCTION COSTS"
Work
Breakdown
Structure
Category
10
20
30
31
32
33
34
35
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Cost Element Description
Project Management
Systems Engineering and
Integration
Orbiting Quarantine Facility1*
Logistics Module
Habitation Module
Power Module
Laboratory Module
Docking Module
Integral Experiments
Experiment Integration
Ground Support Equipment
Systems Test and Evaluation
Logistics
Facilities
Ground Operations
Flight Operations
Total
15-Year Life
30
200
393
39
78
136
122
18
8
—
1
—
—
—
—
108
740
Minimum
Scenario
4
27
51
5
10
18
16
2
8
—
1
—
—
—
—
80
171
Maximum
Scenario
13
87
241
17
34
59
123
8
8
—
1
—
—
—
—
108
458
* Based on FY 1978 dollars, in millions.
b
 Each cost figure includes following five costs.
TABLE 7-3.—OPERATIONS COSTS'
Work
Breakdown
Structure
Category
10
20
30
31
32
33
34
35
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
Cost Element Description
Project Management
Systems Engineering and
Integration
Orbiting Quarantine Facilityb
Logistics Module
Habitation Module
Power Module
Laboratory Module
Docking Module
Integral Experiments
Experiment Integration
Ground Support Equipment
Systems Test and Evaluation
Logistics
Facilities
Ground Operations
Flight Operations
Total
15-Year Life
20
15
219
24
54
85
46
10
—
—
24
—
50
—84
324
736
Minimum
Scenario
17
9
127
14
30
48
29
5
7
10
13
—
28
—48
43
302
Maximum
Scenario
15
11
161
18
39
63
34
7
22
24
17
—
37
—62
216
565
• Based on FY 1978 dollars, in millions.
b
 Each cost figure includes following five costs.
124
TABLE 7-4.—MISSION LENGTH COST EXTENSIONS'
Minimum
Minimum
Maximum
Maximum
Factors
scenario/DDT&E
scenario/DDT&E
scenario/DDT&E
scenario/DDT&E
included
excluded
included
excluded
DDT6E
1186
—
1186
—
Production
171
171
458
458
Operations
302
302
565
565
Total
1659
473
2209
1023
500
400
,300
>
200
100
• Based on FY 1978 dollars, in millions.
TOTAL COST = S1658 X 10s
MINIMUM SCENARIO
DDT&E COSTS INCLUDED
PRODUCTION
OPERATIONS
500
400
300
200
100
200 r
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
Mission Year
TOTAL COST = $473x10«
MINIMUM SCENARIO
DDT&E COSTS EXCLUDED
TOTAL COST = S2204X108
MAXIMUM SCENARIO
DDT&E COSTS INCLUDED
OPERATIONS
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1
Mission Year
200
0100
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Mission Year
TOTAL COST = S1019X106
MAXIMUM SCENARIO
DDT&E COSTS EXCLUDED
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Mission Year
Figure 7-4.—OQF programmatic distribution of mission costs. Top: costs of the minimum (a) and maximum (b)
scenario, assuming that DDTirE costs are included. Bottom: costs of the minimum (c) and maximum (d)
scenario after excluding the DDT&E costs.
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Chapter 8
Additional Uses of the Facility
One of the basic assumptions behind the design of
the Orbiting Quarantine Facility has been that the
facility should be capable of existing in space for 15 or
more years. Given this life span for the laboratory and
supporting modules, it is appropriate to consider the
adaptability and utility of the OQF for purposes other
than the quarantine mission. It should be pointed out,
of course, that one option in the quarantine testing
protocol calls for performing a long-term, complete
study of the Martian sample in space, rather than
releasing the sample to an Earth-based laboratory.
Although current scientific knowledge about Mars
suggests there is a very low probability that the
preliminary quarantine findings will warrant such an
undertaking, complete dedication of this facility for
Martian soil study is a possibility, and if that were the
case the laboratory would not be available for other
uses during a large part of its life span. On the other
hand, it is also possible that the chemical and
biological studies prescribed in the established proto-
col will not detect any Me forms, in which case the
mission will be completed as early as 60 to 90 days
from the initial receipt of the Martian sample. It is
because of this latter possibility that options for other
uses of the facility have been considered as part of this
design study. There are three basic questions that need
to be answered in considering additional uses:
1. Is there a need for a scientific laboratory that
permits long missions?
2. Is the facility, as designed, adaptable to other
space science programs?
3. If so, what are some of the appropriate scientific
studies?
LONG-TERM SPACE STUDIES
The findings from the Skylab experiments suggest
that many aspects of living systems are affected by
zero g and other conditions of space and that the
effects of these space conditions differ, in many cases,
according to the duration of the exposure (ref. 1).
Therefore, flight duration can be considered as one of
the most important variables in life sciences space
research. Although flights of various lengths of time
are proposed for the Spacelab programs (aboard the
shuttle) for the 1980s, there is a limiting constraint of a
30-day maximum mission. Hence, the selection of
research topics for the Spacelab missions is based on
the appropriateness of the study questions as they
relate to the duration of the proposed flights (ref. 2).
This suggests that there will be many research
questions which require long-term experiments that
cannot be accommodated by the Spacelab programs as
they are proposed for the 1980s. Life sciences ques-
tions that require research to be performed in space
can be categorized into the following:
1. Effects of weightlessness on biological systems:
A. Developmental biology:
a. Morphogenesis and reproduction of dif-
ferent animal and plant species;
b. Otolith development in animals;
c. Development of animal and plant orien-
tation behavior;
d. Mutagenesis.
B. Biokinetics and bioenergetics.
C. Biomedical studies—prevention and (or) con-
trol of the effects of zero g.
D. Behavior and performance studies.
2. Consequences and effects of space flight and
space isolation:
A. Radiobiology.
B. Immunology and pathogenesis.
C. Behavior biology, circadian rhythm effects,
and social behavior.
3. Effects of weightlessness on life support systems.
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4. Technological and instrument development for
bioengineermg, medical sciences, and biological
research.
Of these research topics, there are many questions
that can be satisfactorily studied only in a space
laboratory that can support long-term experiments;
i.e., longer than 30 days. Some of the studies recom-
mended by the Space Science Board of the National
Research Council/National Academy of Sciences in
1971 and 1975 fall into the long-term category,
including studies that deal with, the enervation of
gravireceptors during their embryonic development
and maturation in zero g, the influence of weightless
duration on the structure and behavior of different
species as a function of organism maturity; and bone
formation and demineralization under zero g (refs. 3,
4). Deutsch and Mallory (ref. 2) reviewed the 25
general research objectives in the NASA Life Sciences
Program and designated several topics as appropriate
for flight missions of longer duration. In addition, with
the initiation of life sciences research in space, a whole
new set of research problems will undoubtedly be
discovered that can only be answered with longer-
duration missions.
These recommendations and other reports (refs. 5
through 11) suggest, then, that there are a variety of
research questions that can best be answered by long-
term experiments conducted in a space laboratory
such as the one described in this report.
ADAPTABILITY OF THE OQF
The adaptability of the Orbiting Quarantine Facili-
ty to general Me sciences research is determined by
the types of equipment on board as well as by the ease
with which it can be resupplied and refurbished. Since
the assumption has been made that the Space Trans-
portation System will be available to initially orbit
laboratory equipment, expendable materials, and life-
support materials, it can also be assumed that the STS
will be available to transport portable equipment and
supplies needed to modify the facility. The Spacelab
program's philosophy of having a module that is a
dedicated laboratory system, and equipping it with
common operational research equipment (CORE) that
can be exchanged easily and replaced as experimental
objectives change, provides a tremendous flexibility in
the various space research programs conducted by
NASA (ref. 12). The same approach should be applied
to the design of the proposed quarantine facility, thus
enhancing its use in other programs.
Laboratory equipment commonly used in life sci-
ences research is listed in table 8-1, according to the
major space research program that might have use for
it and whether or not that equipment is required in
the OQF (right column). This equipment list is derived
partly from the CORE list identified for the Spacelab
program (ref. 12) and partly from Kail's report (ref.
13). The table shows that the Laboratory Module, as
designed in this study, has much of the laboratory
equipment and instrumentation required for other
types of life sciences space research. With the eventu-
al availability of portable dedicated laboratory units,
the range of life sciences research that can be
performed in this faculty will be greatly expanded.
The most important additional equipment required to
carry out many of the biological research programs are
animal and plant holding units. Although animal
chambers have been developed for Spacelab, it will be
necessary to develop technology to accommodate and
provide life support systems for animals in space
during long-duration flights; in addition, research tools
specific for performing animal studies will also be
required in a general purpose laboratory. Although
plant growth chamber designs have been proposed
(ref. 14), they would need to be constructed to permit
long-term botanical studies. One way of supporting
animal and plant studies in the OQF would be to
attach a dedicated module containing animal holding
units of various sizes as well as plant growth chambers.
Because the Laboratory Module contains many of the
instruments and equipment items necessary for life
sciences research, it would be used to perform the
analytical tasks on organisms maintained in an adja-
cent animal/plant holding module. In this manner, the
OQF could easily be adapted to be a dedicated, long-
term life sciences orbiting laboratory.
ADDITIONAL STUDIES FOR A SPACE
LABORATORY
Recombinant DNA
Since the 1975 Asilomar Conference and publica-
tion of the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving
Recombinant DNA Molecules a year later, there has
been an ongoing debate on the degree of containment
required to adequately protect the public from the
accidental release of genetically altered organisms (ref.
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TABLE 8-1 —LABORATORY EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTS REQUIRED FOR LIFE SCIENCES
RESEARCH IN A SPACE LABORATORY.
[Shading indicates that the equipment could potentially be used in that research program]
Laboratory Equipment
Radtobtology
and Biological
Studies
Space
Medicine
Mars
Behavioral Recombinant Quarantine
Biology DNA Sample Studies
Air particle sampler
Alpha particle analyzer
Arterial pressure recorder
Autoclaves
Automatic cell counter
Automatic plate counter
Autoradiograph
Centrifuges
Chemistry kits
Clmostats
Conductivity meter
Doppler flowmeter
Dosimeter
EEC
EKG
Electrophoresis equipment
EMG equipment
Freezers
Gas analyzer
Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer
Glove box
Hematology and urology kits
Histology kits
Holding units — invertebrate
Holding units — plants
Holding units — primate
Holding units — tissues and
microorganisms
Holding units — vertebrate
Incubators
Limb plethysmograph
Lyophilizer
Mass measurement devices (macro,
micro)
Metabolic monitor
Microscope — electron (scanning)
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TABLE &-!.—LABORATORY EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTS REQUIRED FOR LIFE SCIENCES
RESEARCH IN A SPACE LABORATORY—Continued.
Laboratory Equipment
Radiobiology
and Biological
Studies
Mars
Space Behavioral Recombinant Quarantine
Medicine Biology DNA Sample Studies
Microscope — light
Microscope — stereo
Microbiology kits
Microdissection kits
Micromanipulator-micropositioner
Microprobe analyzer
Microtome
Oven-drying
pH meter
Physiology kits
Physical examination kits
Radiation tracer/detector
Refrigerators
Spectrophotometer
Staining kits
Surgical and work bench
Tissue homogemzer
Vacuum chambers
3 O
0
,
3
°
•*,
'•
-
-
y
L
-
°
°
0
1 •=
"
,
, ,
u
6
°
' '^"'.f-
* Iff,
- ' "*'*»J»~>
0 < '». -'it
, -'.7 ,^
' , '
l
'^':\.'
,-;, '* -^
*s=° ^ A JW^
''* V ^  \ *'"**
-- • ' ? "
0 • ' & ' * ' %
' f •$ ' »ft
*'r - *- 1}
^ *\x
' 0 ,> ^ , , ' * * • " "
1
 • -, "
 v!r~ v
•'' ' x£:
'!- s'-
<f
15).' The question of containment and control of
recombmant DNA research rests on: (a) diverse
philosophical opinions as to biohazard, bioengmeermg,
and evolutionary manipulation; (b) cost-benefit analy-
sis considerations; (c) governmental versus voluntary
regulation of the growth of scientific knowledge; and
(d) the potential for misuse of recombmant DNA
technology (refs. 16, 17). Although there is growing
consensus among scientists and governmental agencies
to lower the containment required for this research
(ref. 18), there are many facets of DNA research that
may continue to require a high level of containment
(such as the use of highly pathogenic microbial DNA
in recombmant studies).
Thus, if and when a need arises in the future to
perform research on hazardous systems, the feasibility
of using the quarantine facility to provide maximum
containment of, and thus maximum protection from,
such activities should be considered. The design of the
facility is ideal for any study that requires a high level
of protection. Because the facility is equipped with
standard microbiological instruments, it will require
only minimal modification to carry out recombinant
DNA studies (see table 8-1).
Materials Processing
Patten (ref. 19) suggests that fluid-flow phenomena
in high-melting-point materials offers an interesting
array of materials processing possibilities; research on
topics such as homogeneous and heterogeneous nu-
cleation of materials and material growth patterns in
zero g should be done using the environment of space.
The planned studies in material sciences and space
processing in early Spacelab missions will undoubtedly
suggest future possibilities and benefits of space
industrialization (ref. 20). Furthermore, early results
from the experiments planned for the Long Duration
Exposure Facility (refs. 21 through 23) should also
provide information suggesting additional physical
sciences experiments that need to be performed in a
manned space laboratory. Thus, long-term research on
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the management and processing of materials in space
could be performed in a module attached to an
existing orbiting station, such as the OQF.
High-value products of matenak processing in
space are likely to appear in the fields of health,
electronics, electro-optics, and optics (ref. 24). In the
weightless environment, crystals can be grown without
impurities and without the structural defects and
nonuniformities that gravity induces. The contain-
erless processing made possible by zero g permits the
formation of ultrapure, nonnucleated glasses and
ceramics for optical and electronics applications.
Improved mixing and the absence of gravitational
flows will provide an opportunity for manufacturing
alloys that cannot be formed on Earth, and for
processing or casting many other metallic materials of
superior strength and punty (for example, supercon-
ductors, magnetic materials, and titanium turbine
blades). Advances in the reprocessing of organic
wastes in space, especially through the use of closed
biological systems, will extend the capability of man
for long-term occupancy of space environments.
Regardless of the final functions to be performed in
a long-term manned space station, the mission can be
performed in a module that will be designed specifi-
cally for materials manufacturing, physical sciences
experiments, or Me sciences research, yet will derive
its power, communications, logistics, and life support
from the core system that previously functioned as the
OQF.
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing discussion suggests that there are
many scientifically important and interesting questions
that can be answered by experiments and studies in a
space laboratory that is available for a duration longer
than 30 days. The OQF can remain as an Earth-
orbiting space station, serving as the core-system to
support additional modules dedicated for materials
processing, physical sciences research, and technologi-
cal development in space sciences. The availability of
a crew support module in the system offers a vastly
expanded range of possibilities for space sciences
development, and its capacity for extended missions
enhances its value as a research facility.
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Units and Conversion Factors
A angstrom A unit of length used for measurement of objects seen under the electron microscope
= 10-'°m
atm standard A unit of pressure based on a standardized sea-level terrestrial atmospheric pressure
atmosphere
= 14.7 psi
= 1.0132 bars
= 760 torr
0
 C degrees Celsius A temperature scale in which the range of temperature between the freezing point and
or centigrade the boiling point of water is divided into 1 00 degrees
= 5/9(°F-32)
cfm cubic feet per The rate of flow of a liquid or gas
minute
g gram Metric unit of weight
g "gee" The force exerted by gravity on a body at rest at the mean surface of the Earth; used to
indicate the inertia! force to which a body is subjected when accelerated
= 980.665 cm/s2
= 32.174ft/s2
1 liter Metric unit of capacity
= 1 .057 quarts (liquid)
Ib pound U.S. unit of weight and mass
= 0 453 kg
m meter Metric unit of measure
= 3.281 ft
= 39.37 in
mi mile U.S. unit of length
= 1.609km
psi pound per A unit of pressure or load on a surface; often used to denote the pressure of a gas
square inch
rpm revolutions per Measure of speed of spin
minute
s seconds Unit of time
SCC standard cubic Metric unit of gaseous volume
centimeters
= 1 cc at standard temperature and pressure
torr torr A unit of pressure
= 1/760 atm
w watt A unit of power
= 1.301 X10-3 horsepower
X times An expression of the resolving power of a magnifying instrument
(magnification)
Metric Prefixes
k kilo- lOOOx
c centi- 1
m milli- 1
/it micro-
n nano- 10-9x
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Acronyms
ASEE American Society for Engineering Education
CDC Center for Disease Control
CORE Common operational research equipment
CRT Cathode ray tube
DDT&E Design, development, testing, and engineering
ECLS Environmental control life support
ESA European Space Agency
EVA Extravehicular activity
GC/MS Gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer
GERT Graphical Evaluation and Review Technique
GMK Green monkey kidney
HEK Human embryonic ladney
HEPA High efficiency particle accumulator
ICBC Interagency Committee on Back Contamination
IUS Inertial upper stage
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JSC Johnson Space Center
LRL Lunar Receiving Laboratory
MOSC Manned orbital systems concept
MSR Mars sample return
MSRC Mars sample return canister
MSRV Mars sample return vehicle
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
OMS Orbital maneuvering subsystem
OQF Orbiting Quarantine Facility
PP Planetary protection
RMS Remote manipulator system
SEM Scanning electron microscope
STS Space Transportation System
TELLE Remote-teleoperated-mampulator
UV Ultraviolet
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